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ABSTRACT
One of the most intense debates in contemporary America involves conflicts between religious
liberty and other key values like civil rights. To shed light on such problems, courts and scholars
often look to the historical background of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. But
that inquiry turns out to be no less controversial. In recent years, a growing number of scholars
have challenged the traditional account that focuses on the roles of Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison in the movement to protect religious liberty in late eighteenth-century America. These
scholars emphasize that most of the political energy behind the movement came from Evangelical
Christians. On this revisionist account, we should not understand the Free Exercise Clause and
corresponding state provisions in terms of the Enlightenment views of Jefferson and Madison,
which these scholars characterize as secular, rationalist, and skeptical—if not hostile—toward
religion. Instead, those protections were adopted for essentially religious reasons: to protect the
liberty of individuals to respond to God’s will and to allow the church to carry out its mission to
spread the Gospel.
This Article offers a different understanding of the intellectual foundations of the Free Exercise
Clause. The most basic view that supported religious liberty was neither secular rationalism nor
Christian Evangelicalism but what contemporaries called natural religion. This view held that
human beings were capable of using reason to discern the basic principles of religion, including
the duties they owed to God and one another. Because religion was founded on reason,
individuals had an inalienable natural right to develop their own beliefs and to worship in accord
with them. At the same time, that right was limited by the law of nature and reason, which
required people to respect the rights of others. In this way, the concept of natural religion
established both the foundations and the limits of religious liberty. This view enabled people
with different religious and philosophical perspectives to find common ground. It provided the
basis for a political coalition between Evangelicals, rationalist Christians, and Enlightenment
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liberals that secured the adoption of state and federal constitutional guarantees for religious
freedom.
The Article begins by demonstrating that natural religion and its associated ideas of natural law
and natural rights were central to the intellectual world of eighteenth-century Americans. Those
ideas played a vital part in many areas of thought, including political and moral philosophy,
natural jurisprudence, English law, Christian and Deist theology, and even Newtonian natural
science—intellectual strands that came together in the Radical Whig ideology that animated the
American Revolution. Next, I explain how those ideas can enhance our understanding of the
religious-liberty provisions of the first state declarations of rights; the political controversy that
culminated in the passage of Jefferson’s Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom in Virginia; and
the debates surrounding the adoption of the Federal Constitution and the Free Exercise Clause
itself. Finally, I explore the founders’ views on the problem of religious exemptions from civil
laws, and discuss the implications of this history for our current debates over civil rights and
religious liberty—a subject that the Supreme Court recently grappled with in Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, and that is before the Court again this
Term in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia .
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Religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of
discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or
violence; and, therefore, all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of
religion, according to the dictates of conscience; and . . . it is the mutual duty
of all to practise Christian forbearance, love, and charity, towards each other.
– VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF 1776, ART. 161
INTRODUCTION
In contemporary America, no subject is more controversial than religious
liberty and its relationship to other important values such as civil rights. This
subject lies at the heart of recent cases such as Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v.
Colorado Civil Rights Commission,2 in which the Supreme Court considered
whether the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment 3 should be
interpreted to exempt businesses that have religious objections to same-sex

1

2
3

VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, Bill of Rights,
document 2, at 3 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987), http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/bill_of_rightss2.html [https://perma.cc/44P8-J77U]
[hereinafter VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS].
138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723 (2018).
The First Amendment’s Religion Clauses declare that “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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marriage from state civil rights laws that prohibit discrimination based on
sexual orientation.
To shed light on the meaning of religious liberty and its place in our
constitutional order, courts and scholars often seek to determine how that right
was understood at the time of the founding. But this too turns out to be
controversial. Although freedom of religion stands at the head of the Bill of
Rights, discussions of that right during the ratification of the Constitution and
the drafting of the First Amendment are sparse.4 For this reason, it is common
to look to the earlier historical background. In particular, courts and scholars
traditionally have focused on one of the most important debates over church
and state in Revolutionary America: the dispute that took place during the
mid-1780s over Patrick Henry’s proposal to institute a tax for the support of
Christian teaching and worship in Virginia. The opposition to this bill was led
by James Madison, whose Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments presented a forceful and wide-ranging defense of religious liberty.
After defeating this bill, Madison and his allies secured the passage of Thomas
Jefferson’s Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom. The traditional account
holds that this bill, like Madison’s Memorial, was based on the Enlightenment
view that individuals had a natural right to use their reason to pursue truth in
the religious realm and that this realm lay beyond the legitimate scope of state
authority, which was confined to such secular concerns as the protection of
life, liberty, and property. A few years later, the same view led Madison to
champion the adoption of the Free Exercise Clause as an essential part of the
Bill of Rights. On this traditional account, the Clause should be understood
to reflect the outlook of Madison and Jefferson. 5 In recent decades, an
increasing number of scholars have challenged this understanding of the Free
Exercise Clause.6 Although they agree that we can gain crucial insight from
the debate in Virginia, they interpret that debate very differently. These
4
5

6

For an exploration of these debates, see infra Part V.B.
For classic examples of this account, see Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1947);
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 163–64 (1878).
See, e.g., THOMAS E. BUCKLEY, CHURCH AND STATE IN REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA, 1776-1787
(1977) [hereinafter BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA]; JOHN A. RAGOSTA, WELLSPRING OF LIBERTY: HOW
VIRGINIA’S RELIGIOUS DISSENTERS HELPED WIN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND SECURED
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 4–7 (2010); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical
Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1437–43 (1990).
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scholars observe that most of the political energy for the defeat of the
Assessment Bill and the passage of Jefferson’s statute came from Evangelical
Christians who were motivated by religious principles. Evangelicals held that
the exercise of state power in this area corrupted religion, usurped God’s
sovereign authority, interfered with the relationship between God and
individual believers, and impeded the church’s ability to spread the Gospel.7
On this revisionist account, the founding-era protections for religion should
not be understood in terms of the Enlightenment principles of Jefferson and
others, which these scholars characterize as secular, rationalist, and skeptical—
if not hostile—toward religion.8 Instead, those protections were adopted for
essentially “religious reasons”: to protect the freedom of individuals “to
respond to God’s will” and to enable the church to “fulfill its mission
uncontaminated by civil government.”9
Other scholars emphasize that the protections for religious liberty reflected
both Enlightenment and Evangelical ideals.10 Yet it is not always clear how the
two different perspectives were related to each other.
In this Article, I propose a different way of understanding the intellectual
foundations of the Free Exercise Clause and its state counterparts. The most
basic view that supported religious liberty was neither secular rationalism nor
Christian Evangelicalism, but what contemporaries called natural religion. As
I shall show, natural religion—together with the associated ideas of natural law
and natural rights—played a vital role in many areas of eighteenth-century
thought, from political theory and jurisprudence to theology and science.
The concept of natural religion was based on a particular understanding of
human beings and their relationship with God. According to this view,
humans are inherently rational beings. Reason enables them to recognize that

7
8
9

10

See, e.g., BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 178–81.
See, e.g., id. at 4, 179–81; McConnell, supra note 6, at 1416, 1449–52.
BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 3, 176, 180–81. For another insightful work that challenges
the traditional account and argues that the origins of the Religion Clauses are better understood in
terms of Christian principles, see STEVEN D. SMITH, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF AMERICAN
RELIGIOUS F REEDOM (2014).
See, e.g., MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1965); SIDNEY E. MEAD, THE LIVELY
EXPERIMENT: THE SHAPING OF CHRISTIANITY IN AMERICA (1963); NICHOLAS P. MILLER, THE
RELIGIOUS ROOTS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT: DISSENTING PROTESTANTS AND THE
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2012); JOHN WITTE, JR. & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION
AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT ch. 2 (4th ed. 2016).
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they were created by a supreme being and that they should love, worship, and
obey him. In addition to these duties to God, natural religion embraces the
duties that one owes to oneself and to others. Taken together, these three
kinds of duties constitute the law of nature.
The law of nature requires individuals to respect the inherent rights of
other people—rights that arise from their own nature as rational creatures.
Among the most important of those rights is religious liberty. Because reason
is central to religion, individuals must be free to pursue spiritual truth and to
worship in accord with their own consciences and understandings. As
intelligent beings with the capacity for self-determination, they also are entitled
to direct their own actions and to dispose of their persons and properties as
they see fit. This is the basis of the natural rights to life, liberty, and property.
Because these rights would be insecure in a state of nature, individuals would
enter into civil society and establish a government with the force necessary to
protect them. But force has no place in the realm of religion, which must be
determined solely by reason and conscience. It follows that religious liberty is
an inalienable right that is limited only by the inherent duty to respect the rights
of other individuals and the community. In this way, the interlocking concepts
of natural religion, natural law, and natural rights provided a powerful rationale
for protecting freedom of conscience.
During the eighteenth century, the idea of natural religion took two
different forms.11 The first was Deism. In its pure form, this view held that
religion should be based on reason alone and therefore rejected all forms of
religion that were based on a belief in divine revelation, including traditional
Christianity. This version of natural religion, which was advocated by radicals
like Thomas Paine, sparked intense discussion around the end of the
eighteenth century, but it had a limited following in America before that time.12
Instead, the most common form of natural religion held that there was no
necessary conflict between reason and revelation. This view maintained that
the basic principles of religion and morality were founded in reason, but left
open the possibility that God had chosen to reinforce those principles and
disclose additional truths through revelation. This view had the potential to

11

See William Warren Sweet, Natural Religion and Religious Liberty in America, 25 J. RELIGION 45,

12

51 (1945).
See E. BROOKS HOLIFIELD, THEOLOGY IN AMERICA: CHRISTIAN THOUGHT FROM THE AGE OF
THE PURITANS TO THE CIVIL WAR 6–7, 159–72 (2003).
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establish common ground among people who held a wide variety of religious
perspectives.
It was this form of natural religion that formed the basis for Jefferson’s Bill
for Establishing Religious Freedom. Although his private views were Deistic,
his bill used the language of reason and natural rights in a way that appealed
not only to Deists but also to many Christians. The same was true of
Madison’s Memorial. Nor were Jefferson and Madison the only ones who
used such language: the ideas of natural rights and reason also appeared in
several of the leading Evangelical petitions against Henry’s Assessment Bill.13
In the end, that bill was rejected, and Jefferson’s Bill adopted, by a political
coalition of Evangelicals, rationalist Episcopalians, and Enlightenment liberals
that was led by Madison.
In this way, the ideas of natural religion and natural rights were central to
the struggle for religious liberty in Virginia. This is not to diminish the
importance of Evangelical ideas, which also played a vital role. But to the
extent that there was a consensus among the different groups that fought for
religious freedom in that state, it was to be found in their support for
Jefferson’s Bill, with its affirmation that “the natural rights of mankind”
included the inalienable freedom to use one’s own mind to form and express
religious opinions and to worship in accord with them.14 There is good reason
to believe that the Free Exercise Clause was understood to reflect the same
view—a view that was rooted in the concept of natural religion.15
13

14

15

See infra text accompanying notes 458–64 (discussing Presbyterian petition of August 13, 1785); infra
text accompanying notes 522–24 (discussing Westmoreland County petition of November 2, 1784);
infra note 531 (discussing General Baptist Association petition of August 13, 1785).
Virginia, Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note
1,
Amendment
I
(Religion),
document
44, http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendI_religions44.html [https://perma.cc/7D6E-4N38]
[hereinafter Virginia Act].
In the legal literature, most discussions of rational religion during the founding period focus on
Deism. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free
Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 357, 377 (1989-90) (asserting that “the governing
intellectual climate of the late eighteenth century was that of deism, or natural law”); Noah Feldman,
The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause , 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346, 391–93 (2002). Among
the few law review articles to discuss “natural religion” in the broader sense is Steven D. Smith, The
Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse , 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 158–62,
193–96 (1991). Other thoughtful explorations of rational religion during this period include
Kathleen A. Brady, Fostering Harmony Among the Justices: How Contemporary Debates in
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This Article proceeds in six Parts. The first two demonstrate that natural
religion and its related ideas of natural law and natural rights held a central
place in the intellectual world of eighteenth-century Americans and were
integrally connected with their understanding of religious liberty. Part I
highlights the role that these ideas played in the works of John Locke, the
philosopher who had the deepest impact on America. Part II shows that these
ideas also were essential to many other forms of thought during this period,
including leading treatises on the law of nature and nations; the English
jurisprudence of Blackstone and Mansfield; the moral philosophies of British
rationalism and the Scottish Enlightenment; Deist and Christian theology; and
even Newtonian natural science. All these strands of thought came together
in the Radical Whig ideology that shaped the political consciousness of
colonial Americans. Part III shows how natural religion and its cognate ideas
provided the justification for the American Revolution and were enshrined in
the first state constitutions and declarations of rights. Part IV explains the vital
part that these ideas played in the struggle over religious liberty in mid-1780s
Virginia. Part V discusses the light they can shed on the founding-era debates
over the protections for religious freedom in the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights.
Finally, in Part VI, I explore what this history can tell us about the problem
of religious exemptions from civil laws. Contrary to the position taken by
revisionist scholars, there is no persuasive evidence that eighteenth-century
Americans espoused a general principle that individuals were entitled to

Theology Can Help to Reconcile the Divisions on the Court Regarding Religious Expression by the
State, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 433, 440–477 (1999), and Laura Underkuffler-Freund, The
Separation of the Religious and the Secular: A Foundational Challenge to First Amendment Theory,
36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 837, 874–960 (1995). For valuable discussions of eighteenth-century
natural religion by historians, political scientists, and philosophers, see PETER BYRNE, NATURAL
RELIGION AND THE NATURE OF RELIGION: THE LEGACY OF DEISM chs. 1–5 (Routledge 2013)
(1989); MICHAEL J. LEE, THE EROSION OF BIBLICAL CERTAINTY: BATTLES OVER AUTHORITY
AND INTERPRETATION IN AMERICA chs. 1–3 (2013); HENRY F. MAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN
AMERICA (1976); MILLER, supra note 10; CLAUDE M. NEWLIN, PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION IN
COLONIAL AMERICA ch. 7 (1962; PROTESTANTISM AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING (Thomas S.
Engeman & Michael P. Zuckert eds., 2004); MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT, THE NATURAL RIGHTS
REPUBLIC: STUDIES IN THE FOUNDATION OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION (1997); B.
A. Gerrish, Natural and Revealed Religion, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF EIGHTEENTHCENTURY PHILOSOPHY 641, 648–60 (Knud Haakonssen ed., 2000); Sweet, supra note 11.
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exemptions from laws that regulated conduct in a way that conflicted with their
religious beliefs. As a non-originalist, I do not believe that this history
necessarily should be controlling. It is an open question whether the Supreme
Court should overrule Employment Division v. Smith16 and subject such laws
to some form of heightened review. The Court is currently considering this
question in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia,17 a free exercise challenge to a city’s
decision to terminate its foster-care contract with a Catholic social service
agency which refused on religious grounds to vet same-sex couples to serve as
foster parents. However, if the Court decides to adopt heightened scrutiny for
general laws that burden religious exercise, it ought not to employ this
approach to curtail the application of civil rights laws, such as the ones involved
in Fulton and Masterpiece Cakeshop. Instead, as I shall show, one of the most
important lessons that emerges from the history is that the right to religious
liberty does not take precedence over the civil rights of other people.
I. JOHN LOCKE ON RELIGION, TOLERATION, AND THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE

A. Locke on Natural Religion
1. The Concept of Natural Religion
Locke’s religious, moral, and political theory is founded on the notion that
human beings are rational creatures.18 Because they are endowed with reason,
individuals are free, self-determining beings who are capable of directing their
own thoughts and actions and pursuing their own happiness or good.19 To
know what that good is, they must pursue knowledge about themselves and
the world.

16
17
18

19

494 U.S. 872 (1990).
922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 1104 (Feb. 24, 2020) (No. 19-123).
For a fuller exploration of Locke’s views on religion and toleration, see Steven J. Heyman, The Light

of Nature: John Locke, Natural Rights, and the Origins of American Religious
Liberty, 101 MARQUETTE L. REV. 705 (2018) [hereinafter Heyman, Light of Nature].
See JOHN LOCKE, A N ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN U NDERSTANDING bk. II, ch. XXI, §§ 1–73, at
233–87 (Peter H. Nidditch ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1975) (1689) [hereinafter LOCKE, HUMAN
UNDERSTANDING].
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Locke explores the foundations of that knowledge in An Essay Concerning
Human Understanding, one of the landmark philosophical works of the
Enlightenment. According to Locke, most of our knowledge is quite limited
because it is derived from sense experience.20 But there are two key exceptions
to this generalization. First, following Descartes, Locke holds that we have
intuitive knowledge of our own existence.21 And second, he maintains that we
are capable of knowing some truths through deductive reason.22 The most
important of these truths concern our relationship with God. They form the
basis of “Natural Religion,” or religion insofar as it can be known through
reason.23
The first principle of natural religion is that God exists.24 In the Essay,
Locke presents two arguments for this proposition. First, in a version of the
traditional cosmological argument, he contends that all beings can be traced
to a first cause that must have existed from eternity, and that is the source of
all the qualities they have.25 Because we are aware of our own existence as
“knowing intelligent Being[s],” we can conclude that we ultimately must have
received our existence and intelligence from another being that is “ eternal,
most powerful, and most knowing.”26 This is what we “call GOD.”27 Second,
Locke offers a version of the traditional argument from design: that only an
intelligent being could have “produce[d] that order, harmony, and beauty
which is to be found in Nature.”28
A second truth of natural religion concerns the relationship between
people and God. Because humans are “Inferior [and] Finite” beings, who are
created by and dependent upon another being who is infinite, “omnipotent,
perfectly wise and good,” they have a duty “to honour, fear, and obey GOD.”29

20

See id. bk. IV, ch. IX, § 3, at 618–19; ch. XI, §§ 2–3, 9, at 630–32, 635–36; chs. XV–XVI, at 654–
68.

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

See id. ch. IX, § 3, at 618.
See id. ch. II, §§ 2–3, at 531–32.
Id. bk. III, ch. IX, § 23, at 490.
See id.
See id. bk. IV, ch. X, §§ 3–5, at 620.
Id. §§ 5–6, at 620–21.
Id. § 6, at 621.
Id. § 10, at 624.
Id. ch. XIII, § 3, at 651.
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Third, reason enables individuals to discern the moral rules that God has
established to govern their conduct. These rules, which Locke calls “the Law
of Nature and Reason,” are rooted in our nature as “rational Creatures.”30 In
the Essay, Locke suggests that by reflecting upon the nature of God and human
beings and the relationship between them, reason is capable of developing
morality into a demonstrative science that has the same logical rigor as
mathematics.31
Although Locke never attempted to fully work out the content of natural
law, his writings contain important indications of what it includes. Following
the Christian natural law tradition, he makes a three-fold division between the
duties that one owes to God, to oneself, and to others.32 The first category of
duties requires individuals not only to “obey” but also to “honour” and
“worship[]” God.33 The second category embraces an obligation to preserve
oneself and not to take one’s own life or to expose it to the arbitrary power of
others.34
Locke’s Second Treatise of Government contains an important discussion
of the law of nature as it applies to the third category—duties to others. As
rational, self-determining beings, individuals are naturally free “to order their
Actions, and dispose of their Possessions, and Persons as they see fit.”35 In
other words, they have natural rights to life, liberty, and property. This natural
state of freedom is also a state of equality, in which no one is inherently
superior or subordinate to anyone else. 36 Locke then uses these ideas to
establish the duties that individuals owe one another: the law of nature holds

30

31
32

33

34
35
36

JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT bk. II, §§ 96, 124, at 332, 351 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (student ed. 1988) (3d ed. 1698) [hereinafter LOCKE, GOVERNMENT].
See LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 19, bk. IV, ch. III, § 18, at 549.
See JOHN LOCKE, QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE LAW OF NATURE 167–69 (Robert Horwitz,
Jenny Strauss Clay, & Diskin Clay eds. & trans., Cornell Univ. Press 1990). As the editors explain,
this work was composed in Latin “no later than 1664” and was first published, with an English
translation, in 1954. Id. at 29–31.
LOCKE, HUMAN U NDERSTANDING, supra note 19, bk. I, ch. IV, § 7, at 87; bk. IV, ch. XIII, § 3, at
651.
See, e.g., LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 30, bk. II, §§ 6, 23–24, 135, at 270–71, 283–85, 357.
Id. § 4, at 269.

See id.
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that because everyone is “equal and independent, no one ought to harm
another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions.”37
For Locke, the three propositions we have just discussed—that God exists,
that people have a duty to worship and obey him, and that he has prescribed
a law for them to follow—make up the substance of “Natural Religion.” 38
Natural religion lies at the heart of all reasonable religion. In contrast to
ancient texts that may be difficult to interpret and that may generate sectarian
controversy, “the Precepts of Natural Religion are plain, and very intelligible
to all Mankind” by the “light of Reason.”39 This religion teaches that “the best
worship” of God lies not in elaborate “ceremonies and outward
performances,” but rather in “a good life” that is characterized by piety toward
God and virtue in relation to oneself and others. 40 Such a life is not only
pleasing to God but also promotes the wellbeing of the society and its
members. 41 Moreover, because the principles of natural religion can be
discerned by “the common light of nature,” they are matters that the adherents
of different religions can agree upon.42 For all these reasons, Locke maintains
that natural religion should have a central place in religious life.43

2. The Limits of Natural Religion and the Need for Revealed Religion
At the same time, Locke concedes that some matters are beyond the scope
of human reason and natural religion. With regard to worship, for example,
while reason teaches that one should approach God with “a pure heart,” there
is no way to know what “outward modes of worship” he desires other than

37

Id. § 6, at 271.

38

LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 19, bk. III, ch. IX, § 23, at 490.

39

Id.

40

JOHN LOCKE, A THIRD LETTER FOR TOLERATION ch. 1 (1692), reprinted in 5 THE WORKS OF
JOHN
LOCKE
139,
156–157
(London,
Rivington,
12th
ed.
1824),
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/locke-the-works-vol-5-four-letters-concerning-toleration
[https://perma.cc/Z3M6-DG5K] [hereinafter LOCKE, THIRD LETTER].
See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (William Popple trans., 2d ed.
1690), reprinted in A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION AND OTHER WRITINGS 1, 45 (Mark
Goldie ed., Liberty Fund 2010), http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/locke-a-letter-concerning-tolerationand-other-writings [https://perma.cc/DKR2-MQRX] [hereinafter LOCKE, TOLERATION].
LOCKE, THIRD LETTER, supra note 40, ch. 1, at 156.
See LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 19, bk. III, ch. IX, § 23, at 490.
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through divine revelation. 44 Likewise, because Locke holds that human
knowledge can come only from ideas derived from sensation and from
reflection upon those ideas, reason can tell people nothing about the spiritual
world (other than the existence and attributes of God), which again can be
known only through revelation.45
The most significant limitation on the scope of reason has to do with what
can be known about an afterlife, a subject that is crucial to Locke’s view of
religion and morality. Locke maintains that, as rational creatures, individuals
are impelled to pursue their own good.46 Although the interests of different
people do not inherently conflict with one another, there are situations in
which they do. In such cases, it may be rational for one person to pursue her
own good by inflicting harm on another. The law of nature is meant to restrain
such conduct. But laws are useless if they are not backed by sanctions.47 It is
evident that those who violate natural law are not always punished in this life.48
It follows that if that law is to be effective, it must be enforced in a future state
where individuals will be requited for their deeds in this world.49 In the Essay,
Locke offers some grounds to believe that such a future state exists, but he
does not contend that its existence actually can be demonstrated by reason. 50
This poses a serious problem for his whole account of morality and religion.
Difficulties like these lead Locke to conclude that human life must be
directed not only by natural religion, which is based on reason, but also by
revealed religion, which is based on faith.51 In the Essay, Locke defines faith
as assent to a proposition not because it has been “made out by the Deductions
of Reason,” but rather because one trusts in the veracity of God, who has
revealed that proposition to human beings.52

44
45
46
47

48
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52

LOCKE, THIRD LETTER, supra note 40, ch. 1, at 156–57.
See LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 19, bk. IV, ch. III, §§ 26–27, at 557–58.
See id. bk. II, ch. XXI, §§ 36–71, at 254–84; id. bk. IV, ch. XXI, §§ 1, 5, at 720–21.
See, e.g., id. bk. II, ch. XXVIII, §§ 5–6, at 351–52 (“It would be in vain for one intelligent Being, to
set a Rule to the Actions of another, if he had it not in his Power, to reward the compliance with, and
punish deviation from his Rule . . . .”).
See, e.g., id. bk. I, ch. III, § 12, at 74.
See, e.g., id. bk. II, ch. XXI, § 70, at 281.
See, e.g., id. at 281–82 (presenting a version of Pascal’s wager).
See Heyman, Light of Nature, supra note 18, at 740–47.
Id. bk. IV, ch. XVIII, § 2, at 689.
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When Locke speaks of revelation, he is thinking primarily of the Bible
and especially the New Testament. That revelation makes clear that there is
a future state in which human beings will be rewarded or punished under the
law of nature for their conduct on earth.53 In this way, revealed religion is able
to overcome the difficulty encountered by natural religion, which is incapable
of demonstrating the existence of a future state upon which morality ultimately
depends.

3. The Relationship Between Faith and Reason
For Locke, however, this does not mean that faith and revelation
supersede reason and natural religion. Instead, he insists that even with regard
to revelation, reason plays an essential role. To begin with, one must use
reason to decide whether something should be regarded as a divine revelation
in the first place.54 In the case of the New Testament, Locke maintains that its
authenticity is attested by the miracles that Jesus performed.55
According to Locke, we must also use our reason to assess the content of
a purported revelation. In this connection, he draws a key distinction between
propositions that are (1) “According to Reason,” (2) “Above Reason,” and (3)
“Contrary to Reason.”56 Although revelation can teach the first sort of truths
(such as the idea that God exists), it is not requisite for the knowledge of such
truths because they can be demonstrated by reason.57 Instead, the principal
function of revelation is to disclose truths that are “above Reason,” such as the
existence of a future state.58 This is the legitimate province “of Faith.”59
By contrast, Locke insists that revelation can never teach truths that are
“Contrary to Reason,” in the sense that they conflict with the clear knowledge
that we attain either directly or “by evident deductions of Reason”—a term that
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See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, THE REASONABLENESS

OF CHRISTIANITY AS DELIVERED IN THE
SCRIPTURES ch. XIV, at 154, 162–63 (John C. Higgins-Biddle ed., Clarendon Press 2000) (1695)
[hereinafter LOCKE, REASONABLENESS].
See LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 19, bk. IV, ch. XVIII, §§ 6, 8, 10, at 693–695.
See LOCKE, REASONABLENESS, supra note 53, ch. XIV, at 142–43, 146–47, 153.
See LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 19, bk. IV, ch. XVII, § 23, at 687.
See id. bk. IV, ch. XVIII, §§ 4–5, at 690–91.
Id. § 7, at 694.
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appears to include the law of nature.60 As rational beings, we cannot accept as
divine revelation anything that conflicts with reason, because we can never
have more confidence that it truly is a revelation than we have in our own
rational faculties, which are “the most excellent Part” of the nature that God
has bestowed upon us.61 By the same token, we must interpret the words of a
revelation so that it does not conflict with reason.62 Thus, even in determining
the authenticity and meaning of revelation, “Reason must be our
last Judge and Guide in every Thing.”63
On these grounds, Locke rejects what he takes to be the common view
that faith and reason are opposed to one another. Properly understood, faith
is “nothing else but an Assent founded on the highest Reason.”64 Rather than
undermining reason, faith “assist[s] and improve[s]” it by giving us “new
Discoveries of Truth, coming from [God, who is] the Eternal Fountain of all
Knowledge.”65 On this view faith and reason are complementary, as are the
forms of religion that arise from them. Natural religion lays the foundations
of religion by teaching human beings everything that can be known about God
and morality through reason. Revealed religion builds on these foundations
and completes the edifice that natural religion began.66

60
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Id. § 5, at 691–93.
Id. at 692–93.
See id.; id. § 8, at 694–695.
Id. ch. XIX, § 14, at 704.
Id. ch. XVI, § 14, at 668.
Id. ch. XVIII, § 10, at 695.
In contrast to the Essay, which sharply criticized those traditionalists who elevated faith above reason,
Locke’s Reasonableness of Christianity was directed against Deists who sought to base religion on
reason alone. See, e.g., LOCKE, REASONABLENESS, supra note 53, ch. I, at 5 & n.2. The work
therefore lays more stress than the Essay on the limits of natural reason and the need for revelation.
Although reason is sufficient to understand the part of natural law that is needed to govern external
interaction between individuals and to ensure the peace and prosperity of civil society (which is the
part of natural law that Locke focuses on in the Essay and the Two Treatises), reason has not led
people to comprehend the full range of that law, which also requires individuals to be inwardly
virtuous and to treat one another with charity and good will. See id. ch. IX, at 58; ch. XII, at 122–
23; ch. XIV, at 147–55. This leads Locke to make the paradoxical remark that “Natural Reason”
seems to be incapable of establishing “Natural Religion in its full extent.” Id. ch. XIV, at 148. Instead,
he maintains that our first full and clear knowledge of the moral law came from revelation. See id.
at 149, 155–57. When we consider the teachings of that law, however, we immediately recognize
that they are “agreeable” and “conformable” to reason. Id. at 149, 151, 153, 156, 159. The law
revealed in the Gospels is substantially the same as the law of nature and reason. See id. ch. II, at
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B. Locke on Religious Liberty and the Separation of Church and State
1. Religious Liberty
Let us now turn to the role that reason plays in Locke’s defense of religious
freedom. His most comprehensive discussion appears in A Letter
Concerning Toleration (1689).67 The Letter begins by advocating for religious
toleration in specifically Christian terms.68 True Christianity is concerned not
with “the Pomp of . . . Outward Worship” nor with disputes over doctrinal
purity but with “the regulating of Mens Lives according to the Rules of Vertue
and Piety.”69 Instead of seeking “Ecclesiastical Dominion” over other people
or forcing them to embrace a particular form of worship or belief, Christians
are called to show “Charity, Meekness, and Good-will in general towards all
Mankind; even to those that are not Christians.”70
For these reasons, Locke maintains that “Toleration [is] the chief
Characteristical Mark of the True Church.” 71 As he soon makes clear,
however, his goal is to show that toleration is required not only by “the Gospel

67

68
69
70
71

13–14; id. ch. III, at 19–21; id. ch. XIV, at 159. On this view, revelation does not supplant or
invalidate natural religion, but instead leads human beings to a clear and comprehensive knowledge
of it. Moreover, while the Reasonableness stresses the advantages of Christianity for salvation, see
id. ch. XIV, at 140–64, it also suggests that, at least in some circumstances, salvation can be attained
through natural religion alone, see id. ch. XIV, at 139–40; Heyman, Light of Nature, supra note 18,
at 767–69. In short, while the Essay and the Reasonableness engage with different opponents and
approach the relationship between faith and reason from different angles—the former from a
naturalistic standpoint and the latter from the perspective of Christian theology––the two works
converge on a view that affirms the essential harmony of natural and revealed religion.
The Letter was published in Latin in April 1689. See Mark Goldie, Notes on the Texts in LOCKE,
TOLERATION, supra note 41, at xxix. That fall saw the publication of an English translation by
Locke’s friend William Popple, which was made with the author’s knowledge but without his
involvement. See id. at xxix–xxx. In this Article, I quote from Popple’s translation, which is the one
that has been used in the English-speaking world from Locke’s day to our own. For a more recent
and literal translation, see JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING T OLERATION (Michael
Silverthorne trans. 2010) (1689), in LOCKE ON TOLERATION 3 (Richard Vernon ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 2010).
See LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 41, at 7–11.
Id. at 7–8.

Id.
Id. at 7. For some readings of Locke’s argument that emphasize its Christian dimension, see MILLER,
supra note 10, at 75–79; SMITH, supra note 9, at 39–40.
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of Jesus Christ” but also by “the genuine Reason of Mankind.” 72 In other
words, his argument is founded upon reason and natural religion as well as
upon revelation. As with the Two Treatises of Government, it is the fusion of
these two modes of discourse that gives Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration
the unique power it had for eighteenth-century British and American readers.
The Letter’s argument begins with the premise that human beings are
inherently free. The philosophical rationale for this premise may be found in
the Two Treatises and the Essay. In those works, Locke argues that our
freedom is grounded in our capacity for reason, which enables us to think for
ourselves, to direct our own actions, and to pursue well-being.73
In the Letter, Locke takes this conception of inherent human liberty for
granted. In addition, he distinguishes two sorts of well-being that humans are
concerned with: their temporal happiness and their happiness in the world to
come.74 To support their life in this world, individuals need to acquire external
goods through labor.75 But their possession of these goods is vulnerable to
fraud and violence by others.76 As in the Second Treatise, the solution lies in
the social contract. 77 To protect their properties as well as their lives and
liberties, individuals would agree to form a civil society and to entrust the rulers
with the force necessary to prevent individual wrongdoing and foreign
aggression.78 To secure this protection, individuals would agree to give up
some of their freedom of outward conduct and to follow the laws adopted by
the society.79
By contrast, Locke insists that when individuals enter the social contract,
they would not give up their liberty to form their own religious beliefs or to
worship God in the manner they believe is required to attain eternal happiness
and salvation.80 In the Letter, he offers four arguments for this proposition.

72
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LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 41, at 11.
See supra text accompanying notes 18–19, 35.
See LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 41, at 45–48.
See id. at 46.
See id. at 46–47.
For Locke’s account of the social contract in the Second Treatise, see LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra
note 30, bk. II, §§ 87–89, 95, 99.
See LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 41, at 46–47.
See id. at 33–35, 46–48.
See id. at 12–15, 45–46.
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First, he contends that religious liberty is inalienable in the sense that
individuals cannot relinquish it when they enter society:
[N]o man can so far abandon the care of his own Salvation, as blindly to leave
it to the choice of any other, whether Prince or Subject, to prescribe to him
what Faith or Worship he shall embrace. For no Man can, if he would,
conform his Faith to the Dictates, of another. All the Life and Power of true
Religion consists in the inward and full perswasion of the mind: And Faith is
not Faith without believing.81

As this passage indicates, Locke’s defense of religious liberty rests on the
same understanding of religion that we explored earlier—an understanding that
seeks to harmonize faith and reason. In maintaining that “Salvation” depends
upon “Faith,” he invokes a doctrine that is central to Christianity and especially
to Protestantism. At the same time, his assertion that “All the Life and Power
of true Religion consists in the inward and full perswasion of the mind” makes
clear that he sees religious belief as an exercise of our intellectual faculties.
The same is true of the other arguments that Locke advances for religious
liberty. His second contention is that “[t]he care of souls cannot belong to the
Civil Magistrate, because his Power consists only in outward force: But true
and saving Religion consists in the inward perswasion of the Mind; without
which nothing can be acceptable to God.”82 Outward force has no power to
convince “the Understanding.”83 To be sure, the magistrate has the same right
that everyone has to “draw [others] into the way of Truth” by means of
“Arguments.”84 But he may not use penalties for this purpose, for “[i]t is only
Light and Evidence that can work a change in Mens Opinions.” 85 In short,
religion should be a matter not of coercion but of “reason, and conviction.”86
Third, Locke argues that even if coercion were capable of changing
people’s minds, this would do nothing to promote the salvation of souls,
because rulers have no privileged access to religious truth. The interests of
true religion would only be harmed if subjects were compelled “to quit the
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Id. at 13.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 13–14.
Id. at 14.
JOHN LOCKE, A SECOND LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (1690), in 5 THE WORKS OF JOHN
LOCKE, supra note 40, at 59, 73.
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Light of their own Reason; to oppose the Dictates of their own Consciences;
and blindly to resign up themselves to the Will of their Governors” in such
matters.87 Finally, there is no call for individuals to give up their religious
liberty when they enter society because the beliefs and forms of worship they
embrace do not injure others or violate their rights.88 It follows that, in matters
of religion, “[e]very man . . . has the supreme and absolute Authority of
judging for himself.”89

2. Separation of Church and State
For all these reasons, Locke maintains that when individuals enter civil
society, they would fully retain their liberty of religious belief and worship and
would grant the society and government no power whatever in this area. This
brings us to another distinctive feature of Locke’s view—his argument for a
strict separation of church and state. On this view, the state is a community
that is concerned solely with its members’ temporal welfare, an interest that it
promotes by securing their “natural” and “civil rights” to life, liberty, and
property.90 The state has no power to either impose or forbid particular beliefs
or modes of worship.91 These matters lie purely within the province of the
“Religious Societies” or “Churches” that individuals voluntarily form to
promote their own salvation.92 Conversely, a church is properly concerned
only with spiritual matters and may not exercise temporal power over
individuals, regardless of whether they belong to its communion.93

3. The Limits of Religious Liberty and Toleration
As the previous section indicates, Locke understands religious liberty in
jurisdictional terms.94 Religious belief and practice are matters to be decided
solely by individuals and the religious societies they voluntarily form, and the
87
88
89
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LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 41, at 14–15.
See id. at 45–46.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 12, 23, 44–48, 58–60.
See id. at 32–33, 37, 44–45.
See id. at 15, 32–34, 37.
See id. at 18–23.
See id. at 11–12.
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state has no authority to meddle in such affairs. By the same token, however,
churches and believers cannot legitimately invoke religion as a basis for
depriving individuals of civil rights such as life, liberty, or property, for these
rights fall within the province and protection of the political community.95 This
limitation on the scope of religious conduct arises from the fundamental
division between religion and state that results from Locke’s theory of natural
law and the social contract.
This theory also imposes another important limitation on religious liberty.
Locke defends this liberty on the ground that religion involves a relationship
between individuals as rational creatures and God.96 The law of nature and
reason protects this relationship against interference by other individuals,
churches, or the state.97 But just as that law grants individuals a right to religious
liberty, it forbids them to use that liberty in a way that violates the natural rights
of others (for example, by performing rituals involving child sacrifice).98 In
these two ways—by separating the spheres of state and religion and by
grounding religion in reason—Locke uses the theory of natural religion to
establish the foundations and the limits of religious liberty.
Finally, Locke also employs that theory to argue that some religious beliefs
are not entitled to toleration at all. To begin with, this is true of religions whose
adherents claim the right to dominate or impose their own beliefs on other
people.99 Because beliefs of this sort deny the equal status and rights of others,
they are “contrary to human Society, or to those moral Rules which are
necessary to the preservation of Civil Society.” 100 Locke also would deny
toleration to atheists on the ground that they reject even the natural religion
which he regards as the foundation of morality, including the obligation to
keep the promises upon which the social contract is based.101 On the other
hand, he makes clear that religious liberty extends to everyone who recognizes
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See id. at 19–20.
See id. at 13–17, 26–29, 31–32, 45–46.
See id. at 19–32, 60.
See id. at 20, 37–38, 60.
See id. at 49–51.
Id. at 49–50; see also id. at 57 (stating that the fundamental principle of the Letter is “[t]hat every
Man [should] enjoy the same Rights that are granted to others ”).
See id. at 52–53.
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“the Being of a God,” including Jews, Muslims, and pagans 102 —a clear
indication that on his view religious freedom is not based simply on the liberty
that Christians enjoy under the Gospel,103 but also is founded on nature and
reason. In short, for Locke, “Liberty of Conscience is every mans natural
Right.”104

C. Conclusion
In the political, philosophical, and theological works we have explored,
Locke places reason at the heart of religion. According to Locke, reason
shows human beings that God exists, that they have a duty to worship and obey
him, and that he has given them the law of nature to guide their conduct. In
addition to establishing these principles of natural religion, reason points to
the need for faith and revelation, which reinforce and perfect those principles.
Reason also provides a justification for religious liberty. As rational beings,
individuals have both a right and a duty to use their minds to seek the truth
concerning God and what he requires them to believe and to do to attain
salvation. At the same time, reason defines the limits of religious liberty, which
cannot properly be invoked as a justification for denying the equal status and
rights of others.
II. NATURAL RELIGION IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY THOUGHT
Although Locke’s view of natural religion and freedom of conscience had
a deep impact on eighteenth-century Americans,105 his view was far from alone.
102
103
104
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Id. at 39–40, 52, 58–59.
See id. at 36.
Id. at 53, 60.
See, e.g., STEVEN M. DWORETZ, THE UNVARNISHED DOCTRINE: LOCKE, LIBERALISM, AND THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1990) (discussing Locke’s impact on eighteenth-century Puritan thought
in America); ZUCKERT, supra note 15 (same); A LAN P.F. SELL, JOHN LOCKE AND THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY DIVINES (1997) (exploring Locke’s influence in England and America).
For an important colonial-era work that draws on Locke to defend religious liberty, see ELISHA
WILLIAMS, THE ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF PROTESTANTS (Boston: S. Kneeland & T.
Green, 1744), reprinted in 1 POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA, 1730-1805,
at 51 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 1990), https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/sandoz-political-sermons-of-theamerican-founding-era-1730-1805-2-vols [hereinafter POLITICAL SERMONS]. Permanent citations
for volume 1 of this collection can be found at https://perma.cc/6MZ4-6J28, and for volume 2 at
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Those concepts were central features of the intellectual world they inhabited.
This Part surveys the role that those ideas played in a wide range of fields,
including natural jurisprudence, English law, moral philosophy, theology,
natural science, and the Whig ideology that informed the American
Revolution.

A. The Law of Nature and Nations
Although Locke employed the idea of natural law in a powerful way, he
did not offer a systematic account of its content. For that, eighteenth-century
Americans looked to writers on the law of nature and nations such as Hugo
Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf, Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui, and Emer de Vattel—
authors who were frequently invoked in the political discourse of this period.106
A leading exposition of natural law could be found in the works of
Pufendorf, which were an important source for Locke’s own thought on the
subject.107 Pufendorf’s magisterial treatise on The Law of Nature and Nations
appeared in 1672. 108 The following year, he published an abridgment for
students and the public which was soon translated into English as The Whole
Duty of Man, According to the Law of Nature.109
Pufendorf’s account of natural law will seem largely familiar to anyone who
has read Locke’s Two Treatises. Individuals are rational beings who are
naturally accountable to no one but God.110 The state of nature is a condition
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https://perma.cc/9FCF-8ULX. For discussions of Williams, see MILLER, supra note 10, at 94–101;
ZUCKERT, supra note 15, at 183–93.
See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 27
(enlarged ed. 1992).
See JOHN MARSHALL, JOHN LOCKE 201–04 (1994). (discussing Locke’s complex relationship with
Pufendorf’s thought).
SAMUEL PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS (photo reprt.) (London, J. Walthoe
et al. eds., Basil Kennett trans., 4th ed. 1729), https://hdl.handle.net/2027/osu.32437121669218
[hereinafter PUFENDORF, LAW OF NATURE].
SAMUEL PUFENDORF, THE WHOLE DUTY OF MAN, ACCORDING TO THE LAW OF NATURE (Ian
Hunter & David Saunders eds., Andrew Tooke trans. 1691, Liberty Fund 2003) (1673),
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/pufendorf-the-whole-duty-of-man-according-to-the-law-of-nature1673-2003 [https://perma.cc/U7S6-E2NY] [hereinafter PUFENDORF, DUTY]. For a more recent and
literal translation, see SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN ACCORDING TO
NATURAL LAW (James Tully ed., Michael Silverthorne trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1673).
See PUFENDORF, DUTY, supra note 109, bk. II, ch. I, § VIII, at 169–70.
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of natural liberty and equality, in which individuals are free to direct their own
actions within the law of nature and reason.111 Because they would be in danger
of violence in a state of nature, they would agree to form a civil society and to
establish government for mutual security.112
Like Locke, Pufendorf holds that the law of nature is established by God
and knowable by “the Light of Reason.”113 That law specifies the duties that
one owes to God, to oneself, and to others.114 The first category, or “[t]he Duty
of Man towards God, so far as can be discover’d by Natural Reason,” is what
Pufendorf calls “Natural Religion.” 115 The chapter that he devotes to this
subject in Whole Duty of Man is the fullest account that can be found in
contemporary works on the law of nature and nations.116
As Pufendorf explains, the duties of natural religion can be divided into
two parts. The “Theoretical” part obliges individuals to use reason to form
true ideas about God.117 These ideas are that God exists, that he created the
universe, that he “governs the whole World, and particularly Mankind,” and
that he is infinite in perfection.118
Pufendorf then turns to “[t]he Propositions of Practical Natural Religion,”
which concern the internal and external worship that human beings should
render to God. 119 Internal worship consists of regarding him with love,
reverence, and honor, while external worship involves public and private
prayer as well as doing one’s best to obey his commands.120
For Pufendorf, natural religion is an essential part of natural law theory not
only because it determines the inherent duties that people owe to God, but
also because religion is essential to social order.121 The fear of God is necessary
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See id. bk. II, chs. IV–V, at 187–98.
Id. bk. I, ch. III, §§ X–XI, at 56–58; PUFENDORF, LAW OF NATURE, supra note 108, bk. II, ch. III,
§ XIII, at 132–35.
PUFENDORF, DUTY, supra note 109, bk. I, ch. III, § XII, at 59–60.
Id. ch. IV, § 1, at 60.
See id. ch. IV, at 60–69.
Id. § I, at 60.
Id. §§ IV–V, at 62; cf. PUFENDORF, LAW OF NATURE, supra note 108, bk. II, ch. IV, § III, at 155.
PUFENDORF, DUTY, supra note 109, bk. I, ch. IV, § VI, at 64.
Id. §§ VI–VII, at 64–66.
See id. ch. III, § XIII, at 59.
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to restrain the unruly passions and conduct of individuals, which cannot
effectively be controlled merely by temporal punishments or a sense of moral
duty. 122 For this reason, religion is properly regarded as “the utmost and
firmest Bond of Human Society.”123
In a later work, Of the Nature and Qualification of Religion in Reference
to Civil Society (1687),124 Pufendorf brings his natural law theory to bear on
the problems of religious toleration and church-state relations.125 Like Locke,
he argues that, as “Rational Creatures,” human beings are inherently free to
worship God in accord with their “own Opinion[s]” as informed by reason or
revelation.126 Individuals would not surrender this freedom when they submit
to civil government, which is established not “for Religions sake” but for the
security “of their Liberty, Life, and Fortunes.”127
Despite what initially appears to be a strong defense of religious liberty and
church-state separation, Pufendorf contends that sovereigns possess
substantial authority with regard to religion. Because religion is essential to
social order, they not only should take care to promote natural religion among
their subjects, but they may also prohibit actions that subvert natural religion,
such as public idolatry, blasphemy, and denial of God’s existence.128
Pufendorf goes considerably further when discussing the authority of
sovereigns in modern European states. To maintain public peace and
tranquility, it is desirable that there be “but one Faith and Religion in a State,”
especially if it is the true religion of Christ as “contained in the Holy
Scripture.” 129 Accordingly, the sovereign has authority, with “the general
consent of his Subjects,” to establish a “Publick Form of Religion” within the
society; to require that it “be professed by all,” especially the clergy; and to
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See id. ch. IV, § IX, at 67–69.
Id. at 67.
SAMUEL PUFENDORF, OF THE NATURE AND QUALIFICATION OF RELIGION IN REFERENCE TO
CIVIL SOCIETY (Simone Zurbuchen ed., Jodocus Crull trans. 1698, Liberty Fund 2002),
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/pufendorf-of-the-nature-and-qualification-of-religion-in-reference-tocivil-society [https://perma.cc/ALF3-K58Q] [hereinafter PUFENDORF, RELIGION].
See Simone Zurbuchen, Introduction to id., at xi.
PUFENDORF, RELIGION, supra note 124, §§ 1–3, at 12–15.
Id. § 5, at 17.
See id. § 7, at 20.
Id. § 49, at 104, 106.
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command that its “Doctrine be Taught both in publick and private.” 130 When
doctrinal disputes arise, the sovereign may convene synods to resolve them.131
Individuals who insist on teaching “erroneous Doctrines” may be “silenced”
or—if all else fails—“banished.”132 The sovereign also has authority to ensure
that the church has adequate revenues, to erect and maintain church buildings
and schools, and to play a limited role in the selection of ministers.133
This account of Pufendorf’s views raises a puzzle. How is it possible to
reconcile his position that religious liberty is an inalienable aspect of natural
liberty, and that civil government is established for the sake of security rather
than religion, with his approval of the establishment of a public religion and
his view that the government is not necessarily bound to grant toleration to
religious dissenters? The answer appears to lie at least partly in his views on
natural and revealed religion and on the role of religion in society. In contrast
to Locke, Pufendorf seems to hold that natural religion has no effect whatever
in promoting the salvation of souls, which can come about only in the ways
offered by divine revelation.134 From the standpoint of natural law, the function
of natural religion—and religion in general—is to provide the “Bond” or
“Cement” of human society, by giving individuals the strongest possible
incentive to obey the laws and refrain from harming one another. 135 In a
society whose members are Christians, the only religion that is capable of
holding the society together is Christianity. 136 Thus, in such a society, the
government should promote not only the principles of natural religion but also
Christian beliefs and worship, by establishing them as the public religion of
the commonwealth.137 That does not mean that the government is justified in
imposing a religion on individuals by force, for that would conflict with their
130
131
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133
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Id. at 106–07.
See id. § 46, at 99–100.
Id. § 49, at 107.
See id. §§ 43, 45, at 95–96, 97–99.
See PUFENDORF, DUTY, supra note 109, bk. I, at 19–20; bk. I, ch. III, § XII, at 59–60; bk. I, ch. IV,
§ VIII, at 66; PUFENDORF, LAW OF NATURE, supra note 108, bk. II, ch. IV, § III, at 156; cf.
PUFENDORF, RELIGION, supra note 124, § 8, at 22 (asserting that salvation cannot be attained
through natural religion alone).
PUFENDORF, DUTY, supra note 109, bk. I, ch. IV, § VIII, at 67–69; PUFENDORF, RELIGION, supra
note 124, § 5, at 17–18.
See PUFENDORF, RELIGION, supra note 124, § 49, at 106.
Id. § 48, at 102–03; id. § 49, at 106–07.
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innate freedom as well as with the very nature of religion, which can be
apprehended only by reason and faith.138 Within limits, it may be appropriate
to tolerate those who differ from the public religion, especially when they are
willing to live quietly and peaceably in the society.139 But when religious dissent
threatens to undermine social peace and order, the government has the
authority to suppress it or, as a last resort, to expel the dissenters.140
In this way, Pufendorf seeks to reconcile the competing values of
individual liberty and social order in the area of religion. He does this by
recognizing a limited right to religious freedom while at the same time
defending the traditional institution of an established church, now reconceived
as an institution that promotes social order as much as one that advances true
religion and the salvation of souls. The tensions and contradictions that exist
within this view are obvious, for although Pufendorf insists that civil
government is not formed for the sake of religion, the powers that he grants
the government in this area may result in far-reaching limits on religious
liberty. In this respect, his position stands in striking contrast to that of Locke,
who takes the idea of a natural and inalienable right to religious liberty to its
logical conclusion by holding that the state has no power whatever in the
religious sphere.141
138
139
140
141

See id. §§ 1–3, at 12–15.
See id. §§ 49–50, at 105–08.
See supra text accompanying note 132.
See supra text accompanying notes 90–93. In their own treatises on the law of nature and nations,
Burlamaqui and Vattel follow Pufendorf in recognizing substantial authority in the sovereign over
religious teaching and worship, while at the same time affirming that subjects have an inviolable
natural right to liberty of conscience. See JEAN-JACQUES BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF
NATURAL AND POLITIC LAW vol. 2, pt. III, chs. II–III, at 404–15; pt. IV, ch. II, §§ XXXII–XXXVI,
at 460–62; ch. VIII, § XVI, at 515 (Petter Korkman ed., Thomas Nugent trans., Liberty Fund 2006)
(2d ed. 1763), https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/burlamaqui-the-principles-of-natural-and-politic-law
[https://perma.cc/G6HQ-Z3B5]; EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS bk. I, ch. XI, § 114, at
147–49, id. ch. XII, §§ 125–57, at 155–85 (Béla Kapossy & Richard Whatmore eds., Liberty Fund
2008) (1797), https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/vattel-the-law-of-nations-lf-ed [https://perma.cc/4T6BN6G9]. By contrast, in his notes on Pufendorf, the great commentator Jean Barbeyrac endorses
Locke’s views on religious toleration and the separation of church and state. See PUFENDORF, LAW
OF NATURE, supra note 108, bk. VII, ch. IV, § XI, n.2, at 665–66 (Barbeyrac’s note). The concept
of natural religion also was an important one for all these authors. See, e.g., BURLAMAQUI, vol. 1,
pt. II, ch. IV, §§ VII-VIII, at 148–50; VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, bk. I, ch. XII, § 127, at
157–58; Jean Barbeyrac, An Historical and Critical Account of the Science of Morality , in
PUFENDORF, LAW OF NATURE, supra note 108, § I, at 1–3; § VI, at 14–16; § 32, at 86–88.
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We can therefore view Locke and Pufendorf as representing two
competing models of religious liberty and its relationship to the state. Both
thinkers begin with the notion that human beings are rational creatures who
are inherently free to use their minds to pursue the truth about God. For
Locke, this religious liberty amounts to an inviolable natural right and the state
has no authority with regard to religion. By contrast, Pufendorf holds that the
state may limit this liberty for the sake of social order, which he believes is best
ensured through the traditional means of an established religion. The history
of religious freedom in the eighteenth century involves an ongoing conflict
between these two models. We now turn to some of the ways this debate
played out within the English legal tradition.

B. English Law and the Toleration Act of 1689
For founding-era Americans, one of the most authoritative articulations of
natural law could be found in Sir William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the
Laws of England. 142 In this work, Blackstone not only presents a
comprehensive account of English law, but also seeks to rationalize and
defend that law by showing that it is consonant with the law of nature. 143
Following the tradition that we are exploring, Blackstone explains that, as
rational creatures endowed with free will, human beings are necessarily subject
to the rules of justice that God has established for their conduct—rules that are
founded in “the nature of things,” that are discoverable by reason, and that are
intended to direct people toward their own “real happiness.” 144 In addition to
duties toward God, including worship and obedience, these rules prescribe
the duties that one owes to oneself and one’s neighbor.145 Taken as a whole,
these duties make up “what we call ethics, or natural law,” or “natural
religion.”146
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WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (Wilfrid Prest gen. ed.,
Oxford Univ. Press 2016) (1765-69) [hereinafter BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES].
See, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 142, introduction § 1, at 32–36 (arguing that
English law reflects the fundamental laws of nature). All page references herein are to the first edition
of the Commentaries.
Id. § 2, at 39–41.
Id. at 39, 45, 54.
Id. at 41, 55.
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This account of natural law provides the foundation not only for “natural

duties” but also for “natural rights.” Those rights consist of personal security,
147

personal liberty, and private property.148 After canvassing the ways that they
are recognized and protected by English law, Blackstone boasts that (as
Montesquieu put it) England “is the only nation in the world, where political
or civil liberty is the direct end of its constitution.”149
Yet in many ways Blackstone struggles to reconcile the principles of liberty
with the needs of social order and the content of English law. Nowhere is this
clearer than in his discussion of the criminal law regarding “Offences Against
God and Religion.”150 Blackstone voices the liberal sentiment that all religious
persecution is “highly unjustifiable upon every principle of natural reason, civil
liberty, or sound religion.”151 But he cautions that this position should not be
taken “into such extremes, as may endanger the national church,” for “there
is always a difference to be made between toleration and establishment.” 152
“[T]he preservation of christianity, as a national religion” is essential not only
because of “its own intrinsic truth,” but also because of its importance to “the
civil state.”153 For example, all confidence in oaths and other forms of veracity
would be undermined if people did not believe in “a future state of rewards
and punishments”—a belief that is “clearly revealed” and “forcibly inculcated”
by the teachings of Christ. 154 The government therefore is justified in
punishing “all affronts to christianity” or to the established church.155 Although
in the past some measures were excessively harsh,156 “[e]very thing is now as it
should be.” 157 In particular, Blackstone defends the existing laws against
apostasy, heresy, blasphemy, and reviling the worship or liturgy of the Church
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Id. at 54 (second emphasis added).
See id. bk. I, ch. 1, at 125.
Id. at 140–41 (citing 1 MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS pt. 2, bk. 11, ch. 5 (Thomas
Nugent trans., London, J. Nourse & P. Vaillant 1750)).
4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 142, ch. 4, at 41.
Id. at 51.
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Id. at 43.
Id. at 43–44.
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Id. at 49.
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of England.158 He also denounces “the protestant dissenters” whose “spirit”
and “doctrines” had led them to overthrow the church and the monarchy
during the Civil War.159 Concededly, the Restoration Parliament went too far
when it criminalized mere nonconformity to, or separation from, the
established church, however much such conduct might proceed from
“perverseness,” “weakness of intellect,” or “misguided piety.” 160 But the
legislature acted with “a spirit of true magnanimity” when it enacted the
Toleration Act of 1689, which suspended the penal laws with regard to many
Protestant dissenters, thereby leaving them “at full liberty to act as their
conscience shall direct them, in the matter of religious worship.”161 At the same
time, Blackstone praises the Corporation and Test Acts, which reserved all
civil offices to members of the national church162—a policy that he insists is
inherent in the very “idea of a national establishment.”163
Shortly after its appearance in 1769, Blackstone’s discussion drew a sharp
rebuke from a leading English nonconformist, Joseph Priestley, who objected
not only to his narrow view of religious liberty but also to the harsh language
he directed against Protestant dissenters.164 In response, Blackstone explained
that he had intended that language to refer not to contemporary dissenters but
to their ancestors, the Puritans who had overthrown the monarchy in the
1640s.165 Conceding that his language was ambiguous, he promised to revise it
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See id. at 43–51, 59.
Id. at 52.
See id. at 52–53.
Id. at 53. By contrast, Blackstone argues that Parliament historically was justified in enacting severe
penal laws against Catholics because of the threat they posed to the state. See id. at 54–57. But he
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57.
Corporation Act, 13 Car. II Stat. 2 c. 1 (1661); Test Act, 25 Car. II c. 2 (1672).
4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 142, ch. 4, at 52–53, 57–58.
JOSEPH PRIESTLEY, REMARKS ON SOME PARAGRAPHS IN THE FOURTH VOLUME OF DR.
BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND RELATING TO THE DISSENTERS
(1769), reprinted in A N INTERESTING APPENDIX TO SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE’S
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 5 (1773), https://ia600207.us.archive.org/31/items/i
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INTERESTING APPENDIX].
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, A REPLY TO DR. PRIESTLEY’S REMARKS ON THE FOURTH VOLUME OF
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in the next edition.166 He also stressed his commitment to religious liberty.167
At the same time, he insisted that nonconformity was still a crime under
English law and that this crime was only partly done away with by the
Toleration Act.168
The controversy continued the following year with the publication of a
work called Letters to the Honourable Mr. Justice Blackstone by the English
dissenting minister Philip Furneaux.169 As Furneaux read the Commentaries
and the reply to Priestley, Blackstone maintained that the Toleration Act did
not abolish the crime of nonconformity even with respect to Protestant
dissenters, but merely suspended the penalties that the law would have
imposed on them.170 In response, Furneaux contended that religious liberty
was among the most sacred and valuable “rights to which men are entitled by
nature,” and that the nation had recognized this when it adopted the
Toleration Act.171 On this view, the Act should be interpreted not merely to
suspend the penalties for nonconformity but to completely relieve that
conduct of its criminality.172
As support for this position, Furneaux pointed to a recent judicial decision
known as the Sheriff’s Case.173 For some years, electors in London had carried
on a scheme to raise money for a new city hall. They would elect to office a
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See id. at 40–41.
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Id., Letter IV, at 108–09.
See id., Letter I, at 10–25.
See id. at 17–22. This decision unfortunately does not appear in the English Reports. The fullest
account of the case, together with two of the leading opinions, may be found in the appendices that
Furneaux included in the second edition of his Letters. See id. at 223 (Furneaux’s explanation of the
background); id. at 235 (Justice Foster’s argument in Court of Judges Delegates (1762)); id. at 249
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person who was known to be a Protestant dissenter, and who therefore was
barred from holding municipal office by the Corporation Act.174 Under the
terms of a London by-law, the person was then subjected to a heavy fine for
refusing to undertake the office to which he had been elected. 175 The
dissenters eventually mounted a legal challenge to this practice.176 In 1767,
they prevailed when the House of Lords ruled in favor of a nonconformist
named Alan Evans who had been elected sheriff.177 In an eloquent opinion,
William Murray, Baron Mansfield, who was Lord Chief Justice of the Court
of King’s Bench, declared that nothing is “certainly more unreasonable, more
inconsistent with the rights of human nature, more contrary to the spirit and
precepts of the Christian Religion, more iniquitous and unjust, more impolitic,
than Persecution. It is against Natural Religion, Revealed Religion, and sound
Policy.” 178 This view, he contended, was embodied in the Toleration Act,
under which “the Dissenters way of worship . . . is not only exempted from
punishment, but rendered innocent and lawful; it is established: it is put under
the protection . . . of the law.”179 For these and other reasons, the city’s scheme
was unlawful.180
Furneaux’s critique of Blackstone also relied on another leading decision
called Omichund v. Barker.181 In that case an Indian merchant from Calcutta
sued an English official for financial fraud.182 The defendant responded that
because the plaintiff was Hindu, his testimony was inadmissible because he
was “incapable of swearing upon the Gospels.”183 The judges rejected this
contention. Invoking Pufendorf and almost “[a]ll other Writers in Divinity,
Morality, the Law of Nature or Nations, or any other Science relative to this
Subject,” Lord Chancellor Hardwicke explained that the practice of taking
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See id. at 223.
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Of the Sufficiency and Disability of a Witness (Omichund v. Barker) (1744) 22 Eng. Rep. 337; 2
Equity Cases Abridged 395.
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oaths was not peculiar to Christianity but “follows from the Principles of
Natural Religion.”184 All that was required was that the oath taker believe in “a
God, and that he will reward and punish Men for their Actions” if they swear
falsely.185 The judges concluded that individuals were entitled to give evidence
by swearing in the manner prescribed by their own religions.186 In his Letters,
Furneaux cites Omichund to support his argument that natural religion and
not revelation is the foundation of judicial oaths, and so there is no justification
for punishing individuals merely because their regard for oaths is based on
considerations other than Christian doctrine.187
In response to objections from writers like Priestley and Furneaux,
Blackstone made certain changes to the Commentaries.188 But while those
changes softened the tone of his discussion, they were unable to resolve the
deep contradictions that lay at the heart of his effort to reconcile principles of
religious liberty with the establishment of religion, at least as the latter was
embodied in the English law of his day.
In addition to criticizing Blackstone’s position, Priestley and Furneaux
published affirmative arguments for religious liberty. In An Essay on the First
Principles of Government, Priestley argued that “the best interests of
mankind” would be promoted by “unbounded liberty, in matters of
religion.”189 Furneaux’s Essay on Toleration made a Lockean case for religious
freedom based on “the nature of religion” as well as “the origin, and the ends,
of civil government.”190 As we shall see, Furneaux’s writings made a strong
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For a comprehensive account of these changes, see 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note
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impression on Jefferson and Madison and contributed in important ways to
their views on religious liberty.191

C. Moral Philosophy
During the eighteenth century, one strand of British philosophy
emphasized the role of reason in morality while another stressed the
importance of emotion. The concepts of natural law and natural religion held
an important place in both views.

1. Sentimentalism and the Scottish Enlightenment
As many scholars have shown, founding-era Americans were substantially
influenced by the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment.192 That is especially
true of Francis Hutcheson, a Presbyterian minister who held the chair of moral
philosophy at the University of Glasgow from 1729 to 1746.193 Hutcheson’s
views were developed in a series of works that culminated in A System of
Moral Philosophy.194
Hutcheson holds that the purpose of moral philosophy is to direct human
beings to the course of action that will “promote their greatest happiness and
perfection,” insofar as this can be discerned through observations “from the
constitution of nature” without the assistance of “supernatural revelation.”195
The resulting rules of conduct are “called the LAW OF NATURE.”196
In contrast to theorists like Locke and Pufendorf, however, Hutcheson
rejects the notion that morality is primarily based on reason.197 Instead, he
contends that just as human beings have an aesthetic sense that enables them
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to perceive the beauty of objects, they have a moral sense that enables them
to perceive the goodness of intentions and of the actions that follow from
them.198 This goodness consists in benevolence or the desire to promote “the
happiness of others.”199
On this view, morality is ultimately a matter of the heart rather than the
head.200 Yet reason does hold an important place in Hutcheson’s scheme.
Although the moral sense can recognize that goodness consists in universal
benevolence, reason is needed not only to “corroborate” our moral sense but
also to determine what actions will in fact promote the good. 201 The
conclusions that reason reaches on this subject constitute the laws of nature.202
Following the Christian tradition, Hutcheson maintains that the essence of
those laws consists in love toward God and neighbor.203 Two chapters of the
System are devoted to duties toward God. 204 After reciting the traditional
arguments for his existence, Hutcheson focuses on what reason can ascertain
about his moral character.205 By reflecting upon the order and harmony of the
visible world as well as upon their own nature and moral sentiments, human
beings can recognize that God is benevolent, that he created “rational
creatures” from “a desire to communicate [his own] perfection and happiness”
to them, that he “exercises an universal providence” over the world, and that
his laws are “good and just, adapted to the interest and perfection of the
whole.” 206 Indeed, Hutcheson goes so far as to contend that God’s
benevolence provides good reason to hope in eternal life, a future state in
which virtuous conduct will be rewarded.207 “Th[is] opinion,” he asserts, “is
natural to mankind, and what [God] designed they should entertain.”208
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On this view, God himself is “the source of the highest happiness to
[rational creatures], the noblest object of their contemplation and veneration,
of their love, esteem, hope, and secure confidence, and the best pattern for
their imitation.”209 This is “the foundation of all piety, and all joy in religion.” 210
Hutcheson then elaborates upon the natural duty to worship God both
internally—“in the sentiments and affections of the soul”—and externally—“in
the natural expression of these . . . sentiments and affections” though
instruction, praise, prayer, repentance, and so on.211
In these ways, reason confirms what Hutcheson regards as the natural
human disposition toward piety and devotion.212 “Notions of Deity and some
sort of worship have in fact as universally obtained among men, as living in
society, the use of speech, or even propagating their kind; and thus may be
counted as natural.”213
According to Hutcheson, natural religion is also more fundamental than
revealed religion. The “primary way by which God discovers his will
concerning our conduct” is not by Scripture but by “the constitution of nature,
and the powers of reason, and moral perception, which he has given to
mankind.”214 Revelation supplements reason, but God does not mean to treat
human beings as “children” by relieving them of the responsibility to discover
for themselves how they ought to live.215
Hutcheson’s account of natural religion provides the foundation not only
for a moral duty of religious worship but also for a right to religious freedom.
As he explains, it “must always be unjust” to compel people to profess religious
opinions or to perform religious actions contrary to their beliefs, “as no
interest of society can require it, and such profession and action must be sinful
to those who believe it to be so.”216 Nor is this “right of private judgment”
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Id. § XVI, at 207.
Id. § V, at 174.
Id. ch. X, §§ I–IV, at 210–18.
Id. ch. IV, § VII, at 63.
Id.
Id. bk. II, ch. 3, § VIII, at 268–69 (citing RICHARD CUMBERLAND, A Philosophical Inquiry into the
Nature of Law, in A TREATISE ON THE LAWS OF NATURE 247–362 (Jon Parkin ed., John Maxwell
trans., Liberty Fund 2005) (1672), https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/cumberland-a-treatise-of-the-lawsof-nature [https://perma.cc/364E-ZZNJ]).
2 id. bk. II, ch. 17, § VII, at 131–32.
1 id. bk. II, ch. 5, § 3, at 296.
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confined to the religious sphere. 217 Instead, Hutcheson holds that “every
intelligent being” has a right to form “his own opinions” on all subjects.218 This
right is an “unalienable” one which “cannot be subjected to the will of
another.”219
At the same time, Hutcheson observes that few people have both the time
and the inclination to “exercise this right of private judgment vigorously.” 220
Thus, to promote the good of society and to “prevent the influence of
dangerous enthusiasts or rogues,” it is both the interest and the duty of the
magistrate to appoint persons to provide moral and religious instruction to the
people.221 But while the government does have a limited role in promoting
religion, it must do so in a way that does not compel individuals to worship in
a particular manner and does not impose punishment for religious sentiments,
so long as “they are not hurtful to society” or used as a pretense for “invading
the rights or properties of others.”222
Hutcheson’s general approach to morality also can be found in later
Scottish philosophers such as Adam Smith, 223 Thomas Reid, 224 and Henry
Home, Lord Kames.225 Although they differed with one another in important
respects, they all maintained that morality was rooted in the senses or feelings,
and the idea of natural religion held an important place in their thought.
Smith’s views are particularly interesting. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments,
he argues that religion is natural to human beings, and he connects it with their
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Id. at 312.
Id. §§ I–II, at 312–15.
See infra text accompanying notes 226–27.
See, e.g., THOMAS REID, ESSAYS ON THE ACTIVE POWERS (1788), reprinted in I NQUIRY
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ESSAYS 297 (Ronald E. Beanblossom & Keith Lehrer eds., Hackett 1983); THOMAS REID, ON
PRACTICAL ETHICS: LECTURES AND PAPERS ON NATURAL RELIGION, SELF-GOVERNMENT,
NATURAL JURISPRUDENCE AND THE LAW OF NATIONS 112, 117–26, 145, 255–58 (Knud
Haakonssen ed., 1990).
See HENRY HOME, LORD KAMES, ESSAYS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY AND NATURAL
RELIGION (Mary Catherine Moran ed., Liberty Fund 2005) (3d ed. 1779),
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/kames-essays-on-the-principles-of-morality-and-natural-religion
[https://perma.cc/5D4P-MJ77]. For a discussion of the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers’ influence
on Jefferson, see WILLS, supra note 192, at 200–05.
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sense of justice and with belief in an afterlife.226 And in The Wealth of Nations,
he argues that the interests of individual liberty, social peace, and rational
religion all would be promoted by doing away with establishments that grant
monopolies to particular sects and by instead allowing many small sects to
compete with one another for adherents.227

2. Rationalism
Other British philosophers based morality on reason rather than
sensation. A good example is Richard Price, a liberal clergyman who was wellknown to Americans as a strong supporter of their Revolution.228
In A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals, Price maintains that
theorists like Hutcheson undermine the objectivity of morality when they base
it on the sensations that individuals experience when they perceive actions.229
Instead, Price holds that morality is founded on “self-evident principles” that
can be discerned through reason and intuition, such as the precepts that it is
right for intelligent beings to pursue happiness and wrong for them to violate
the rights of others or to inflict misery on innocent persons.230 “Reason is . . .
the natural and authoritative guide of a rational being,” and the morality that it
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See ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS pt. II, sec. ii, ch. 3, §§ 11–12, at 91; id.
pt. III, ch. 2, §§ 3–13, at 163–70 (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1976) (6th
ed. 1790).
See 2 ADAM SMITH, AN I NQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
bk. V, ch. I, pt. III, art. III, at 273–79 (Edwin Cannan ed., London, Methuen 1904),
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/smith-an-inquiry-into-the-nature-and-causes-of-the-wealth-of-nationscannan-ed-vol-2 [https://perma.cc/9JUR-7BXD].
See RICHARD PRICE, TWO TRACTS ON CIVIL LIBERTY, THE WAR WITH AMERICA, AND THE
DEBTS AND FINANCES OF THE KINGDOM (1778), in POLITICAL WRITINGS 14–19 (D.O. Thomas
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) [hereinafter PRICE, TWO TRACTS]; MAY, supra note 15, at 171.
For an exploration of Price’s moral philosophy, see J.B. SCHNEEWIND, THE INVENTION OF
AUTONOMY: A HISTORY OF MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 380–88 (1998). Some other leading
treatments of morality and natural religion from a rationalist perspective include those of Samuel
Clarke, see infra text accompanying notes 280–85, and William Wollaston, see WILLIAM
WOLLASTON, THE RELIGION OF NATURE DELINEATED (London, S. Palmer 1725),
https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=H68WAAAAQAAJ&rdid=bookH68WAAAAQAAJ&rdot=1 [https://perma.cc/3NT2-E5PR].
RICHARD PRICE, A REVIEW OF THE PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS IN MORALS ch. I, § 1, at 13–17 (D.D.
Raphael ed., London, Clarendon Press 1974) (3d ed. 1787).
See id. § 3, at 45, 53; ch. VII, at 157–64, 168.
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dictates is a “universal LAW” that governs not only humans but “[t]he whole
creation.”231 “It is the source and guide of all the actions of the Deity himself,
and on it his throne and government are founded.”232
As this discussion indicates, Price’s account of reason and morality is
closely connected to the idea of natural religion. God is the creator of the
world, the embodiment of moral perfection, and “the fountain of reason and
wisdom.” 233 Human beings depend on him for their existence and wellbeing.234 For these reasons, it is inherently proper for them to love, honor, and
worship him as well as to trust in “his all-directing providence.”235
In the book’s final chapter, Price returns to these themes and contends
that his account of morality can help to explain and prove “ some of the
principal Doctrines of Natural Religion.”236 From the ideas that morality and
the divine will are founded on reason, one can infer that the Deity is
benevolent, that he created the world to promote the happiness of his
creatures, and that he governs it in accord with justice.237 Because justice does
not always prevail in this world, it is reasonable to believe that there is a future
state in which individuals will be rewarded or punished for their conduct in
this life.238 Yet there are limits to what reason can tell us about an afterlife.239 It
is here that “the Christian revelation” is particularly valuable, for in addition
to “confirm[ing] to us whatever we can gather from reason on these subjects,”
it promises that the virtuous will enjoy a never-ending life of “complete
happiness.”240
Price’s account of natural religion and morality also provides a justification
for liberty of conscience. After doing our best to determine whether a course
of conduct is right or wrong, we have a duty to act according to “the sincere
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conviction of our minds.”241 To be sure, society is entitled to act in “necessary
self-defense, when the consciences of men lead them to hurt others, to take
away their liberty, or to subvert the publick.”242 In all other cases, however, it
is not only impious but
a contradiction to common sense . . . for any men to pretend to a power to
oblige their fellow men to worship God in any manner different from that
which is most agreeable to their consciences; that is, in any way but that in
which alone it is acceptable and right in them to do it.243

In his writings on the American Revolution, Price expands on this view,
describing “religious liberty” as one of “the unalienable rights of human
nature” 244 and firmly connecting it with the idea of “a rational and liberal
religion.”245

3. Uniting Reason and Sentiment
Although philosophers like Hutcheson and Price differed in their
methodology, the substance of their teachings on morality and natural religion
had much in common. This is an important theme in the lectures on moral
philosophy delivered later in the century by the Rev. John Witherspoon, the
president of the College of New Jersey (later Princeton), who was a leader in
revolutionary politics and a signer of the Declaration of Independence. 246
Although he agrees with Hutcheson that moral sense or conscience is an
essential “principle of our nature,” Witherspoon sees no occasion to reject
reason as an equally important principle.247 Instead, after reviewing these and
other approaches to morality, he concludes that “we ought to take the rule of
241
242
243
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Id. ch. VIII, at 179.
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PRICE, TWO TRACTS, supra note 228, at 33, 81. Once again, Price insists that this liberty does not
entitle one to “encroach on the equal liberty of others,” for it would be contradictory to hold “that
every one had a right to enjoy what every one had a right to destroy.” Id. at 81.
RICHARD PRICE, OBSERVATIONS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1785),
in POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 228, at 116, 133 [hereinafter PRICE, OBSERVATIONS].
JOHN WITHERSPOON, LECTURES ON MORAL PHILOSOPHY (photo reprt., n.d.) (Varnum
Lansing Collins ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1912) (1800), https://play.google.com/store/books/details
?id=M2gVAAAAYAAJ&rdid=book-M2gVAAAAYAAJ&rdot=1 [https://perma.cc/7K3P-YM3T].
On Witherspoon, see J. DAVID HOEVELER, CREATING THE AMERICAN MIND: INTELLECT AND
POLITICS IN COLONIAL COLLEGES 117–27 (2002); MILLER, supra note 10, at 135–41, 149–51.
WITHERSPOON, supra note 246, lect. III, at 17.
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duty from conscience enlightened by reason, experience, and every way by
which we can be supposed to learn the will of our Maker, and his intention in
creating us such as we are.”248
After reviewing the main proofs for the existence of God, Witherspoon
turns to the substance of natural religion.249 Our internal duties to God require
us to love, venerate, and trust him, while our external duties involve the natural
expression of these sentiments through worship and prayer.250 Witherspoon
maintains that “not only private, but public and social worship is a duty of
natural religion.”251 Moreover, he agrees with those who contend that “the
magistrate ought to make public provision for the worship of God, in such
manner as is agreeable to the great body of society.” 252 At the same time,
Witherspoon insists that “all who dissent from [this public worship must be]
fully tolerated,” for every individual has an “unalienable” “right to judge for
himself in all matters of religion,” as well as in “matters of opinion” more
broadly. 253 Like all other rights, however, religious liberty must not be
exercised in a way that violates the rights of others.254 These are the doctrines
of natural religion and moral philosophy in which James Madison was
instructed when he attended Witherspoon’s lectures as a Princeton
undergraduate in the early 1770s.255

D. Theology
Remarkably, the concept of natural religion played an essential role not
only in disciplines like natural jurisprudence, moral philosophy, and political
theory, which were founded on natural reason, but also in much of the
theology of the period.
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1. Deism
Of course, this is true of Deism, which may be defined (in Locke’s words)
as “pure Natural Religion” or religion based on natural reason. 256 In De
Veritate (1624), a work that is often regarded as the founding text of modern
Deism, the English aristocrat Edward, Lord Herbert of Cherbury, maintained
that all true religion is founded upon five basic truths that are accessible to
everyone through reason.257 These truths are that God exists, that he is to be
worshipped, that religion should focus on virtue and piety rather than on
doctrine or ceremony, that one can atone for misconduct through repentance
and amendment of life, and that there is a future state of rewards and
punishments.258 Herbert did not foreclose the possibility of special revelation
from God, but he insisted that individuals must think for themselves and use
reason to determine whether something is a revelation or not.259
Deism was an increasing topic of discussion in late seventeenth and early
eighteenth-century Britain. Some Deists claimed to remain within the
Christian tradition in an effort to reform it. 260 A prominent example was
Matthew Tindal, a fellow of All Souls College, Oxford. In Christianity as Old
as the Creation, Tindal maintained that the will of God was identical with the
“Law of Nature, or Reason; . . . which is common . . . to all rational
Creatures.”261 “[T]he Design of the Gospel” was not to alter this law but rather
to restore it by “free[ing] Men from that Load of Superstition which had been
mix’d with it” over the ages.262
Tindal’s emphasis on reason led him to strongly defend liberty of
conscience. Echoing Locke, he wrote that “no Man can any more discern the
objects of his own Understanding . . . by the Faculties of another, than he can
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see with another Man’s Eyes.”263 It follows that anyone “who demands a Man’s
Assent to any thing” without conveying reasons adequate to support it “erects
a Tyranny over his Understanding.”264
In this way, Tindal and other “Christian Deists” 265 sought to reform
Christianity by showing that it contained nothing that could not be known
through natural reason.266 Other Deists took a more critical stance toward
Christianity or at least toward the texts on which it claimed to be based.267
As E. Brooks Holifield has observed, Deism in eighteenth-century
America displayed a similar diversity. 268 Moderate Deists like Benjamin
Franklin and Thomas Jefferson rejected what they regarded as the dogmatism
of traditional Christianity and the abuses of clericalism, but supported a form
of natural religion and morality which they sometimes associated with Jesus.269
By contrast, the end of the eighteenth century saw the rise of more radical
thinkers such as Ethan Allen, Thomas Paine, and Elihu Palmer.270 This group
“was aggressive, populist, polemical, disdainful of a Bible riddled with
contradiction and immorality, eager to debunk the gospel stories, and hopeful
that a religion of nature would altogether replace an effete Christianity.”271
Although Deism attracted considerable attention in late eighteenth-century
America, it remained a distinctly minority viewpoint. Yet it was not the only
form of religious thought that embraced the concept of natural theology. That
concept had a long history in the Christian tradition,272 and it took on increasing
263
264
265
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importance during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The remainder
of this section discusses its role in the Anglicanism which prevailed in the
southern states and the Congregationalism which dominated New England.

2. Anglicanism
American Anglican thought was rooted in that of the mother country. In
the 1640s, that nation was torn apart by the religious and political struggles that
led to the Civil War. After the monarchy was restored in 1660, many Anglican
theologians reacted to these bitter conflicts by adopting a more latitudinarian
approach which sought to promote religious peace and unity and which
contended that the essence of religion lay in morality rather than in ritual or
doctrine.273
A major figure in this movement was the Rev. John Tillotson, who served
as Archbishop of Canterbury from 1691 until his death in 1694. In a sermon
entitled “Of the Great Duties of Natural Religion,” he asserted that religion is
much more concerned with “the real Virtues of a Good Life” than with
external devotion.274 The moral duties that God requires of human beings are
known not solely or even primarily through “External Revelation”; they are
also known by “a kind of natural instinct,” by “Natural Reason,” and by the
consensus of mankind.275 The duties enjoined by revelation are “the same in
Substance with the Law of Nature.”276 “[T]he Gospel teacheth us the very same
things which Nature dictated to Men before,” but it makes those duties more
“certain and plain” and offers more powerful motives as well as “a greater
Assistance to the performance of [them].”277
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development from the pre-Socratics through Plato and Aristotle to Stoicism and Neoplatonism).
See, e.g., MARTIN I.J. GRIFFIN, JR., LATITUDINARIANISM IN THE SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY
CHURCH OF ENGLAND (1992).
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http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A62632.0001.001 [https://perma.cc/5UUN-F2M4].
Id. at 16, 20–33.
Id. at 32–33.

Id.

January 2021]

ORIGINS OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE

45

In a companion sermon, Tillotson maintained that “Natural Religion is the
Foundation of all Instituted and Revealed Religion,” and that “the great Design
of the Christian Religion, was to restore and reinforce the practice of
the natural Law.” 278 Finally, he used this view of the centrality of natural
religion to argue that it can never be legitimate to persecute individuals “for
not understanding and believing” doctrines that come from revealed religion,
for “[n]o Zeal for any positive Institution in Religion, can justifie the Violation
of the natural Law,” which requires people to treat one another humanely.279
The leading Anglican spokesman for rational Christianity during the
eighteenth century was the Rev. Samuel Clarke. 280 In 1704 and 1705, he
delivered two sets of lectures in the series that had been endowed by the
eminent scientist Robert Boyle to promote natural religion.281 In the first set
Clarke sought to demonstrate the existence and attributes of God, while in the
second he argued for “The Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion and
the Truth and Certainty of the Christian Revelation.”282 Natural religion holds
“that there is one eternal, infinite, intelligent, all-powerful, and wise being, the
creator, preserver, and governor of all things”; that human beings are bound
to worship and obey him; that people have a duty to promote the happiness
and good of all through a “universal benevolence”; and that they will be subject
to “rewards and punishments” in “a future state” for their deeds in this life.283
For Clarke, these principles of natural religion and morality can be
discerned through reason and should govern every rational being, since they
278
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reflect the inherent and “eternal . . . relations that different things bear one to
another,” such as the relationship that human beings have to God and each
other.284 But because people are often blinded by carelessness, prejudice, false
ideas, bad customs, and unruly desires, God has undertaken to confirm and
supplement these principles of natural religion through the Christian
revelation.285
The rationalism represented by Clarke and Tillotson was one of two major
strands of Anglican thought in eighteenth-century America.286 It was promoted
by such figures as the Rev. William Smith, provost of the College of
Philadelphia (which later became the University of Pennsylvania); the Rev.
William White, first Episcopal Bishop of Pennsylvania and first Presiding
Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States; the Rev.
Samuel Provoost, first Episcopal Bishop of New York; and the Rev. James
Madison, who was cousin to the statesman, president of the (Anglican) College
of William and Mary, and first Episcopal Bishop of Virginia.287
A good statement of this rationalist position may be found in a pamphlet
published by the Rev. James Maury, a clergyman and professor at William
and Mary who “was the first real teacher” of the Rev. James Madison and
Thomas Jefferson. 288 According to Maury, God addresses humans as
“creatures endowed with reason” who are capable of distinguishing “between
good and evil, right and wrong, truth and falsehood.”289 “Reason and revelation
are alike the gifts of GOD,” and while unassisted reason “could never have
formed that perfect . . . rule of religious faith and practice, we are now happily
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blessed with; yet we contend the God of nature never designed revelation
entirely to supersede the use of, but only to be, as it were, supplemental to our
natural reason.”290 In line with these views, Maury condemned “that narrow
and uncharitable, that merciless and antichristian spirit, which presumes to
limit the divine favour only to some few,” and which would consign “all the
rest of mankind” to fiery persecution in this world and “eternal damnation” in
the next.291

3. New England Congregationalism
The Puritans who settled New England brought with them a strong form
of Calvinist theology. The most authoritative statement of their views appears
in the Westminster Confession of Faith,292 which was adopted by an assembly
of divines in England in 1646 and endorsed two years later by a convention of
clergy in Massachusetts Bay.293 In line with natural religion, the confession
opens by affirming that “the Light of Nature, and the works of Creation and
Providence . . . manifest the Goodness, Wisdom, and Power of God.”294 After
the Fall of Adam, however, human nature is so deeply “corrupted” that people
are imbued with original sin, naturally inclined to evil, and subject to “the wrath
of God.”295 Thus, mere natural religion is utterly incapable of bringing about
salvation, which can only come through grace and faith in Christ.296 Likewise,
290
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God exists, that he is good, and that he is to be worshipped and served). For a brief discussion of
the role of natural theology in John Calvin’s own thought, see Russell Re Manning, Protestant
Perspectives on Natural Theology, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 272, at 201–04.
WESTMINSTER CONFESSION, supra note 292, ch. VI, at 12–13.
See id. ch. X, at 21–22.
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knowledge of God must be sought through the revelation that he made in the
Holy Scriptures.297 In these ways, reason and natural theology did play a role
in New England Puritan theology, but a role that was firmly subordinate to that
of faith and revelation.298
By the middle of the eighteenth century, the old Calvinist consensus was
breaking down. Some theologians began to take a more rationalist approach
to religion. One of the best known figures was the Rev. Jonathan Mayhew, the
pastor of Boston’s West Church.299 In a series of sermons delivered in 1748,
Mayhew maintained that “the dignity of our nature” is founded upon our
intellectual capacities: “It is principally on account of our reason, that we are
said to have been created in the image of God.”300 Like Clarke, Mayhew holds
that morality consists of objective truths that arise from “the nature of God,
[and] our relation to him, and one another.” 301 Mayhew also follows the
Scottish Enlightenment philosophers in contending that humans have “a
moral sense” that leads them to feel pleasure from seeing good actions and
pain from bad ones.302 He concedes that “our rational faculties [are] limited,
[and so] there is room for our being instructed by revelation.” 303 But he
forcefully rejects the position that our minds are so darkened by the Fall that
we are incapable of discerning religious and moral truths.304
Because Mayhew regards revelation as essential to Christianity, he cannot
accept Tindal’s view that it is merely “a re-publication of the law of nature.”305
As Mayhew makes clear, however, he sees natural religion as lying at the core
of Christianity. The most important duties of the Christian religion are the
same as those “dictated by the light of nature”: they “are natural moral duties
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Id. ch. I, § I, at 1.
See HOLIFIELD, supra note 12, at 25.
See BAILYN, supra note 106, at 96–99, 255–57 (describing Mayhew’s role in the struggle against
Britain).
JONATHAN MAYHEW, Sermon II, in SEVEN SERMONS UPON THE FOLLOWING SUBJECTS 39
(photo. reprt. 2015) (Boston, Rogers & Fowle 1749), http://name.umdl.umich.edu/N05074.0001.00
1 [https://perma.cc/K4X8-622Z] [hereinafter SEVEN SERMONS].
Id., Sermon VII, at 150; see also id., Sermon I, at 5.
Id., Sermon V, at 97.
Id., Sermon II, at 35.
See id. at 38–39.
Id., Sermon VII, at 150.
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[that are] inforced with revealed and supernatural motives.”306 He concludes
that although “[m]odes and ceremonies of religion” may differ, “the substance
of true religion must necessarily be the same . . . in all countries, to all rational
creatures, in all parts of the universe, in all periods of time.”307
Mayhew also sees an integral connection between the concept of natural
religion and “right of private judgment,” or “freedom of thought and inquiry
in religious matters.” 308 The Westminster Confession had declared that
Christians were entitled to “Liberty of Conscience,” but it justified that liberty
largely on the ground that “God alone is Lord of the Conscience, and hath left
it free from the Doctrines and Commandments of men, which are in any thing
contrary to his Word.”309 Consistent with this limitation, the Confession held
that both the church and the civil magistrate had authority to restrain the
“publishing of such Opinions . . . as are contrary to the light of Nature, or to
the known principles of Christianity.”310
By contrast, Mayhew’s defense of private judgment is based squarely on
reason and natural religion. The freedom to judge for ourselves in religious
matters and “to worship God according to our consciences” is rooted in our
very nature as rational beings.311 This freedom “is absolutely unalienable in its
own nature,” because it is not only a right but also an “ indispensable duty”
which is enjoined by “God and nature and the gospel of Christ.” 312 Those who
institute “human tests of orthodoxy” and “punish dissenters” invade “the
natural rights of mankind” and act “in opposition to [the authority] of almighty
God.” 313 Jesus and his followers were themselves “dissenters from the
established religion” of the time.314 Indeed, the very idea of “articles of faith
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Id., Sermon IV, at 83.

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

50

[Vol. 23:1

established by law” is no less absurd than that of “mathematicks established
by law.”
315

Although Mayhew and other liberal theologians were the foremost
advocates of the idea of natural religion among New England
Congregationalists at this time, they were not alone. The idea also played a
vital role in works of the other two major schools of Congregationalist thought:
traditional Calvinism and the New Divinity of the followers of Jonathan
Edwards.316 The former category included Peter Clark’s sermon on Man’s
Dignity and Duty as a Reasonable Creature, while the latter included
Nathanael Emmons’s discourse on The Dignity of Man.317 To be sure, there
were important differences between these three authors: Clark placed a greater
emphasis on the insufficiency of reason and the need for revelation than did
Mayhew or Emmons.318 But each of them stressed the importance of reason
and its harmony with revelation. These themes were also central to the
Dudleian lectures on natural religion that were delivered at Harvard College
beginning in the 1750s, and that were given by Congregationalists of different
persuasions.319

315

Id. at 84.

316

See HOLIFIELD, supra note 12, at 128 (discussing these three views).
PETER CLARK, MAN’S DIGNITY AND DUTY AS A REASONABLE CREATURE; AND HIS
INSUFFICIENCY AS A FALLEN CREATURE (Boston, Richard & Samuel Draper 1763),
http://name.umdl.umich.edu/N07331.0001.001 [https://perma.cc/7VX2-KE23]; NATHANAEL
EMMONS, THE DIGNITY OF MAN (1787), reprinted in 1 POLITICAL SERMONS, supra note 105, at
883.
See CLARK, supra note 317, at 26–33.
Endowed by a bequest from the prominent judge Paul Dudley, these lectures were modeled on the
Boyle lectures in England, see supra text accompanying note 281, and were devoted to natural and
revealed religion as well as other topics. For studies, see LEE, supra note 15, ch. 3; Leslee K. Gilbert,
The Altar of Liberty: Enlightened Dissent and the Dudleian Lectures, 1755–1765, 31 HIST. J. MASS.
(Summer 2003), http://www.westfield.ma.edu/historical-journal/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/gilbertsummer-2003-combined.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ECY-4BK2]. The Dudleian lectures are still being
given over 250 years later. For a comprehensive list, see Dudleian Lectures, ANDOVER-HARV.
THEOLOGICAL
LIBR.,
https://guides.library.harvard.edu/hds/named-lecture-series/dudleian
[https://perma.cc/HB5G-Z9VP].
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E. Natural Science
It is “a commonplace” among historians that “natural religion took
enormous support from the developments in seventeenth century science.” 320
Here I shall sketch the position of Sir Isaac Newton, the most celebrated
scientist of the age.321 A summary of his views can be found in key passages of
the Principia and Opticks.322 According to Newton, “Natural Philosophy” or
science proceeds inductively by observing phenomena and then proceeding
“from Effects to their Causes, and from particular Causes to more general
ones,” until it reaches the first cause from which all things began.323 When we
observe “[t]his most beautiful System of the Sun, Planets and Comets,” we
recognize that it could not have come about through “mere mechanical
causes,” but only “from the counsel and dominion of an intelligent and
powerful being.”324 This being, whom we call God, is “Eternal and Infinite,
Omnipotent and Omniscient.”325 “[B]y existing always and every where,” he
constitutes time and space. 326 In the beginning, he created matter and
established the “general Laws of Nature” such as gravitation.327 His creative
intelligence and choice can be seen in natural phenomena ranging from the
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RELIGIOUS WORLDS OF ISAAC NEWTON (2017); Robert Iliffe, Newton’s Religious Life and
Work (2013), http://www.newtonproject.ox.ac.uk/view/texts/normalized/CNTX00001 [https://perm
a.cc/5KCC-USL2]; Rogers, supra note 320, at 152-56.
2 ISAAC NEWTON, General Scholium, in THE MATHEMATICAL
PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY 387, 387–93 (London, 1729), http://www.newtonproject.o
x.ac.uk/view/texts/normalized/NATP00056 [https://perma.cc/JKF3-HFZV] [hereinafter NEWTON,
PRINCIPLES]; ISAAC NEWTON, The Third Book of Opticks, in OPTICKS (London, W.
& J. Innys, 2d ed. 1718) (1704), http://www.newtonproject.ox.ac.uk/view/texts/normalized/NATP00
051 [https://perma.cc/93NA-GCNF] [hereinafter NEWTON, OPTICKS]. My citations are to the
website of Oxford University’s Newton Project, which is producing a definitive edition of his works.
NEWTON, OPTICKS, supra note 322, at 380–81.
NEWTON, PRINCIPLES, supra note 322, at 388–89.
Id. at 389.
Id. at 390.
NEWTON, OPTICKS, supra note 322, at 375–78.
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solar system to “the Bodies of Animals.”328 He perceives, understands, and
“governs all things” through his “providence.”329
For Newton, these conclusions of scientific inquiry have vital implications
for “moral Philosophy”:
For so far as we can know by natural Philosophy [i.e., science] what is the first
Cause, what Power he has over us, and what Benefits we receive from him, so
far our Duty towards him, as well as that towards one another, will appear to
330
us by the Light of Nature.

In an unpublished manuscript, Newton expanded on this concept of “natural
religion.”331 In addition to requiring individuals “to give thanks & honour &
glory” to God for their existence and well-being, this religion enjoined them to
love their neighbors as themselves.332 This “moral part of religion” was of “an
eternal immutable nature”; it was “binding to all nations” at all times and lay
at the core of both Judaism and Christianity.333
Thus, Newton did not view science as merely compatible with religion.
Instead, as Rob Iliffe has explained, “he believed that natural philosophy was
to a large extent a religious enterprise through which one could come to an
understanding of the way God had created the world.”334 For Newton, science
laid the foundation for a rational approach to religion.335 At the same time, he
accepted the legitimacy of revelation and sought to use reason to determine
the true meaning of Scripture.336 In line with this devotion to reason, he was
strongly committed to liberty of conscience and freedom of inquiry.337
328
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ILIFFE, supra note 321, at 16.
See id. at 19–21.
See id. at 16, 20–21.
See id. at 17–19. For accounts of Newtonianism and natural theology in the eighteenth century, see
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F. The Radical Whig Tradition
Finally, a commitment to rational religion and the rights of conscience was
integral to the Commonwealth or Real Whig tradition—a body of eighteenthcentury thought that identified with the struggles against the Stuarts that
culminated in the overthrow of Charles I in the Civil War and of James II in
the Glorious Revolution of 1688. 338 As Caroline Robbins explains in her
classic study, The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman, this tradition
encompassed politicians, clergymen, and lawyers; popular writers and
academics; Deists, Protestant dissenters, and liberal Anglicans.339 It included
Hutcheson, Mayhew, Price, and Priestley and drew inspiration from Locke,
Newton, Tillotson, and Clarke.340 In these ways, the Radical Whig tradition
combined the various strands of thought that we have canvassed in this Part.
As Bernard Bailyn and Gordon S. Wood demonstrate, although this tradition
had a limited following in Great Britain and Ireland, it deeply shaped the
beliefs of colonial Americans and provided the ideological origins of the
American Revolution.341
The eighteenth-century Commonwealthmen defended what they regarded
as the traditional rights of British subjects and the natural rights of mankind.342
They advocated for freedom of thought and expression; constitutional
government in which the people were adequately represented; education that
reflected modern philosophy and science; the promotion of moral and civic
virtue; and a limited measure of social equality.343 They were also committed
to the protection of religious liberty as an inalienable right.344 This position
had been advocated by the Levellers during the Commonwealth period345 and
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further developed by Protestant dissenters during the Restoration.346 At that
time, the dissenters were subjected to severe persecution347 as well as to harsh
attacks from some leaders of the re-established Church of England, who
argued that the corruption of human nature after the Fall made individuals
incapable of properly using their own judgment in religious matters. 348 As
Richard Ashcraft explains, the dissenters responded that this position in effect
denied that humans were reasonable creatures.349 By contrast, the dissenters
presented a picture of rational individuals having been created in a state of
equality and freedom. . . . These individuals constituted a natural moral
community, since they existed under an established framework of moral
obligations owed to each other and to God. Through the use of their reason,
they were capable of discovering these obligations embodied in the Law of
Nature. This law not only imposed duties, but it also confirmed the rights of
individuals, among which . . . was the right to follow the dictates of one’s
conscience.350

This position became the standard Radical Whig view. A good example
may be found in the essays of John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon that
appeared in The Independent Whig and Cato’s Letters, works that were
widely known in eighteenth-century Britain and America. 351 According to
Trenchard and Gordon, human beings are said to be created in God’s image
because they are endowed with reason.352 By using this faculty, they discover
that there is “a First Cause” that made and preserves all things, and they learn
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their “Duty in relation to God” and to “one another.” 353 These duties of
morality constitute “Natural Religion,” which aims to “promote[] unlimited
and universal Happiness to the whole World.”354
For Trenchard and Gordon, our intellectual capacities are also vital for
responding to revelation, which “presupposes Reason, and addresses itself to
Reason.”355 Only reason can determine whether the Scriptures are the Word
of God and how they should be interpreted.356 Nor is it possible to make new
converts other than by “an Appeal to their Reason, by which they are to judge
for themselves of the Reasonableness of our Religion.”357
Up to this point, Trenchard and Gordon express views that would be
accepted by every rationalist Christian. In some essays, they go further and
maintain that Christianity is essentially “natural Religion restored and
improved,” and that it contains nothing that is “mysterious” or “above
reason.” 358 In this respect, they side with Christian Deists like Tindal and
Toland and against other rationalist Christians like Locke and Clarke.359 They
also differ with Locke in that they accept the idea of an established church,
although they reject the notion that civil offices should be reserved for its
members.360 In common with all Radical Whigs, however, Trenchard and
Gordon hold that the “Devotion which [God] requires must be free, rational,
and willing,”361 and they condemn all forms of persecution—a practice that is
“incompatible with true Religion, whether Natural or Revealed,” 362 and that
invades the core of human liberty by infringing the inherent “right of every
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man to pursue the natural, reasonable, and religious dictates of his own
mind.”363

G. Conclusion
Parts I and II have explored the place of natural religion, natural law,
and natural rights in the intellectual world of eighteenth-century
Americans. These ideas held that humans are capable of using reason
to discern the principles that govern the natural and moral realms,
including the duties that they owe to God and one another. This
conception of reason provided a foundation for religious belief as well
as religious liberty. This set of ideas was present in one form or another
in the natural law theories of Locke and Pufendorf, the English
jurisprudence of Blackstone and Mansfield, the moral philosophy of
Hutcheson and Price, the works of theologians from Herbert to
Mayhew, the natural science of Newton, and the Radical Whig tradition
of Trenchard and Gordon. In the rest of this Article, I show how this
account of natural religion and related ideas can help us to understand
what Americans in the founding era meant when they incorporated
protections for religious freedom into the state and federal
constitutions.
III. THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND THE FIRST STATE
CONSTITUTIONS

A. The Revolution
In late 1772, a public meeting in Boston issued a statement to the people
of Massachusetts. 364 As Gordon Wood explains, this statement—which
became known as the Boston pamphlet—“was one of the most important in
[this] period” because of the powerful manner in which it articulated the

363
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colonists’ ideology and inspired the growing resistance to Great Britain.365 The
pamphlet began with an account of the “Natural Rights of the Colonists as
Men” that was drawn from Locke.366 In addition to life, liberty, and property,
the Bostonians declared that “by the eternal and immutable Laws of GOD and
Nature” everyone “has a Right peaceably and quietly to worship God,
according to the Dictates of his Conscience.” 367 As Locke’s Letters on
Toleration demonstrated, this “Spirit of Toleration” was also “‘the chief
charactistical Mark of the true Church.’”368 In a subsequent section on “The
Rights of the Colonists as Christians,” the pamphlet maintained that this
inherent right to religious liberty had been “restored” to “every Subject in
England” by the Toleration Act of 1689.369 After enumerating a long list of
other grievances against the British government, the Bostonians recounted that
their ancestors had come to the new world to escape the “cruel persecut[ion
of] all who differed from the established Church,” and went on to express
concern about the efforts that were then being made to extend the Anglican
hierarchy’s power to America—a development that would endanger “that
Liberty with which CHRIST hath made us free.” 370 In these ways, the
Bostonians advanced an argument for religious liberty that was rooted in both
natural religion and Protestant Christianity.
In this litany of “rights and grievances,” the Boston pamphlet “anticipate[d]
the Declaration of Independence.” 371 Of course, that Declaration also
embodies the ideas we have discussed. Jefferson bases the American case for
independence on “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God” 372—terms that
often appear in accounts of natural religion.373 The idea that human beings
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[https://perma.cc/89YQ-EWTD].
References to the “God of Nature” may be found in classic treatises such as NATHANIEL
CULVERWELL, AN ELEGANT AND LEARNED DISCOURSE OF THE LIGHT OF NATURE ch. 7, at 62
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“are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights” also sounds in
natural religion and can be found in various forms in Locke, Hutcheson, and
others in the Radical Whig tradition.374 Finally, the Americans’ concluding
“appeal[]to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our
intentions” 375 recalls Locke’s discussion of the rights of resistance and
revolution in the Second Treatise, where he explains that when the people
become convinced that the government has become oppressive, they have no
alternative but to defend their rights by force, while “appeal[ing] to Heaven”
for the justice of their cause.376

B. The First State Constitutions and Declarations of Rights
1. Virginia
On the eve of independence, representatives of the people of Virginia met
in convention to establish a constitutional framework for their new state. The
Declaration of Rights, which was drafted by George Mason, began by
proclaiming that
all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent
rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any
compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and
liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and
obtaining happiness and safety.377
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After articulating many other principles of Radical Whig ideology, the
Declaration turned to religion. In Mason’s draft, the sixteenth and final article
asserted that
Religion, or the Duty which we owe to our divine and omnipotent Creator,
and the Manner of discharging it, can be governed only by Reason and
Conviction, not by Force or Violence; and therefore that all Men shou’d enjoy
the fullest Toleration in the Exercise of Religion, according to the Dictates of
Conscience, unpunished and unrestrained by the Magistrate, unless, under
Colour of Religion, any Man disturb the Peace, the Happiness, or Safety of
Society, or of Individuals. And that it is the mutual Duty of all, to practice
Christian Forbearance, Love and Charity towards Each other.378

In both phraseology and substance, this draft clearly owes much to Locke’s
Letters on Toleration. The last sentence echoes his contention that “Charity”
enjoins “the mutual Toleration of Christians in their different Professions of
Religion.” 379 Like Locke, however, this draft does not limit toleration to
Christians but extends it to “all Men” as beings endowed with “Reason.”380 To
express this point in the words of article 1, religious liberty is one of the
“inherent rights” that all individuals possess “by nature” and that they do not
abandon when they enter civil society.381 This point was made even clearer
when the convention adopted James Madison’s proposal to amend Mason’s
language to speak in terms of rights rather than of “Toleration.”382 In its final
form, article 16 read:
That Religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of
discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or
violence; and, therefore, all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of
religion, according to the dictates of conscience; and that it is the mutual duty
of all to practise Christian forbearance, love, and charity, towards each other.383

Finally, we should observe that this provision bases religious liberty on the
core idea of natural religion: that “Religion . . . can be directed only by reason
and conviction.” Of course, that does not mean that the provision was
intended to denigrate revealed religion in any way; the concluding reference
378

379
380
381
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383

George Mason’s Proposed Declaration of Rights, [ca. 20–25 May 1776], NAT’L ARCHIVES:
FOUNDERS
O NLINE,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-01-02-0054-0001
[https://perma.cc/X53Y-HKP3].
LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 41, at 7–12.
See supra text accompanying notes 72, 80–89.
VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, art. 1.
See BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 18.
VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, art. 16, at 3–4.
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to Christianity suffices to make that clear. But it is equally clear that the
Convention’s basic assertion is that individuals must be free from compulsion
regarding religion because it inherently involves the use of reason to discern
one’s duties to God.
Article 16 condemned the legal penalties and restrictions that had often
been imposed on dissenters from Anglicanism, which was the established
religion of the colony. Another amendment that Madison drafted would have
had the effect of abolishing the establishment altogether.384 Although this effort
failed in 1776, it succeeded a decade later when he secured the passage of
Jefferson’s Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom—a development that, as
Part IV will show, also was based on ideas of natural rights and natural religion.

2. Pennsylvania
Unlike Virginia, the Pennsylvania colony gave religious liberty broad
protection from the beginning. The rationale for this approach can be found
in The Great Case of Liberty of Conscience and other writings by its founder,
the Quaker William Penn.385 Some of Penn’s arguments were based on “the
Authority of . . . Scripture,” such as the contention that religious persecution
violated biblical teachings by “enthron[ing] Man [rather than God] as King
over Conscience.” 386 Other arguments were based on “the Authority of
Reason.” 387 Penn maintained that individuals have an innate “Instinct of
a Deity” which is essential to their very nature. 388 Efforts to restrict their
religious liberty are “destructive of the great Priviledge of Nature and Principle
of Reason,” for “[t]he Understanding can never be convinc’d” by “any external
Violence,” but only “by such Arguments, as are Rational, Perswasive, and

384

See BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 18-19.
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WILLIAM PENN, THE GREAT CASE OF LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE (1670), reprinted in THE
POLITICAL WRITINGS OF WILLIAM PENN 79 (Andrew R. Murphy ed., 2002),
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/penn-the-political-writings-of-william-penn [https://perma.cc/99AA32DC]. On Penn, see A NDREW R. MURPHY, LIBERTY, CONSCIENCE, AND TOLERATION: THE
POLITICAL THOUGHT OF WILLIAM PENN (2016).
PENN, supra note 385, at 79, 86–87.
Id. at 79. On Penn’s use of natural theology, see MILLER, supra note 10, at 56–60.
PENN, supra note 385, at 92.
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suitable to its own Nature.”
Man’s natural Right.”

389

61

It follows that “Liberty of Conscience is every

390

A similar fusion of rationalist and Christian justifications can be found in
the first chapter of the Great Law that was enacted by Penn and the colonial
assembly in 1682.391 This law guaranteed religious freedom to all believers in
God on the ground that he alone was “Lord of Conscience Father of Lights &
Spirits an[d] the Author as well as Object of all divine Knowledge Faith and
Worship who only can Enlighten the Mind and perswade and Convince the
Understanding of People.”392 As J. William Frost observes, this provision was
drafted in such a way that Quakers could interpret “enlightening the mind and
convincing the understanding as referring to the experience of the Inward
Light of Christ,” while Anglicans and Deists could interpret it in more
rationalist terms.393 At the same time, the Great Law reserved civil officeholding to Christians.394 Yet in contrast to the Anglican establishments in the
southern colonies and the Congregationalist establishments in New England,
Pennsylvania and its sister mid-Atlantic colonies established no church.395 For
these reasons, they came to be seen as bastions of religious liberty and
diversity.396
This libertarian approach was embodied in the new state constitution that
was adopted by a convention in September 1776.397 That document draws on
the language of natural religion and Radical Whig political theory. It opens
by declaring that “all government ought to be instituted . . . for the security and
protection of the community as such, and to enable the individuals who
compose it to enjoy their natural rights, and the other blessings which the
389
390

Id. at 92–95.
Id. at 110.
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The “Great Law” ch. 1 (1682), http://www.phmc.state.pa.us/portal/communities/documents/16811776/great-law.html [https://perma.cc/X5VY-6AFR].
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J. WILLIAM FROST, A PERFECT FREEDOM: RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN PENNSYLVANIA 13–14 (1990).
See The “Great Law,” supra note 391, ch. 2 (requiring that “all Officers & Persons Commissionated
and Imployed in the Service of the Government . . . shall be Such as profess and Declare they Believe
in Jesus Christ to be the Son of God the Savior of the World”).
See FROST, supra note 393, at 1–3.
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PA. CONST. of 1776, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/pa08.asp [https://perma.cc/RQ9V7JP8].

62

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 23:1

Author of existence has bestowed upon man,” and by thanking him for
permitting the people to deliberately and consensually adopt rules for their
own governance.398 The Constitution then sets forth a Declaration of Rights.
After affirming the inherent liberty and equality of mankind, it asserts:
That all men have a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God
according to the dictates of their own consciences and understanding: And
that no man ought or of right can be compelled to attend any religious
worship, or erect or support any place of worship, or maintain any ministry,
contrary to, or against, his own free will and consent: Nor can any man, who
acknowledges the being of a God, be justly deprived or abridged of any civil
right as a citizen, on account of his religious sentiments or peculiar mode of
religious worship: And that no authority can or ought to be vested in, or
assumed by any power whatever, that shall in any case interfere with, or in any
manner controul, the right of conscience in the free exercise of religious
worship.399

As for the right to hold civil office, the convention initially proposed to
extend it to everyone who acknowledged the being of a God and a future state
of rewards and punishments.400 After this proposal encountered opposition
from the Philadelphia clergy, it was amended to restrict office holding to
Christians.401 But the state reverted to the convention’s original view when a
new Constitution was adopted in 1790.402

3. Massachusetts
Perhaps the most fully developed exposition of Radical Whig ideology in
the first state constitutions may be found in the one that was drafted by John
Adams and adopted by Massachusetts in 1780.403 The preamble characterizes
the body politic as a “social compact” which the people make to protect “their
398
399
400
401
402

403

Id. pmbl.
Id. arts. I–II.
FROST, supra note 393, at 65.
See id.; PA. CONST. of 1776, supra note 397, ch. II, § 10.
See FROST, supra note 393, at 74–75; PA. CONST.

of 1790, art. IX, § 4,
https://www.paconstitution.org/texts-of-the-constitution/1790-2/
[https://perma.cc/5PDN-LSAH]
(stating that a person who “acknowledges the being of God and a future state of rewards and
punishments” shall not be disqualified from holding office). The new Constitution’s protection for
the “natural and indefeasible right” to religious liberty appears in id. § 3.
MASS. CONST. of 1780, in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 11–23, https://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/print_documents/v1ch1s6.html [https://perma.cc/5JRW-2D4F].
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natural rights” and to promote “their safety, prosperity and happiness.” 404
After thanking “the Great Legislator of the Universe” for the opportunity to
establish this compact, the document gives a comprehensive account of the
fundamental rights of individuals and the community as a whole.405 Like its
counterparts in Virginia and Pennsylvania, the Massachusetts convention
describes religious liberty in accord with ideas of natural rights and natural
religion. Article II of the Declaration of Rights asserts that “[i]t is the right as
well as the duty of all men in society, publicly, and at stated seasons, to worship
the SUPREME BEING, the great creator and preserver of the universe.”406
For this reason, “no subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his
person, liberty, or estate, for worshipping GOD in the manner and season
most agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience; or for his religious
profession or sentiments,” so long as he does not “disturb the public peace, or
obstruct others in their religious worship.”407
Although this provision was uncontroversial, that was not true of the next
one, which reflected the state’s Puritan heritage. From the founding of the
Massachusetts Bay Colony, Congregationalism had effectively been the
established religion.408 The 1780 Constitution modified this position but did
not eradicate it. As Article III explained, “the happiness of a people, and the
good order and preservation of civil government, essentially depend upon
piety, religion and morality,” which could be maintained only by means of
public worship and religious instruction.409 The towns therefore should be
required to provide “for the institution of the public worship of GOD, and for
the support and maintenance of public protestant teachers of piety, religion
and morality” to be elected by the people of each town. 410 All individuals
should be required to attend the instruction of such teachers or ministers if
they could “conscientiously and conveniently” do so.411 This public teaching

404
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Id. pmbl.
Id. pmbl. & pt. 1 (Declaration of Rights).
Id. pt. 1, art. II.
Id.
See THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH

AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE
PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 89, 107–12, 119–20, 131–32, 172–74 (1986).
MASS. CONST. of 1780, supra note 403, pt. 1, art. III.

Id.
Id.
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and worship was to be supported by taxation, although each individual would
have the right to require that the money he paid be “applied to the support of
the public teacher or teachers of his own religious sect or denomination,
provided there be any on whose instructions he attends.”412
Although this framework theoretically allowed towns to elect ministers
from any Christian denomination, most towns were likely to choose
Congregationalists.413 In addition, while individuals had a right to direct their
taxes to their own denominations, they sometimes encountered legal and
practical obstacles to doing so.414 Moreover, some denominations, such as
Baptists, held beliefs that forbade them to accept coerced payments.415 The
upshot was that Article III was likely to maintain the dominance of the
Congregational churches. The provision was vigorously opposed by Baptists
and others as an infringement of religious liberty, but it was ratified by the
towns (in a disputed vote count) and became part of the Declaration of
Rights.416

4. Conclusion
Although the Revolutionary-era state constitutions took a range of
positions on the relation between religion and state, they were nearly
unanimous on one point: that all individuals have a natural and inalienable
right to form their own religious beliefs and to worship God in accord with
their own “reason,” “conviction,” “conscience,” and “understanding”417—ideas

412
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414
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Id.
See, e.g., ISAAC BACKUS, AN APPEAL

TO THE PEOPLE (1780), reprinted in ISAAC BACKUS ON
CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM: PAMPHLETS, 1754–1789, at 386–87 (William G. McLoughlin
ed., 1968) (editor’s introduction) [hereinafter BACKUS PAMPHLETS].
See id. at 387.
See id. at 392.
See WILLIAM G. MCLOUGHLIN, ISAAC BACKUS AND THE AMERICAN PIETISTIC TRADITION 144–
57 (1967).
DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, § 2, reprinted in THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra
note 1, Bill of Rights, document 4, at 5, http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/bill_of
_rightss4.html [https://perma.cc/6JZD-N2U2] (“[A]ll men have a natural and unalienable right to
worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences and understandings.”); GA.
CONST.
of
1777,
art.
LVI,
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ga02.asp
[https://perma.cc/X7NC-W3S2] (“All persons whatever shall have the free exercise of their religion;
provided it be not repugnant to the peace and safety of the State; and shall not, unless by consent,
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support any teacher or teachers except those of their own profession.”); GA. CONST. of 1789, art.
IV, § 5, https://georgiainfo.galileo.usg.edu/topics/government/related_article/constitutions/georgiaconstitution-of-1789 [https://perma.cc/7GZU-GSQZ] (“All persons shall have the free exercise of
religion, without being obliged to contribute to the support of any religious profession but their
own.”); MASS. CONST. of 1780, supra note 403, pt. 1, art. II, at 11 (describing religious liberty as “the
right . . . of all men in society”); N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. I, arts. IV–V,
https://lonang.com/library/organic/1784-nhr/ [https://perma.cc/MYH8-234X] (“Every individual has
a natural and unalienable right to worship GOD according to the dictates of his own conscience, and
reason . . . .”); N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XVIII, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/nj15.asp
[https://perma.cc/KR2B-CN32] (“[N]o person shall ever . . . be deprived of the inestimable privilege
of worshipping Almighty God in a manner, agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience . . . .”);
N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXVIII, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ny01.asp
[https://perma.cc/WZ94-XDVY] (declaring that “we are required, by the benevolent principles of
rational liberty, not only to expel civil tyranny, but also to guard against . . . spiritual oppression and
intolerance,” and providing “that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever hereafter be allowed, within this State, to all
mankind”);
N.C.
CONST.
of
1776,
A
Declaration
of
Rights,
§
XIX,
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/nc07.asp [https://perma.cc/95DY-6RSW] (“[A]ll men have
a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own
consciences.”); PA. CONST. of 1776, , supra note 397, A Declaration of the Rights of the Inhabitants
of the Commonwealth or State of Pennsylvania, art. II (“[A]ll men have a natural and unalienable
right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences and
understanding . . . .”); VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, art. 16, quoted supra text
accompanying note 1.
The clearest exception is the South Carolina Constitution of 1778, which confined toleration to those
“persons and religious societies who acknowledge that there is one God, and a future state of rewards
and punishments, and that God is publicly to be worshipped.” S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XXXVIII,
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/sc02.asp [https://perma.cc/SRP7-6QR5].
In 1790,
however, the state acceded to the consensus by providing that “[t]he free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession [and] worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever hereafter be
allowed within this State to all mankind.”
S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. VIII, § 1,
https://www.carolana.com/SC/Documents/sc_constitution_1790.html
[https://perma.cc/K4UXHP5L].
Another arguable exception is the Maryland declaration, which provided that “all persons, professing
the Christian religion, are equally entitled to protection in their religious liberty.” MD . CONST. of
1776, A Declaration of Rights, &c, art. XXXIII, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/ma02.asp
[https://perma.cc/X7ES-B7CR] (emphasis added). In virtually the same breath, however, the
Declaration asserted that “it is the duty of every man to worship God in such manner as he thinks
most acceptable to him” and that “no person ought by any law to be molested . . . on account of his
religious persuasion . . . ; unless, under colour of religion, any man shall disturb the good order, peace
or safety of the State, or shall infringe the laws of morality, or injure others, in their natural, civil, or
religious rights.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, while hardly a model of clarity, the Maryland provision
does not appear to have been meant to limit religious freedom to Christians or to have diverged from
the prevailing view that this right belongs to all.
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that resonate with natural religion. Of course, this is not to deny the
importance of revelation. Many people considered the teachings of reason
and revelation to be in harmony with one another. But as this section has
shown, when the state declarations granted protection to religious liberty, they
primarily used the language of natural rights and reason rather than of
explicitly Christian theology. One can offer several explanations for this
choice. First, the question of religious toleration historically was controversial
within Christianity, and that controversy had not ceased by the late eighteenth
century. By adopting the language they did, the states were able to bypass such
theological disputes. Second, the language of natural rights reflected the view
that religious liberty is a right that belongs not only to Christians (with all the
problems that would have been involved in determining who qualified and in
excluding others) but to all human beings. And third, the use of such language
allowed the declarations to ground the right to religious liberty in the same
principles as the other rights that they protected, such as life, liberty, property,
and freedom of speech.
Accordingly, the state constitutions treated religious liberty as a natural
right of mankind. At the same time, many states limited civil equality or the
right to hold office to Christians or even to Protestants,418 and some states also
retained their religious establishments. 419 As we have seen, contemporary
theorists of natural religion were not of one mind concerning the idea of
religious establishments—some like Locke and Price rejected this notion 420
while others like Pufendorf, Hutcheson, and Witherspoon accepted it in some
form.421 Yet there clearly is some tension between the idea that religious liberty
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419

420
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See, e.g., DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF 1776, supra note 417, § 3 (guaranteeing “equal rights
and privileges” to “all persons professing the Christian religion”); MASS. CONST. OF 1780, supra note
403, pt. I, art. III, at 12 (establishing a system of public teaching and worship and providing that
“every denomination of christians, demeaning themselves peaceably, and as good subjects of the
Commonwealth, shall be equally under the protection of the law”); N.H. CONST. of 1784, supra note
417, pt. I, art. VI (following Massachusetts in these respects); N.J. CONST. of 1776, supra note 417,
art. XIX (protecting the civil and office-holding rights of Protestants).
See, e.g., supra notes 408–16 and accompanying text (noting that Congregationalism was effectively
the established religion of Massachusetts).
See supra notes 90–93 and accompanying text (Locke); PRICE, OBSERVATIONS, supra note 245, at
240–44.
See supra notes 129-33 (Pufendorf), 220-22 (Hutcheson), 251-53 (Witherspoon) and accompanying
text.
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is an inalienable right that belongs to all alike and the notion that the state may
establish a religion and thereby inevitably favor some over others.422 And there
is an even greater conflict between the principle of religious liberty and the
idea that individuals may be denied equal civil or political rights because of
their religious views.

IV. THE BATTLE OVER RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN 1780S VIRGINIA
These conflicts came to a head in the battle over religious freedom and
disestablishment that occurred in Virginia during the mid-1780s. This
controversy produced one of the era’s fullest debates over the meaning of this
freedom, and it has long been regarded as providing vital insight into the ideas
that underlie the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.

A. The Controversies of the Mid-1780s
1. The General Assessment Bill
Anglicanism was the established religion of Virginia throughout the
colonial period.423 All inhabitants were required to attend weekly services in
their parish churches and to pay taxes for their support. 424 During the
eighteenth century, a limited degree of toleration was afforded to dissenting
Protestant sects, provided that they paid these taxes and complied with strict
regulations regarding worship.425 Members of groups like the Separate Baptists
who preached in defiance of these regulations sometimes faced harsh
persecution.426
In 1776, this approach to dissent was repudiated by article 16 of state
Declaration of Rights, which proclaimed that all individuals were equally
entitled to the free exercise of religion.427 The debate then turned to the status
of the Anglican Church. The dissenting sects and liberal allies such as

422
423
424
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See, e.g., BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 18–19.
See BUCKLEY, ESTABLISHING, supra note 288, at 1.
See id.
See id. at 12–32.
See id. at 39–42.
See supra text accompanying notes 378–84.

68

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 23:1

Madison fought to disestablish it.428 Although these efforts fell short in 1776,
the legislature relieved dissenters of the obligation to pay taxes to support the
church.429 The legislature also suspended, and eventually abolished, the duty
of all citizens to pay such taxes.430 Due to lack of revenue and other factors,
the church found itself in increasingly dire straits.431
In 1784, Patrick Henry spearheaded an effort to pass a bill to combat what
he and others regarded as the decline of religion and morality in Virginia. 432
Rather than declaring Christianity to be “the true Religion,” as an earlier bill
would have done,433 Henry’s bill was premised on the notion that the spread
of “Christian knowledge” was the best way to promote individual morality and
preserve social peace.434 This proposal, which became known as the General
Assessment Bill, effectively would have made Christianity in general the
established religion by imposing a state-wide tax for the support of Christian
ministers, teachers, and places of worship.435 Each individual would have been
permitted to designate the “society of Christians” to which his taxes should
go. 436 In this way, the bill sought to promote Christianity “without
counteracting the liberal principle heretofore adopted and intended to be
preserved by abolishing all distinctions of preeminence amongst the different
societies or communities of Christians.”437
In December 1784, Henry’s bill came close to passage, only to be blocked
when the House of Delegates agreed to Madison’s motion for a delay to allow
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See BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 19–37.
See CURRY, supra note 408, at 136.
Id.
See BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 43–45 (noting factors such as a decreasing clergy, the
absence of a bishop, and the suspension of clerical salaries).
See id. ch. 3; CURRY, supra note 408, at 140–41.
BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 56–57, 185–88 (quoting and reprinting a bill considered by the
House of Delegates in 1779).
A Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion, Virginia (1784), in THE
SACRED RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE 252, 252 (Daniel L. Dreisbach & Mark David Hall eds., 2009)
[hereinafter Assessment Bill].
See id. at 252–53.
Id. at 253.
Id. at 252.
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for consideration by the people. 438 Extensive public campaigns were then
launched to mobilize support or opposition to the bill.439
Among the most important petitions against the bill was the Memorial and
Remonstrance against Religious Assessments440 which was written by Madison
at the urging of several other prominent liberals.441 This document offered the
most comprehensive and intellectually powerful defense of religious liberty in
eighteenth-century America.
Madison’s leading arguments are grounded in the principles of natural
rights and natural religion enshrined in the Declaration of Rights. Quoting
article 16, he asserts that it is “a fundamental and undeniable truth, ‘that
Religion . . . can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or
violence.’”442 It follows that individuals have a right to exercise religion in the
way that their own reason and conscience dictate. Drawing on arguments
developed by Locke and other writers we have discussed, Madison offers two
reasons for regarding this right as an “unalienable” one.443 The first is that “the
opinions of men, depending only on the evidence contemplated by their own
minds cannot follow the dictates of other men.”444 Second, “what is here a
right towards men, is a duty towards the Creator,” for “every man [has a duty]
to render to the Creator such homage and such only as he believes to be
acceptable to him.”445 For these reasons, Madison concludes that individuals

438
439
440

441

442
443
444
445

See BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 108–09.
See id. ch. 4.
James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, [ca. 20 June] 1785 ,
NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-08-020163 [https://perma.cc/THW5-WP3B] [hereinafter Madison, Memorial].
See id. For an insightful discussion of Madison’s views on religion, see Brady, supra note 15, at 456–
60.
Madison, Memorial, supra note 440, § 1.

Id.
Id.
Id. The first of these arguments finds classic expression in Locke’s writings. See supra text
accompanying notes 81–86. The second echoes Philip Furneaux’s Essay on Toleration. See
FURNEAUX, TOLERATION, supra note 190, at 12 (arguing that just as the ability to exercise religion
is “a right” that every individual has “with respect to his fellow men, . . . so, with respect to God, it is
a duty which he owes to him”). For Furneaux’s influence on Madison, see KETCHAM, supra note
255, at 66.
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do not surrender their right to free exercise when they enter civil society, and
that the state has no jurisdiction whatever over religion.446
Expanding this critique, Madison contends that the Assessment Bill also
violates the principle of natural equality. Quoting from the Declaration, he
reasons that
[i]f “all men are by nature equally free and independent,” all men are to be
considered as entering into Society on equal conditions; as relinquishing no
more, and therefore retaining no less, . . . of their natural rights. Above all are
they to be considered as retaining an “equal title to the free exercise of
Religion according to the dictates of Conscience.”447

Relying once more on the idea that religion can be directed only by reason,
he continues: “Whilst we assert for ourselves a freedom to embrace . . . the
Religion which we believe to be of divine origin, we cannot deny an equal
freedom to those whose minds have not yet yielded to the evidence which has
convinced us.”448 The Assessment Bill violates this equality by imposing a tax
for the support of Christianity, thereby discriminating against non-Christians
as well as against those Christian sects who reject the idea of compulsory
support for religion.449 Instead of “degrad[ing] from the equal rank of Citizens
all those whose opinions in Religion do not bend to those of the Legislative
authority,” a “just Government” should secure the rights of all “by protecting
every Citizen in the enjoyment of his Religion with the same equal hand which
protects his person and his property; by neither invading the equal rights of
any Sect, nor suffering any Sect to invade those of another.”450
Like Locke, Madison argues for a strict separation of church and state and
warns of the dangers that arise from their union. Drawing on the Radical Whig
view of history, he observes that “[i]n some instances [ecclesiastical
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Id. §§ 8–9.
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establishments] have been seen to erect a spiritual tyranny on the ruins of the
Civil authority; in many instances they have been seen upholding the thrones
of political tyranny: in no instance have they been seen the guardians of the
liberties of the people.”451
Madison’s defense of religious freedom, like that of article 16, appeals not
only to natural religion and natural rights but also to a particular conception of
Christianity.452 For civil rulers to use religion to promote their own ends is “an
unhallowed perversion of the means of salvation.”453 An establishment is not
needed to support the Christian religion, which historically has been advanced
by divine providence without support from—and indeed in opposition to—civil
authorities.454 Far from maintaining the purity of Christianity, establishment
tends to corrupt it by promoting “superstition, bigotry and persecution.” 455
Instead of social peace, governmental intrusions into the religious realm
generate sectarian conflict and undermine the “Christian forbearance, love
and charity” that the Declaration of Rights calls for.456 Finally, those who enjoy
“the light of revelation” should desire that it spread to “the whole race of
mankind”—a goal that is undermined by laws that discourage non-Christians
from immigrating to the state.457
The great logical and rhetorical force of Madison’s Memorial comes from
the ways that it draws on both natural religion and Christianity. His central
thesis is that the state is devoid of authority in the religious sphere because
individuals have an inalienable right to exercise religion in accord with reason
and conscience. But he also maintains that religious freedom and
nonestablishment are the best ways to promote the Christian religion. This
451

452
453
454
455
456
457

Id. § 8. Many of the same themes can be found in Madison’s notes for a speech he gave during the
Assembly’s consideration of the Assessment Bill in December 1784. In that speech, he also argued
that establishments are unnecessary because human beings have a natural “propensity . . . to
Religion.” James Madison, Madison’s Notes for Debates on the General Assessment Bill, [Outline
B],
[23–24
December
1784],
NAT’L
ARCHIVES:
FOUNDERS
ONLINE,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-08-02-0104-0003 [https://perma.cc/ZQ82EG6P].
See BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 133–34; MILLER, supra note 10, at 148.
Madison, Memorial, supra note 440, § 5.
Id. § 6.
Id. § 7.
Id. § 11 (quoting VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, art. 16).
Id. § 12.
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broad approach allows him to appeal to a wide range of groups, from Deists
to liberal Anglicans to many Evangelical Protestants.
Madison’s was not the only leading petition that highlighted ideas of
natural rights and natural religion. The same was true of a memorial that the
Assembly received from the Presbyterians, 458 one of the largest and most
influential dissenting groups in the commonwealth.459 Some of the petition’s
arguments are made in specifically Christian terms, including the assertions
that it would be “an invasion of the Divine prerogative” for civil rulers to
meddle in spiritual affairs, and that the progress of Christianity should be left
to “the all directing providence of God.” 460 But the petition’s most
fundamental claims are that “[r]eligion is altogether personal” and that
individuals have an “unalienable” right to exercise it “agreeably to the
convictions of reason and conscience.”461 The Assessment Bill would infringe
the religious liberty of all, including those “who may be good citizens, but who
have not embraced our common faith.”462 The measure therefore “is a direct
violation of [the sixteenth article of] the Declaration of Rights.” 463 The
Presbyterians conclude by urging the legislature to enact Jefferson’s Bill for
Establishing Religious Freedom.464
Thus, two of the major petitions against the Assessment Bill relied on
arguments drawn from natural rights and natural religion as well as from the
dissenting Protestant tradition. This was also true of a third set of petitions,
which denounced the bill as “contrary to the spirit of the Gospel and the Bill

458

459

Memorial of the Presbytery of Hanover, Virginia (Aug. 13, 1785), in SACRED RIGHTS OF
CONSCIENCE, supra note 434, at 304 [hereinafter Presbyterian Memorial (1785)].
See BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 13; see also Rhys Isaac, “The Rage of Malice of the Old

Serpent Devil”: The Dissenters and the Making and Remaking of the Virginia Statute for Religious
Freedom, in THE VIRGINIA STATUTE FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 139, 149–50 (Merrill D. Peterson
460
461
462
463
464

& Robert C. Vaughan eds., 2003) (discussing the Presbyterians’ use of natural religion).
Presbyterian Memorial (1785), supra note 458, at 305–06.
Id. at 304-05.
Id. at 305.

Id.
See id. at 306.
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of Rights.”465 These petitions, which were signed by thousands of Evangelicals,
are discussed in depth below.466

2. Jefferson’s Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom
In response to this surge of political opposition, the Assembly quietly
allowed the Assessment Bill to die. 467 With Madison’s leadership, the
legislature then adopted an amended version of Jefferson’s Bill for
Establishing Religious Freedom.468 This bill, which was first published in 1779,
declared:
that no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship,
place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or
burthened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer, on account of his
religious opinions or belief; but that all men shall be free to profess, and by
argument to maintain, their opinions in matters of religion, and that the same
shall in no wise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capacities.469

In an extensive preamble, the Bill articulated a rationale that was cast
largely in terms of natural religion and natural rights. The Bill asserted “that
Almighty God hath created the mind free” and made it incapable of external
restraint; that he intended for religion to be promoted “by its influence on
reason alone”; “that the opinions and belief of men depend not on their own
will, but follow involuntarily the evidence proposed to their minds”; that
opinions “are not the object of civil government, nor under its jurisdiction”;
and that government should not interfere with “principles on supposition of
their ill tendency,” but only when they “break out into overt acts against peace
and good order.”470 The “civil rights” we enjoy as members of society “have
no dependance on our religious opinions,” and therefore for the law to deny
any individual the capacity to hold civil office “unless he profess or renounce
465

466
467
468
469

470

Petition Against the Bill [from Westmoreland County, Virginia] (Nov. 2, 1784), in SACRED RIGHTS
OF CONSCIENCE, supra note 434, at 307 [hereinafter Westmoreland Petition].
See infra text accompanying notes 514-25.
See BUCKLEY, ESTABLISHING, supra note 288, at 79–80.
See id. at 155–63.
A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, 18 June 1779, NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS O NLINE,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-02-02-0132-0004-0082
[https://perma.cc/54XJ-Q86A] [hereinafter Jefferson Bill] (setting forth the Bill as Jefferson drafted
it); see also Virginia Act, supra note 14 (the final version of the Bill).
Jefferson Bill, supra note 469.
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this or that religious opinion, is depriving him injuriously of those privileges
and advantages to which, in common with his fellow citizens, he has a natural
right.”471 Finally, the preamble affirms “that truth is great and will prevail if left
to herself; that she is the proper and sufficient antagonist to error, and has
nothing to fear from the conflict unless by human interposition disarmed of
her natural weapons, free argument and debate.”472 The Bill concludes by
declaring “that the rights hereby asserted are of the natural rights of mankind,
and that if any act shall be hereafter passed to repeal the present or to narrow
its operation, such act will be an infringement of natural right.”473
The views expressed in Jefferson’s Bill emerged in part from his reflections
on Locke, Furneaux, and other writers we have explored.474 Like those writers

471

472
473

474

Id. At first glance, this assertion seems problematic: because civil offices do not exist in a state of
nature, the right to hold them cannot properly be described as “a natural right.” See Philip A.
Hamburger, Equality and Diversity: The Eighteenth-Century Debate about Equal Protection and
Equal Civil Rights, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 295, 350–51 (1992). The logic behind Jefferson’s assertion
becomes somewhat clearer if we consider the passage in Furneaux that evidently inspired it. As
Furneaux explains, although one does not have an inherent right to actually hold civil offices, “a
capacity of being elected or appointed to them, is the right of every good subject; and being deprived
of that capacity is plainly an injury; and every injury done to a man merely for his religion, and not
on a civil account,” is a form of religious “persecution” which is “contrary to the law of nature.”
FURNEAUX, LETTERS, supra note 169, Letter VI, at 164–65 (emphasis added). It follows that
imposing such a disability on dissenters prevents them from “enjoying those privileges and advantages
to which, in common with their fellow subjects, they have a natural claim.” Id. at 167 n.*. For other
passages in Furneaux’s Letters that anticipate the language of Jefferson’s preamble, see id. Letter III,
at 59 (asserting that “human laws have nothing to do with mere principles, but only with those overt
acts arising from them, which are contrary to the peace and good order of society”); id. at 60 (stating
that the magistrate exceeds his authority when he punishes individuals “on account of the supposed
ill tendency of their principles”); id. Letter VI, at 201 (observing that “though they are criminal who
do not resist [the temptation to hypocritically change their religious practice in order to satisfy a legal
test for civil office]; yet, neither are they innocent, who lay the snare in their way”).
Jefferson Bill, supra note 469.
Id. A few years after drafting the Bill, Jefferson presented a similar defense of religious liberty, which
also cited Furneaux. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, QUERY XVII
(1782), reprinted in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 123, 284–85 & n.* (Merrill D. Peterson ed.,
1984).
See supra note 471 (discussing Furneaux’s influence on Jefferson’s Bill). For some passages in Locke
that are echoed in Jefferson’s writings, see LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 41, at 14 (“It is only
Light and Evidence that can work a change in Mens Opinions. And that Light can in no manner
proceed from corporal Sufferings, or any other outward Penalties.”); id. at 44 (asserting that the
“Speculative Opinions” that individuals hold “have no manner of relation to the Civil Rights of the
Subjects”); id. at 44–45 (maintaining that the expression of such opinions “does no injury” to others
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and Madison’s Memorial, Jefferson’s Bill blended the language of natural
rights and natural religion with that of the Christian tradition. For example,
the Bill’s assertion that it was not only “tyrannical” but “sinful” to “compel a
man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which
he disbelieves and abhors” had powerful appeal to Protestant dissenters and
was incorporated into the Baptist petitions against the Assessment Bill. 475
Christian overtones also could be heard in Jefferson’s assertion that all
attempts to influence the mind by civil incapacitations or punishments “are a
departure from the plan of the holy author of our religion, who being lord
both of body and mind, yet chose not to propagate it by coercions on either,
as was in his Almighty power to do, but to extend it by its influence on reason
alone.”476 Jefferson’s language here seems designedly ambiguous. Christians
naturally would take “the holy author of our religion” to be a reference to
Christ, and indeed this phrase was inspired by a passage in Locke’s Letter that
clearly related to him.477 At the same time, the phrase was vague enough that
it might refer simply to the “Almighty God” who was mentioned earlier in the
preamble. Many years later, Jefferson recalled that the assembly had
overwhelmingly rejected a proposal to amend the preamble to specify that “the
holy author of our religion” was “Jesus Christ”—a decision that Jefferson
regarded as proving that the Act’s “protection of opinion was meant to be

475
476
477

and that “the business of Laws is not to provide for the Truth of Opinions, but for the Safety and
Security of the Commonwealth, and of every particular mans Goods and Person”); id. at 45
(suggesting that “Truth certainly would do well enough, if she were once left to shift for her Self”);
see also infra text accompanying note 477 (describing how Jefferson drew on another passage from
Locke’s Letter). For further discussion, see Sanford Kessler, Locke’s Influence on Jefferson’s “Bill
for Establishing Religious Freedom,” 25 J. CHURCH & ST. 231 (1983).
Jefferson Bill, supra note 469; see Westmoreland Petition, supra note 465, at 308.
Jefferson Bill, supra note 469.
After observing that Christ sought to bring people into the church not by “Instruments of Force” but
by “the Gospel of Peace,” Locke added, “Tho’ if Infidels were to be converted by force, . . . we know
very well that it was much more easie for Him to do it, with Armies of Heavenly Legions, than for
any Son of the Church . . . with all his Dragoons.” LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 41, at 11. In
the notes Jefferson took while reading this passage, he wrote that “our Saviour chose not to propagate
his religion by temporal punmts or civil incapacitation, if he had it was in his almighty power. but he
chose to <enforce > extend it by it’s influence on reason, thereby shewing to others how [they] should
proceed.”
Thomas Jefferson, Notes on Locke and Shaftesbury, 11 October–9
December 1776, NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS O NLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/J
efferson/01-01-02-0222-0007 [https://perma.cc/LQ5S-PLBN].
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universal” and to “comprehend . . . the Jew and the Gentile, the Christian and
Mahometan, the Hindoo and infidel of every denomination.”478
Before enacting Jefferson’s Bill, the Assembly deleted some of the
preamble’s most rationalistic language, such as the propositions that “the
opinions and belief of men . . . follow involuntarily the evidence proposed to
their minds” and that religion should progress “by its influence on reason
alone.”479 Yet most of the key language survived, from the declaration that
“Almighty God hath created the mind free” to the closing assertion that
religious liberty is among “the natural rights of mankind.” 480 Moreover, the
most serious effort to amend the Bill simply would have replaced Jefferson’s
preamble with the language of article 16 of the Declaration of Rights, with its
contention that “Religion . . . can be directed only by reason and conviction,
not by force or violence.”481 Thus, while the Assembly moderated Jefferson’s
articulation of natural religion, it clearly did not reject that notion, and the core
of his position remained intact. As Madison wrote to him shortly afterwards,
the changes to the preamble “somewhat defaced the composition,” but they
“did not affect the substance” of a statute that the two men believed would “in
this Country [i.e., Virginia] extinguish[] for ever the ambitious hope of making
laws for the human mind.”482

B. Interpreting the Virginia Controversy
It is agreed on all sides that the events that culminated in the Virginia Act
for Establishing Religious Freedom shed crucial light on the meaning of the
First Amendment, which was adopted only a few years later. But there is acute

478

479

Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson: Autobiography, 6 Jan.–29 July 1821, 6 January 1821, NAT’L
ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS O NLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/98-01-02-1756
[https://perma.cc/52AW-755F]. While the Assembly’s journals contain no record of this
amendment, it might have been considered in the Committee of the Whole. See BUCKLEY,
VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 158 n.45.
Jefferson Bill, supra note 469. For the deleted propositions, see the language marked in italics.

480

See id.

481

VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, art. 16; see BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 158,
162–63.
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Jan. 22, 1786), NAT’L A RCHIVES: FOUNDERS
ONLINE,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-08-02-0249
[https://perma.cc/FA4U-XWDJ].
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disagreement over how those events should be understood. Traditionally,
courts and historians have focused on the contributions made by Jefferson,
who drafted the statute, and by Madison, who shepherded it through the
legislature after leading the successful fight to defeat Henry’s Assessment
Bill.483
In recent decades, however, a growing number of scholars have stressed
that it was the Evangelicals who provided most of the political momentum that
led to the establishment of religious freedom in Virginia.484 For example, while
Madison’s Memorial received about 1,700 signatures—an impressive number
for the time—the petitions circulated by Evangelicals garnered many more. 485
Moreover, it was the Presbyterians’ decision to drop their previous support
for an assessment and to instead endorse Jefferson’s Bill that turned the tide,
first in the popular debate and then in the legislature.486 It follows that “[t]he
key to understanding the nature of the religious settlement in Virginia rests
with the dissenters” rather than with the Enlightenment rationalism of
Jefferson and Madison.487
This revisionist interpretation draws much of its force from the notion that
the supporters of religious freedom held two sharply different views—an
Evangelical view that was rooted in orthodox Christianity and a rationalist view
that was secular or at most Deistic.488 During the 1780s, those who espoused
these views came together to promote religious liberty, but they did so for

483
484

485
486

487

488

See supra text accompanying notes 6–9.
See, e.g., BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 143, 175–82; MILLER, supra note 10, at 109–11;
RAGOSTA, supra note 6; McConnell, supra note 6, at 1437–41.
See BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 147, 175; McConnell, supra note 6, at 1440.
See, e.g., BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 136–39, 143, 147–49; McConnell, supra note 6, at
1440.
BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 175; see also, e.g., McConnell, supra note 6, at 1446.
Departing from the common understanding, McConnell argues that while Jefferson took an
Enlightenment rationalist approach to religious freedom, Madison took a very different approach
which “echoed evangelical convictions” and exalted “the claims of religious freedom” over those of
civil society. See id. at 1446, 1452–55. As I shall show, however, whatever their private views may
have been, Madison and Jefferson took the same public stance toward religion—an approach that was
rooted in the ideas of natural religion and natural rights. See supra text accompanying notes 440–57,
468–78; infra text accompanying notes 494–96.
See, e.g., BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at ix–x, 3, 6, 148, 164, 178–81; McConnell, supra note
6, at 1437–41, 1445–46, 1449–53.
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fundamentally different reasons.489 Evangelicals were motivated by “avowedly
religious reasons”: they held that “[e]very man had to be free to respond in
faith and worship as God would draw him,” and that the church had to be free
to promote “the salvation of a Christian America through the Gospel
message.” 490 By contrast, rationalists were indifferent if not hostile toward
Christianity and other forms of organized religion.491 They wished to protect
intellectual freedom and to liberate social and political life from the
domination of religion by confining it to the private sphere.492 Although the
two groups joined forces against the religious establishment during this period,
in the end their views were not merely distinct but “diametrically opposed” to
one another.493 When the two positions are framed in this way, one can make
a reasonable case that the defeat of the Assessment Bill and the adoption of
the Act for Religious Freedom are best understood in terms of the conception
of religious liberty that was held by the Evangelicals, whose political support
was decisive, rather than in terms of the Deism, skepticism, or irreligion that
they abhorred.
The fundamental problem with this revisionist interpretation is that it fails
to take sufficient account of natural religion and to recognize the way that it
offered common ground between the rationalist and Evangelical positions. In
his private correspondence, Jefferson did articulate Deist views as well as
strong hostility toward traditional Christianity.494 Although Madison’s youthful
letters breathed with Evangelical fervor, 495 in later years he “was extremely
489
490
491
492
493
494

495

See, e.g., BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 178–81.
Id. at 176, 178, 180–81.
See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 6, at 1449–52 (discussing Jefferson’s views).
Id. at 1449–50, 1453.
Id. at 1446.
See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (May 5, 1817), NAT’L ARCHIVES:
FOUNDERS
O NLINE,
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-02-02-6753
[https://perma.cc/AU5P-KHJT] (denouncing the “Monkish darkness” and “Sectarian dogmas” of
traditional Christianity); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Francis Adrian Van der Kemp (July 30,
1816),
NAT’L
ARCHIVES:
FOUNDERS
ONLINE,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-10-02-0167 [https://perma.cc/Z2LV-AJGF]
(describing orthodox Christian ideas such as “the trinity” as “unintelligible propositions” that are “the
mere Abracadabra of the mountebanks calling themselves the priests of Jesus”).
See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to William Bradford (Nov. 9, 1772), NAT’L ARCHIVES:
FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-01-02-0015
[https://perma.cc/7H7L-HWXJ].
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reticent about expressing his ideas on matters of faith.”496 Yet whatever the two
leaders’ personal views may have been, the position they took in their public
writings was based not on an agnostic or antireligious secularism but on an
affirmation of natural religion. Moreover, the form of natural religion they
affirmed was one that was open to the possibility of revelation and that
recognized the right of all individuals to hold and advocate for their beliefs,
including traditional Christian ones. The leading Evangelical defenses of
religious liberty in Virginia also rested in part on the concepts of natural
religion and natural rights. It was these concepts that enabled rationalists and
Evangelicals to form an alliance to promote religious liberty. It follows (as I
shall now argue) that the statute and its adoption are best understood neither
in terms of secular rationalism nor in terms of Evangelicalism but rather in
light of natural religion and natural rights.
At the outset, we should clarify the question we are interested in. Some
forms of history would focus on the social and political forces that brought
about the statute’s adoption or would explore its implications for religion,
politics, and society in Virginia. Although these are relevant to our inquiry,
they are not our principal concern. Instead, the question is how we should
understand the normative principle of religious liberty as it was incorporated
into the fundamental law of the state by the Act for Religious Freedom. What
did that statute mean from a legal and constitutional standpoint?
In pursuing this issue, we should begin with the statute’s language.
Although its rationalism was toned down as it made its way through the
legislature, it clearly is based on ideas of natural religion and natural rights.
The Act declares that God has created the mind free; that human beings are
capable of reaching “truth” through “free argument and debate”; that they have
an inherent right to formulate and argue for their beliefs, as well as to be free
from all compulsion in this sphere; that they are entitled to full and equal “civil
rights” without regard to their religious opinions; that those opinions lie
beyond the legitimate authority of civil government; and that the rights asserted
are among the inviolable “natural rights of mankind.”497

496

497

Ralph L. Ketcham, James Madison and Religion—A New Hypothesis, 38 J. PRESBYTERIAN HIST.
SOC’Y 65, 65 (1960).
Virginia Act, supra note 14.
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At the same time, Jefferson’s statute does not articulate these ideas in a way
that is antagonistic to revealed religion, for the Act speaks respectfully of “the
Holy author of our religion,” “the ministry,” and the “faith” of individuals.498
The statute seems to assume that individuals reasonably can hold a variety of
religious views. It also incorporates a number of points that would appeal to
dissenting Protestants, such as a denunciation of rulers who would impose
their (quite possibly false) opinions on others.499 Yet it studiously refrains from
using explicitly Christian language. In short, like Madison’s Memorial, the Act
is a classic instance of a document that is founded on natural religion but open
to revealed religion, that appeals to both rationalist and pietist defenders of
religious freedom, and that secures this freedom to everyone under the
doctrine of natural rights.
This leads to the next point: the Act’s supporters and their views. Although
a wave of Evangelical activity may have ensured the defeat of the Assessment
Bill, that activity was not sufficient to secure the adoption of a law protecting
religious liberty. Instead, that result was achieved by a broader political and
legislative coalition that also included Anglicans (or Episcopalians, as they
became known after the Revolution).500
As we have seen, eighteenth-century Anglican thought had both a
traditionalist and a rationalist strand.501 The latter emphasized the importance
of reason as well as the harmony between natural and revealed religion. 502
Some rationalists agreed with traditionalists on the value of an established
church. 503
But others strongly supported religious liberty and
disestablishment.504 During the mid-1780s, individuals who took this liberal
Episcopalian position held about nineteen seats in the House of Delegates. 505
498
499
500
501
502
503

504
505

Id.
Id.
See, e.g., BUCKLEY, ESTABLISHING, supra note 288, at 80.
See supra text accompanying notes 286–87.
See supra text accompanying notes 288–90.
For example, James Maury’s discourse was written to defend the established church against the
challenge posed by Separate Baptists. See MAURY, supra note 288; BUCKLEY, ESTABLISHING, supra
note 288, at 43.
See, e.g., BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 124–25, 128, 130–31, 164.
See id. app. II, at 192–200 (listing a group of delegates who favored a church-state relationship as
well as a group that opposed one—a category that he subdivides between Episcopalian rationalists and
predominantly Presbyterian dissenters).
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Together with a similar number of Evangelicals, they had the strength to block
the Assessment Bill and to enact Jefferson’s statute.506 A few months later, such
efforts to secure religious liberty and to dissolve the union between church and
state were hailed as a triumph for rational religion and “the rights of humanity”
in a sermon preached to the Episcopal Church of Virginia by the Rev. James
Madison, who was soon to become its first bishop.507
The other main part of the coalition for religious liberty consisted of
Evangelical dissenters from the established church. This was not a unified
group, however, for it consisted of several distinct denominations, the largest
of which were the Presbyterians and Baptists. At this time, nearly all the
Evangelical members of the House of Delegates were Presbyterians.508
Presbyterians had long resented the dominance of the Anglican Church in
Virginia. 509 They were committed to religious liberty and equality for all
Christian sects.510 During the fall of 1784, they expressed qualified support for
an assessment because of religion’s importance for “the existence and welfare”
of society. 511 The following summer, however, they changed course and
denounced Henry’s proposal as an invasion of the religious sphere and “a
direct violation of the Declaration of Rights.” 512 As we have seen, their
memorial to the General Assembly contained strong elements of natural
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See id.; BUCKLEY, ESTABLISHING, supra note 288, at 80; supra Part IV.A.
See JAMES MADISON, A SERMON PREACHED BEFORE THE CONVENTION OF THE PROTESTANT
EPISCOPAL CHURCH IN THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, ON THE TWENTY SIXTH OF MAY, 1786, at 3–7
(Richmond, Thomas Nicolson 1786). In a statement that epitomizes natural religion, Madison
asserted that “religion, to be profitable to the individual and acceptable to God, must be the result of
free inquiry and the determination of reason. This right of free inquiry, and of judging for ourselves
is a right natural and unalienable.” Id. at 10. For Madison, this right was not only “the glory of our
nature” and “the truest source of joy and triumph to an American,” it was also “the indispensable
duty of a Christian.” Id.
See BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, app. II, at 199–200.
See id. at 137–39.
See Memorial of the Presbytery of Hanover, Virginia (Oct. 24, 1776), in SACRED RIGHTS OF
CONSCIENCE, supra note 434, at 269, 269–70, https://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/documen
t/the-memorial-of-hanover-presbytery/ [https://perma.cc/J645-83Z6] [hereinafter Presbyterian
Memorial (1776)].
Memorial of the Presbytery of Hanover, Virginia (Oct. 28, 1784), in SACRED RIGHTS OF
CONSCIENCE, supra note 434, at 301, 303.
See Presbyterian Memorial (1785), supra note 458, at 304–05.
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religion and urged the adoption of Jefferson’s Bill.513 It therefore is fair to say
that ideas of natural religion and natural rights were affirmed by both of the
groups—Presbyterians and liberal Episcopalians—that formed the legislative
coalition that passed the Act for Religious Freedom.
Much of the revisionist case instead focuses on the Baptists. The most
widely subscribed petitions against the Assessment Bill probably were their
work.514 These petitions objected to the bill primarily in Christian terms. By
imposing a tax for religious purposes, the legislature would act “contrary to the
spirit of the Gospel” by disregarding Christ’s “plain directions” that the church
and its teachers should be supported “by free Contributions.”515 Even if the
bill’s supporters are correct “that Deism with it’s banefull Influence is
spreading itself over the state,” the proper remedy is not to establish religion.516
Instead, the rulers should promote religion by setting a good example as well
as by adopting laws to punish immorality.517 Ministers should demonstrate to
the world that they are called to their work by “divine Grace” and not by a
mere desire to profit from ecclesial employment.518 But on no account should
civil government meddle in the religious realm.519
Several scholars rely on these petitions as important evidence that the
adoption of the Virginia statute should be regarded as a victory for an
Evangelical rather than an Enlightenment view of religious liberty.520 But this
evidence does not bear the weight that is placed on it.
To begin with, we should recall that the specific purpose of these petitions
was to oppose the Assessment Bill. In turn, the rationale for that bill was that
it offered the best way to diffuse “Christian knowledge” throughout the
community and to thereby promote social peace and morality. 521 In this
context, it is perfectly understandable that the petitions should contend that,
far from promoting true Christianity, the Assessment Bill violated the most
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See supra text accompanying notes 461–64.
See BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 148–49 & n.12; Isaac, supra note 459, at 150–51. For a
good example of these petitions, see Westmoreland Petition, supra note 465.
Westmoreland Petition, supra note 465, at 307–08.
Id. at 308.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 307–08.
See, e.g., BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 148–49; McConnell, supra note 6, at 1440.
Assessment Bill, supra note 434, at 252.
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basic principles of that religion as the Baptists understood it. Thus, the bill
could be accused of failing on its own terms by undermining the very goal it
sought to promote. The petitions made no effort to articulate a general
rationale for protecting religious liberty in the new republic. There is no
reason to suppose that, if they had, they would have offered a justification that
focused purely on the idea of Christian liberty to the exclusion of other
rationales.
On the contrary, the petitioners took pains to argue not only that the
Assessment Bill contravened “the spirit of the Gospel,” but also that it
infringed the natural freedom and equality of non-Christians by granting
Christians exclusive benefits in violation of “the Bill of Rights.”522 In this way
the petitioners signaled that they accepted the doctrine of natural rights and
recognized that those rights belonged to everyone regardless of religion.
Although the natural rights argument did not hold center stage in these
petitions, it nevertheless was integral to the position they took. That position
was based on a sharp distinction between church and state. The petitions’ first
argument was that the Assessment Bill violated the doctrines of the Christian
church as set forth in the Gospel, while the second argument was that the Bill
violated the principles of the Commonwealth of Virginia as set forth in the
Declaration of Rights. The first argument expressed the Baptists’ own
religious beliefs, while the second appealed to precepts that had been declared
by the representatives of all the people of Virginia. In this way, the two
arguments were perfectly complementary, and from a Baptist perspective each
would have been lacking without the other.
It is hardly surprising that the petitioners did not undertake to develop a
general defense of religious liberty, for they were well aware that a powerful
one already existed in the form of Jefferson’s Bill. The Baptists had endorsed
that bill when it was first published in 1779, and they were among its principal
supporters. 523 Some of its key language was incorporated into the Baptist
petitions of 1785, including the assertion that religious matters “are not the
object of Civil Government, nor under it’s jurisdiction.” 524 The Baptists
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Id. at 307–08.
See BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 55; BUCKLEY, ESTABLISHING, supra note 288, at 71–72.
See Westmoreland Petition, supra note 465, at 308.
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welcomed the statute’s passage in 1786, and in later years they strongly
identified with it.525
Some scholars contend that the Baptists supported Jefferson’s statute not
for what it said but for what it did: the law “served their purposes” by
disestablishing Anglicanism, protecting religious liberty, and enabling them to
promote “the salvation of a Christian America through the Gospel message.” 526
But some prominent Baptists advocated for religious liberty in ways that
strongly echoed Locke and Jefferson. For example, Elder John Leland
presented such a justification in a sermon entitled The Rights of Conscience
Inalienable.527 Leland’s views are of particular interest because he not only
played an important role in Baptist political activity at this time, but also was
instrumental in securing Madison’s commitment to promote a federal
constitutional amendment to protect religious liberty.528
According to Leland, the American states have recognized that civil
government should be based on “compact.”529 Individuals enter civil society
to protect themselves and their property from violence. 530 The “rights of
conscience” are “inalienable,” for “religion is a matter between God and
individuals,” and one’s “mind should always be open to conviction” and willing
to “receive that doctrine which appears the best demonstrated.” 531 Truth
525

526

527

528
529
530
531

See Isaac, supra note 459, at 158–59. An early official history of the Virginia Baptists lauded not
only Jefferson’s Bill but also Madison’s Memorial, observing that “[f]or elegance of style, strength of
reasoning, and purity of principle, [the latter] has . . . never [been] surpassed by any thing in the
English language.” ROBERT B. SEMPLE, THE HISTORY OF THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF THE
BAPTISTS IN VIRGINIA 33, 72 (John O’Lynch 1810), [https://perma.cc/6XBF-VTST]. Passages like
this suggest that contemporaries saw less difference between the Evangelical and Enlightenment
positions on religious liberty than modern scholars do. Cf. BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at
148 (asserting that there was a “wide gap” between those two positions but acknowledging that this
gap may have been “unrecognized at the time”).
BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 180–81. Buckley offers this assertion not only about the
Baptists but also about the Evangelicals in general. This view fails to capture the position of the
Presbyterians, who highlighted ideas of natural religion and natural rights in their memorial against
the Assessment Bill. See supra text accompanying notes 458–64.
JOHN LELAND, THE RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE INALIENABLE (1791), reprinted in 2 POLITICAL
SERMONS, supra note 105, at 1079, 1080 [hereinafter LELAND, CONSCIENCE ].
See RAGOSTA, supra note 6, at 167–68.
LELAND, CONSCIENCE, supra note 527, at 1083.
Id. at 1084.
Id. at 1084–85. In a similar vein, a Baptist petition against the Assessment Bill observed that
“Christianity addresses itself to the understanding and affections of Men, and [seeks] to attach them
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comes from studying “nature and reason” as well as “the bible,” and is best
pursued through free and open discussion.532 It follows that everyone should
be allowed to “maintain the principles that he believes [and to] worship
according to his own faith, either one God, three Gods, no God, or twenty
Gods.”533 Human lawmakers may not compel anyone to pay taxes for religious
purposes, and compulsion of this sort would be unjust to Deists, Jews,
Catholics, Muslims, and others who reject Christianity.534
Leland’s views present a paradox. For six decades, he travelled the
countryside preaching a traditional Calvinist message “that human powers
were too degenerate to effect a change of heart by self-exertion” and that
individuals could be saved only through faith in the atoning power of Christ’s
death on the cross. 535 Yet when Leland sought to persuade the public to
protect religious liberty, he emphasized reason and natural rights. How can
these two positions be reconciled?
In part, the answer seems to be that Baptists like Leland did not see as
much tension between the two positions as we might today. God was both the
creator and the redeemer of the world. While Leland might believe that

532
533

534

535

to its Interests only by Arguments adapted to convince them of its native excellence, and its
importance to their happiness. If these considerations fail it has no others to propose.”
Remonstrance and Petition of Committee of General Baptist Association at 2 (Aug. 13 , 1785,
received by General Assembly Nov. 3, 1785), http://www.virginiamemory.com/collections/petitions
[https://perma.cc/QE4S-UF9L] [hereinafter General Baptist Petition].
LELAND, CONSCIENCE, supra note 527, at 1089–90.
Id. at 1089. This statement recalls Jefferson’s famous assertion that religion is beyond the state’s
authority because “it does me no injury for my neighbour to say there are twenty gods, or no god. It
neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg.” JEFFERSON, supra note 473, QUERY XVII, at 285.
LELAND, CONSCIENCE, supra note 527, at 1092–93. In other writings, Leland articulated these
themes in equally powerful terms. See, e.g., JOHN LELAND, The Virginia Chronicle, in THE
WRITINGS OF THE LATE ELDER JOHN LELAND 91, 105-09, 117-19, 121-23 (L.F. Greene ed., New
York, G.W. Wood 1845), https://ia802605.us.archive.org/11/items/writingsoflateel00lela/writingsofl
ateel00lela.pdf [https://perma.cc/RD6N-U6YJ] [hereinafter LELAND’S WRITINGS]; JOHN LELAND,
The Yankee Spy (1794), in LELAND’S WRITINGS, supra, at 213, 219–29; JOHN LELAND, Short
Sayings, in LELAND’S WRITINGS, supra, at 572, 573, 578–81. Leland was not alone in taking such
an approach. For instance, the first election sermon delivered by a Baptist clergyman to the
Massachusetts legislature also defended civil and religious liberty in Lockean terms. See SAMUEL
STILLMAN, A SERMON PREACHED BEFORE THE HONORABLE COUNCIL . . . at 7–9, 11–14, 22
(Boston, T. & J. Fleet 1779) [https://perma.cc/D9ZT-N4YP].
JOHN LELAND, Events in the Life of John Leland, in LELAND’S W RITINGS, supra note 534, at 2, 28,
39.
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salvation came only through faith, that did not negate the idea that God was
also the author of the natural order and of the rights that human beings had
within it. One could believe in “nature’s God” as well as in the God of the
Bible; there was no necessary conflict between understanding life in this world
in terms of natural rights and believing that revelation offers the only path to
attaining life in the world to come.536 To put it another way, however God may
have determined to bring about salvation, individuals have an inalienable right
to liberty of conscience in relation to other human beings.537
Leland’s writings also suggest another (not incompatible) way to resolve
the paradox. He is well aware that different forms of discourse are called for
in different spheres of life. For example, although it was reasonable for the
statesmen who drafted the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights to declare
“that all men came into the world free and independent,” it is equally
reasonable for parents to regard young children as dependent and in need of
control.538 By the same token, it may be appropriate to describe religious
liberty as one of the inherent rights of humans as rational creatures when
advocating for its protection in the constitution of a liberal polity, while
asserting that all humans are naturally sinful when speaking from an
Evangelical theological perspective.539 These different forms of discourse are
suited to the contexts in which they are used and to the audiences to whom
they are addressed. On this view, there is no necessary contradiction between
preaching Baptist doctrines regarding salvation, as Leland did throughout his
ministry, and defending liberty of conscience as a natural right, as he did in
advocating constitutional and legal reform.540
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538
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JOHN LELAND, A Blow at the Root (1801), in LELAND’S W RITINGS, supra note 534, at 233, 255; see
also JOHN LELAND, Circular Letter of the Shaftsbury Association (1793), in LELAND’S WRITINGS,
supra note 534, at 196, 196–99 (presenting reasons for holding that the Bible is the word of God);
JOHN LELAND, An Elective Judiciary (1805), in LELAND’S W RITINGS, supra note 534, at 283, 294
(stating that the Christian religion involves mysteries that are “not of this world” and that cannot be
understood through natural reason).
See, e.g., LELAND, A Blow at the Root, supra note 536, at 239 (discussing the inalienable right to
freedom of conscience).
Id. at 235–36 (paraphrasing MASS. CONST. of 1780, supra note 403, pt. 1, art. I).
See id. at 237, 239.
See supra text accompanying notes 529–34; JOHN LELAND, Speech Delivered in the House of
Representatives of Massachusetts, on the Subject of Religious Freedom (1811), in LELAND’S
WRITINGS, supra note 534, at 353.
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This distinction between different forms of discourse may also shed some
light on the views of the Rev. Isaac Backus, the Massachusetts pastor and
scholar who was perhaps the most influential Baptist leader in late eighteenthcentury America. 541 Although his writings on religious liberty endorsed
Locke’s position on the separation of church and state, they generally relied
not on natural rights theory but on Scripture and Baptist theology.542 Yet in
1779 when a friend asked him to draft a bill of rights in advance of the
Massachusetts constitutional convention, the document he produced
emphasized the “natural, inherent, and unalienable rights of mankind.”543 The
article on religion read as follows:
As God is the only worthy object of all religious worship, and nothing can be
true religion but a voluntary obedience unto his revealed will, of which each
rational soul has an equal right to judge for itself, every person has an
unalienable right to act in all religious affairs according to the full persuasion
of his own mind, where others are not injured thereby.544

The language of rational religion in this passage is unmistakable. To be
sure, the reference to God’s “revealed will” might suggest that “true religion”
is based on revelation.545 During this era, however, it often was said that God
revealed his will through nature and reason as well as through Scripture.546 In
any event, the passage makes clear that “each rational soul” has a right to use
“his own mind” to determine religious truth.547 Thus, while some of Backus’s
writings argue for religious freedom as a matter of “Christian liberty” under
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On Backus, see MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 416; MILLER, supra note 10, at 101–13, 387.
See ISAAC BACKUS, A SEASONABLE PLEA FOR LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE 4-5 (Boston, Philip
Freeman 1770), http://name.umdl.umich.edu/N09053.0001.001 [https://perma.cc/RLF9-8RYH];
ISAAC BACKUS, AN APPEAL TO THE PUBLIC FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (1773), in BACKUS
PAMPHLETS, supra note 413, at 303; id. at 40–44 (editor’s introduction).
Isaac Backus’ Draft for a Bill of Rights for the Massachusetts Constitution, art. I (1779), in BACKUS
PAMPHLETS, supra note 413, at 487 [hereinafter Backus, Draft].
Id. art. II, at 487.
Id.; see MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 416, at 144.
See, e.g., Gerrish, supra note 15, at 646–47 (distinguishing between “general revelation” through
nature and “special revelation” through Scripture). For example, Locke maintained that “Reason is
natural Revelation, whereby [GOD] communicates to Mankind that portion of Truth, which he has
laid within the reach of their natural Faculties,” while “ Revelation is natural Reason enlarged by a
new set of Discoveries communicated by GOD immediately.” LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING,
supra note 19, bk. IV, ch. XIX, § 4, at 698.
Backus, Draft, supra note 543, art. II, at 487.

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

88

[Vol. 23:1

the Gospel,548 his draft bill of rights portrays it as “an unalienable right” of all
human beings that has no inherent connection with Christianity.549 To put the
point somewhat differently, Backus’s draft resembles both the Virginia
Declaration and Jefferson’s Bill in using some language that resonates with
Christianity,550 but in ultimately affirming that rational creatures have a natural
right to follow the judgments of their own minds about religious truth.551

C. Conclusion
The revisionist scholarship of recent decades has greatly enriched our
understanding of the theological ideas and political forces that contributed to
the victory of religious liberty and disestablishment in Virginia. As I have
explained in this Part, however, it would be a mistake to conceive of the
normative constitutional meaning of that victory in terms of the Evangelicals’
distinctive theological position. Instead, that meaning is best understood in
terms of the principles that provided the basis of their coalition with rationalist
Christians and Enlightenment liberals and that were articulated in Jefferson’s
Bill—that because God created the mind free, individuals have an inalienable
natural right to form and advocate their own opinions regarding religious truth
and that the state has no legitimate power in this realm.552
The revisionist position also takes another form. In an important book
entitled The Religious Roots of the First Amendment, Nicholas P. Miller
argues that the founding-era conception of religious freedom derived from a
548
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ISAAC BACKUS, A DOOR OPENED FOR CHRISTIAN LIBERTY (1783), in BACKUS PAMPHLETS, supra
note 413, at 427, 436.
Backus, Draft, supra note 543, art. II, at 487.
In addition to the references to God’s “revealed will” and the “soul,” this language includes “the full
persuasion of his own mind.” This phrase, which also appears in the English version of Locke’s
Letter Concerning Toleration, ultimately derives from St. Paul’s Letter to the Romans. See LOCKE,
TOLERATION, supra note 41, at 13 (“All the Life and Power of true Religion consists in the inward
and full perswasion of the mind . . . .”); Romans 14:5 (“Let every man be fully persuaded in his own
mind.”). All biblical quotations herein are to the King James Version, which was in general use at
the time.
See supra text accompanying notes 378–83 (Virginia Declaration), 468–82 (Jefferson’s Bill). In 1789,
Backus praised Virginia for adopting Jefferson’s statute. See BUCKLEY, ESTABLISHING, supra note
288, at 40–43.
See Virginia Act, supra note 14.
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particular strand of Protestant thought.553 At the heart of the Reformation was
the idea of sola scriptura—the assertion that religious truth was to be found not
in traditional church teachings but in Holy Scripture alone.554 The question
then became how—and by whom—Scripture was to be interpreted. The
jurisdictions that broke from Rome generally established churches that
asserted their own authority to interpret the Bible and to impose religious
doctrines with the backing of the state.555 Dissenting from this position, other
Protestant sects such as Baptists and Quakers insisted that every believer
possessed a “right of private judgment,” that is, a right to interpret Scripture
for himself with the assistance of the Holy Spirit.556
Miller contends that this notion of a right of private judgment was the
starting point for the modern conception of religious liberty. Initially, that right
related only to biblical interpretation. 557 Over time, however, dissenting
Protestants came to conceive of the right as extending to religious truth in
general.558 In the late seventeenth century, the principle of private judgment
was given philosophical form by Locke.559 Eighteenth-century Americans then
drew on Lockean as well as dissenting Protestant thought when they asserted
that individuals had an inherent right to religious liberty that was entitled to
legal and constitutional protection.560
Miller persuasively shows that this Protestant view made an essential
contribution to the American conception of religious liberty. At times, he
553
554
555
556
557
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MILLER, supra note 10.
See id. at 17, 93.
See, e.g., id. at 23, 27, 29.
See id. at 1–3, 23, 31, 37–38.
See id. at 1–2.
See id. at 76–78.
See id. at 78–79, 88–89. As we have seen, a principal goal of Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration
was to show that in religious matters “[e]very man . . . has the supreme and absolute Authority of
judging for himself.” LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 41, at 46. It should be noted, however, that
when Locke uses the actual term “private judgment,” it is generally in a pejorative sense. See, e.g.,
id. at 48 (asserting that “the private Judgment of any Person concerning a Law enacted in Political
Matters, for the publick Good, does not take away the Obligation of that Law, nor deserve a
Dispensation”); id. at 48–49 (“[T]he private Judgment of any particular Person, if erroneous, does
not exempt him from the obligation of Law . . . .”); LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 30, bk. II, §§
87–88, at 324-25 (explaining that a basic goal of the social contract is to ensure that disputes are settled
by the judgment of the community rather than the “private judgement” of individuals).
See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 10, at 53–54, 85–88, 145–46.
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describes dissenting Protestantism as a movement that “worked alongside”
and “converged” with “other ideologies” such as Enlightenment liberalism. 561
Yet Miller often seems to make a more far-reaching claim: that the foundingera conception should be understood primarily in terms of dissenting
Protestant thought.562 On this view, Locke’s writings on toleration merely gave
“philosophical and political expression [to] what were perceived to be
Protestant theological principles,” but did not add anything essential to them.563
“It was Locke’s formulation . . . of dissenting Protestantism,” Miller concludes,
“mediated by Madison, Witherspoon, and other key American thinkers, . . .
that carried the day in the founding of the American republic.”564
In my view, this broader form of Miller’s position is unconvincing for two
reasons. First, we should not focus on dissenting Protestantism at the expense
of other influences. Although the right of private judgment was a distinctively
Protestant idea in origin, the same cannot be said of reason and nature—ideas
that were no less central to the eighteenth-century American understanding of
religious liberty. Among the sources of those ideas were modern natural
science 565 and the tradition of natural law and natural right theory which
stretched back through early modern and medieval Scholasticism to classical
Roman and Greek philosophy.566
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Id. at 1, 4, 7.
See, e.g., id. at 3 (asserting that the right of private judgment “grew from theological rather than secular
Enlightenment roots”); id. at 4 (“Disestablishment in America was a populist movement where
religious, and not Enlightenment, influences predominated.”); id. at 13 (maintaining that dissenting
Protestants “played [a] greater role [than Madison] in bringing the principle of religious liberty and
disestablishment to the early American republic”).
Id. at 77–82, 90; see also id. at 80–82, 89 (suggesting that Locke can best be understood as a dissenting
Protestant theorist).
Id. at 162; see also id. at 145 (referring to “the core theological and biblical issues that lay at the heart
of Madison’s belief in the right of personal liberty”). For another sophisticated version of this
argument, see SMITH, supra note 9, at 39–40 (arguing that “insofar as it fed into American religious
freedom,” the Enlightenment is best understood as “a conduit” for Christian ideas).
See supra Part II.E.
See, e.g., HAAKONSSEN, supra note 192, ch. 1; SCHNEEWIND, supra note 228, at 17; LEO STRAUSS,
NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY (1953). Miller shows that even before Locke, dissenting Protestant
writers made appeals to reason and nature. See MILLER, supra note 10, at 69, 77–78, 81–82. But
he does not explore the origin of those ideas or recognize the ways in which they are in tension with
core principles of Protestantism like sola scriptura and the corruption of human nature by the Fall,
see supra text accompanying notes 295–97, 554.
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Second, we should recognize that, over the course of time, the idea of a
right of private judgment evolved in ways that carried it far beyond its
Reformation roots. As Miller observes, it developed from a right to interpret
Scripture for oneself into a right to seek religious truth in general. 567 The
progression did not stop there, however. By the eighteenth century, the right
to private judgment was being described in even broader terms. As Hutcheson
put it, it consisted in the “natural right” of “every intelligent being” to form all
of “his own opinions, speculative or practical, . . . according to the evidence
that appears to him”—a right that arises “from the very constitution of the
rational mind.”568
In short, between the Protestant Reformation and the American founding,
the idea of private judgment underwent a fundamental transformation, by
which it came to encompass not only a right of religious believers to interpret
the sacred texts of their own tradition with the assistance of divine illumination,
but also a right of all human beings to use their reason to search for religious,
philosophical, moral, and other forms of truth.569 It was this reformulation of
the idea in the universal language of natural religion and natural rights that
enabled it to be integrated into the intellectual worldview of the eighteenth
century, to be used as the basis of a broad political coalition for the protection
of religious liberty, and to be incorporated into American legal and
constitutional documents that declared the natural rights of mankind.
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See MILLER, supra note 10, at 76–78.
1 HUTCHESON, SYSTEM, supra note 194, bk. II, ch. 5, § 3, at 295. For an earlier statement to this
effect, see F RANCIS HUTCHESON, AN INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINAL OF OUR IDEAS OF BEAUTY
AND VIRTUE bk. II, § VII, at 186 (Wolfgang Leidhold ed., rev. ed., Liberty Fund 2008) (2d ed.
1726), https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/hutcheson-an-inquiry-into-the-original-of-our-ideas-of-beautyand-virtue-1726-2004 [https://perma.cc/H564-34DY].
Like Hutcheson, Witherspoon taught that individuals have an inalienable “right of private judgment
in matters of opinion,” thought, and knowledge, as well as “in all matters of religion.”
WITHERSPOON, supra note 246, at 56, 69. In his American edition of Blackstone, the Jeffersonian
jurist and Deist St. George Tucker articulated this more comprehensive view when he wrote that
individuals have an inalienable “right of personal opinion” that embraces both (1) “liberty of
conscience in all matters relative to religion” and (2) “liberty of speech and of discussion in all
speculative matters, whether religious, philosophical, or political.” 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND app. Note G, at 3–4, 6–7, 11 (St. George Tucker ed.,
Philadelphia, Young & Small 1803), https://lonang.com/library/reference/tucker-blackstone-notesreference/tuck-2g/ [https://perma.cc/5W6B-HWSA].
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V. THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AND BILL OF
RIGHTS

A. The Debate over the Constitution
1. The Demand for a Bill of Rights
When the Federal Convention met during the summer of 1787 to draft a
new constitution, the delegates focused on strengthening the powers of the
national government and on reaching compromises between competing state
and regional interests. Securing constitutional protection for individual rights
was at most a peripheral concern. Toward the convention’s end, George
Mason of Virginia and Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts moved that a
committee be appointed to draft a bill of rights, but their proposal was rejected
with little debate.570
This decision was “a critical error that almost proved fatal,” for the lack of
a bill of rights turned out to be the most effective line of attack against the
Constitution when it was submitted to the people for ratification.571 In state
after state, Antifederalists excoriated the document for failing to secure “the
great, important rights of humanity” which were “essential to liberty and
happiness.”572 Together with trial by jury and freedom of speech and press,
these rights included “LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE.” 573 As one writer put it,
invoking the natural rights/natural religion language of the Pennsylvania
Declaration of Rights, “all men have a natural and unalienable right to worship
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See JAMES MADISON, THE DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IN
CONVENTION HELD AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 538 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1827),
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/madison-the-debates-on-the-adoption-of-the-federal-constitution-vol5 [https://perma.cc/PV6D-QH96] [hereinafter MADISON, DEBATES].
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL
CONGRESS ix (Helen E. Veit, Kenneth R. Bowling & Charlene Bangs Bickford eds., 1991).
3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 317, 593 (2d ed. 1827) (remarks of Patrick Henry in Virginia
Convention). Permanent citations for Elliot’s debates may be found at the following locations:
volume 2, https://perma.cc/4FKE-NPSD; volume 3, https://perma.cc/FFY9-TBMA; volume 4,
https://perma.cc/2DZL-F3LY.
Id.; AN O LD WHIG NO. 5, in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST § 3.3.25–26, at 34–35 (Herbert
J. Storing & Murray Dry eds., 1981).
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Almighty God, according to the dictates of their own consciences and
understanding.”574
In response, the Constitution’s Federalist supporters insisted that a bill of
rights was unnecessary (since federal officials would have “no particle of . . .
jurisdiction” over subjects like religion and press) and might even be
“dangerous” (because it was impossible to enumerate all the rights of
individuals, and the failure to mention a particular right would imply that it
was not meant to be protected).575 But abstract legal arguments of this sort did
little to stem the tide of popular support for a bill of rights. As Patrick Henry
observed in the Virginia convention, “[i]f you had a thousand acres of land” at
stake in a transaction, you would insist that your rights be spelled out in no
uncertain terms; and this was all the more true when your “most valuable rights
and privileges” were involved.576
To overcome such opposition, Madison and some Federalist colleagues
expressed a willingness to adopt further protections for rights after the
Constitution was ratified.577 A number of state conventions put forward such
amendments.578 The most fully developed proposal on religious liberty came
from Virginia:
That religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of
discharging it can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or
violence, and therefore all men have an equal, natural and unalienable right
to the free exercise of religion according to the dictates of conscience, and that
no particular religious sect or society ought to be favored or established by
Law in preference to others.579

Four features of this proposal are striking. First, its assertion that religion
“can be directed only by reason and conviction” adopts the natural religion
language of article 16 of the Virginia Declaration of Rights. 580 Second, the
proposal amplifies that article’s natural rights language by asserting that “all
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CENTINEL NO. 2, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST, supra note 573, § 2.7.55, at 152.
THE FEDERALIST NOS. 69, 84, at 422, 513–14 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
3 ELLIOT, supra note 572, at 318.
See Paul Finkelman, James Madison and the Bill of Rights: A Reluctant Paternity , 1990 SUP. CT.
REV. 301, 301 n.2, 324–25, 327–28.
These proposals are collected in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 571, at 14–28.
Id. at 19.
See supra text accompanying notes 378–83.
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men have an equal, natural, and unalienable right to the free exercise of
religion, according to the dictates of conscience.” Third, the proposal omits
article 16’s admonition that all people should practice Christian charity toward
one another. Finally, in accord with the events of the mid-1780s, the proposal
firmly connects religious liberty with the nonestablishment of religion.581
Virginia’s proposal was later endorsed by North Carolina and Rhode
Island, both of which refused to ratify the Constitution without amendments. 582
Two other states called for a bill of rights to be added after ratification. New
York submitted an amendment declaring “[t]hat the People have an equal,
natural and unalienable right, freely and peaceably to Exercise their Religion
according to the dictates of Conscience, and that no Religious Sect or Society
ought to be favoured or established by Law in preference to others.”583 New
Hampshire would simply have stated that “Congress shall make no Laws
touching Religion, or to infringe the rights of Conscience.” 584 Additional
proposals on religious liberty came from the delegates who dissented from
ratification in Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Maryland.585 Notably, all the
proposals that emerged from the state conventions articulated the principle of
religious liberty in general terms, and none made any reference to Christianity.
Likewise, while some of the ratifications thanked God for the opportunity to
make a national Constitution, they did not use specifically Christian language
in this regard.586

2. The Ban on Religious Tests
Further insight into the conception of religious liberty that informed the
Constitution may be found in the debates over the clause in Article VI which
obligated all federal and state officials to make an “Oath or Affirmation” to
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See supra Part IV.A.
See 4 ELLIOT, supra note 572, at 242, 244; THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS § 1.1.2.7, at 12–13
(Neil H. Cogan ed., 2d. ed. 2015); AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY
6–7 (2005).
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 571, at 22.
Id. at 17.
See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 582, at 11–12.
See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT, supra note 572, at 176 (ratification by Massachusetts convention “acknowledging,
with grateful hearts, the goodness of the Supreme Ruler of the universe”).
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support the Constitution, but which added that “no religious Test shall ever
be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United
States.” 587 The ban on religious tests was adopted unanimously by the
Philadelphia Convention despite Roger Sherman’s suggestion that the
provision was unnecessary in light of “the prevailing liberality” of public
sentiment on such matters. 588 In the state ratifying conventions, some
Antifederalists objected that the provision would allow Jews, Catholics,
Muslims, Pagans, Deists, and even atheists to hold federal office.589 These
delegates asserted that “the Christian religion is best calculated, of all religions,
to make good members of society, on account of its morality.” 590 Some
delegates went so far as to say that “a person could not be a good man without
being a good Christian,” and that “[a]ll those who have any religion are against
the emigration of [non-Christians] from the eastern hemisphere.”591
The Federalists responded that the Constitution aimed to reject this
“intolerant spirit,” which had led to “persecutions and wars of the most
implacable and bloody nature . . . in every part of the world.” 592 As the
Federalist leader and future Supreme Court Justice James Iredell told the
North Carolina convention, America had repudiated the view that “all
wisdom” centered in the rulers, and instead had embraced the more “modest[]
and reasonabl[e]” view “that a man may be of different religious sentiments
from our own, without being a bad member of society.” 593 The ban on
religious tests was “calculated to secure universal religious liberty” by making
all individuals eligible for office without regard to their beliefs.594 Iredell also
discussed Omichund v. Barker,595 the English decision which disavowed the
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U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
MADISON, DEBATES, supra note 570, at 498.
See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT, supra note 572, at 118, 148 (remarks of Dr. Jarvis and Major Lusk in
Massachusetts convention); 4 id. at 191-92, 199, 215 (remarks of Messrs. Henry Abbott, Caldwell,
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4 id. at 199 (remarks of Mr. Caldwell).
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4 id. at 192–93 (remarks of Mr. Iredell in North Carolina convention).

Id.
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notion that only Christian oaths could be relied upon.596 As we have seen, this
decision rested on the view that the practice of oath-taking is not limited to
Christianity but “follows from the Principles of Natural Religion.”597
The idea of natural religion also appeared in other Federalist defenses of
the religious test ban. In the Massachusetts convention, the Rev. Daniel Shute
observed that he did not limit his “charity and confidence” to his fellow
Congregationalists, but instead believed “that there are worthy characters
among men of every denomination—among the Quakers, the Baptists, the
Church of England, the Papists; and even among those who have no other
guide, in the way to virtue and heaven, than the dictates of natural religion.” 598
To disqualify people from public office on account of their religious views
would infringe their “civil rights” without conferring any benefit on the
public.599 The state’s future Chief Justice, Theophilus Parsons, added that it
was impossible to formulate a religious test in a manner that was neither
unacceptably narrow (since no one today “is so illiberal as to wish [to confine
office-holding] to any one sect of Christians”) nor so broad as to be
meaningless, since the term “Christianity” could be used to describe anything
from strict Calvinism to “natural religion.”600 In the end, “the only evidence
we can have of the sincerity of a man’s religion is a good life,” and that is what
voters should focus on.601
In these ways, the ideas of reason and natural religion played a significant
part in the Federalist defense of the religious test ban. Christian arguments
were made as well. Iredell asserted that “[t]he divine Author of our religion
[that is, Christ] never wished for its support by worldly authority.”602 Shute
observed that “[t]he apostle Peter tells us that God is no respecter of persons,
but, in every nation, he that feareth him, and worketh righteousness, is
acceptable to him.”603 Isaac Backus went furthest in this direction when he told
596
597
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See 4 E LLIOT, supra note 572, at 197–98.
Omichund, 22 Eng. Rep. at 347; 2 Equity Cases Abridged at 408 (opinion of Hardwicke, C.); supra
text accompanying notes 181–86 (discussing this case).
2 ELLIOT, supra note 572, at 119 (remarks of Rev. Shute).
Id. at 118.
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Id.
4 id. at 194 (remarks of Mr. Iredell in North Carolina convention).
2 id. at 119 (remarks of Rev. Shute in Massachusetts convention, quoting Acts 10:35).
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the Massachusetts convention that “no man or men can impose any religious
test, without invading the essential prerogatives of our Lord Jesus Christ.” 604
Yet even Backus rested his position on broader grounds when he appealed to
“reason” as well as “the Holy Scriptures” for the principle that “religion is ever
a matter between God and individuals” into which the state may not intrude.605
In short, while the Federalists offered some Christian rationales for the ban,
their defense of “universal religious liberty” ultimately was founded on their
view of what reason required.606

B. The Free Exercise Clause and the Bill of Rights
In early 1789, Madison was elected to the First Congress with key support
from John Leland and other Virginia Baptist leaders, after assuring them that
he believed the Constitution should be amended to protect “all essential
rights,” including freedom of the press and “the rights of Conscience in the
fullest latitude.” 607 Madison strove to make good on this commitment by
persuading Congress to approve a bill of rights. The effort was a lonely one,
for most Federalists were at best indifferent to the project, while Antifederalists
were more interested in fundamentally restructuring the constitutional scheme
in order to diminish federal power.608 That a bill of rights was adopted was
largely due to Madison’s perseverance in the face of these obstacles.609
On June 8, 1789, Madison presented his proposal to the House of
Representatives. His long speech on this occasion offers the greatest insight
into the document’s meaning and goals.610 As he explained, the American
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people had come to believe that constitutional barriers should be erected to
protect “the great rights of mankind” against abuse of power. 611 In a
democratic society, the most serious danger came not from the executive or
even from the legislative branch but from “the body of the people, operating
by the majority against the minority.” 612 The state declarations protected
several categories of rights, including (1) the “natural right[s]” which the people
retain when they establish a government and (2) certain “positive rights” such
as trial by jury, which do not exist in a state of nature but which are made part
of “[the] social compact” because they are “as essential to secure the liberty of
the people as any one of the pre-existent rights of nature.”613
As Madison’s notes for the speech indicate, he regarded liberty of
conscience as an inalienable natural right. 614 To protect this freedom, he
proposed to amend the Constitution to provide that “[t]he civil rights of none
shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any
national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of
conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed.”615 Together with
his other amendments, this proposal was considered first by a House select
committee and then by each chamber.616 As finally adopted, it read, “Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof.”617
Unfortunately, the congressional debates shed little light on the concrete
legal meaning of the Free Exercise Clause. Several broader points do emerge,
however. First, religious liberty was regarded as an inalienable natural right.
This view was reflected not only in Madison’s speech and notes but also in the
draft bill of rights prepared by another select committee member, Roger
Sherman of Connecticut, who placed “the rights of conscience in matters of
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religion” first among the “natural rights which are retained by [the people]
when they enter into society.”618
Their colleagues undoubtedly agreed with this position, which had
become widely accepted in American thought. As we have seen, the idea of
natural rights was associated with the idea of natural religion. In the words of
the Declaration of Independence, natural rights were the rights bestowed on
individuals by “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God.”619 Thus, the fact that
the framers of the Free Exercise Clause saw religious liberty as a natural and
inalienable right supports the view that the provision was informed by the
concept of natural religion.
Further support for this view can be found in the fact that the framers saw
an important connection between freedom of conscience and freedom of
expression. These two liberties were treated as inalienable rights both in
Madison’s notes and in Sherman’s draft.620 Amendments to protect religious
liberty and the freedoms of speech, press, and assembly stood immediately
next to one another throughout the drafting process, from Madison’s original
proposal through the final version of the Bill of Rights, which consolidated all
these rights into the First Amendment.621 The notion that liberty of conscience
and freedom of thought and expression belong together also can be found in
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many of the writers we have discussed.622 It is consistent with the idea that both
of these liberties are encompassed within freedom of mind, or the liberty of
rational creatures to use their faculties to seek and communicate truth about
the most important matters. This view finds classic expression in Jefferson’s
Bill for religious freedom, which proclaims that because “Almighty God hath
created the mind free,” all individuals have a right “to profess, and by argument
to maintain, their opinions in matters of religion.”623
A final point concerns the relationship between religious liberty and
nonestablishment of religion. Once again, these two ideas were joined
together in the text throughout the legislative process. 624 According to
Madison, the ban on establishment was meant to respond to concerns that had
been raised during the ratification debates by providing that “congress should
not establish a religion, and enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor
compel men to worship God in any manner contrary to their conscience.” 625
Of course, it is clear that, in Madison’s words, a law of this sort would “infringe
the rights of conscience,” and no one in the House debates disputed this
view.626 But there was no consensus beyond that point. Some members, like
Daniel Carroll of Maryland, maintained that “the rights of conscience” were
so delicate that they could not “bear the gentlest touch of the governmental
hand,”627 while others, including Peter Silvester of New York and Benjamin
Huntington of Connecticut, feared that if such a ban were interpreted broadly
it would “have a tendency to abolish religion altogether.” 628 As Madison’s
622
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Memorial indicates, he himself believed that government had no legitimate
authority at all in the religious domain.629
In the end, Congress did not attempt to resolve this issue. One reason is
obvious: as Madison repeatedly emphasized, constitutional amendments
could achieve the supermajority required for adoption only if they were
drafted in the form of general principles that commanded broad assent. 630
Accordingly, while the First Amendment prohibited federal laws respecting an
establishment of religion, it did not specify what that meant.
VI. RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS FROM CIVIL LAWS

A. Background
In this Article, I have argued that the central view that informed the Free
Exercise Clause was neither secular liberalism nor Evangelicalism, but natural
religion and natural rights. This view has a bearing on many of the doctrinal
questions that arise under the Clause today. In this Part, I briefly explore what
this view can teach us about the original understanding on one of the most
important issues: whether the Free Exercise Clause gives individuals a
constitutional right to exemption from civil laws that conflict with their
religious beliefs.
The Supreme Court has long grappled with this problem. Nearly a century
and a half ago, Reynolds v. United States631 held that the right to free exercise
did not excuse one from the duty to comply with civil laws.632 In 1963, the
Court reversed course in Sherbert v. Verner633 and ruled that when a general
law has the incidental effect of substantially burdening a person’s religious
practice, the law can be applied to that person only if the government is able
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See CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 571, at 167–68, 176, 200 (remarks of Rep.
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to satisfy strict scrutiny.634 In Employment Division v. Smith,635 however, the
Court effectively repudiated this approach and reverted to the Reynolds
position.636 In turn, this led Congress in 1993 to adopt the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA), which took issue with Smith and sought to restore
the Sherbert standard.637 In City of Boerne v. Flores,638 the Court reaffirmed
Smith and struck down RFRA as applied to the states. But the statute
continues to apply to the federal government itself,639 and many states have
adopted RFRAs of their own. 640 In recent years, the problem of religious
exemptions has only become more controversial as individuals and businesses
have challenged laws that required them to provide contraception to their
employees or to refrain from discriminating against same-sex couples.641
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(declaring in § 2(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1), that the Act seeks “to restore the compelling interest
test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially
burdened”).
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
See State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts , NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx
[https://perma.cc/PW8K-64LV] (last visited Nov. 30, 2020) (observing that “[s]ince 1993, 21 states
have enacted state RFRAs”).
See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (ruling
that the commission violated the Free Exercise Clause by failing to impartially consider whether an
exemption should be accorded to a baker who refused on religious grounds to make a wedding cake
for a same-sex couple); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (holding that a
federal regulation requiring companies to provide health-insurance coverage for certain methods of
contraception violated the federal RFRA); Fulton v. City of Phila., 922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019)
(determining that the city had not contravened the First Amendment rights of a religious organization
that refused to vet same-sex couples to become foster parents because the City had applied its nondiscrimination policy neutrally), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1104 (Feb. 24, 2020) (No. 19-123).

636
637

638
639
640

641

January 2021]

ORIGINS OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE

103

B. General Views on a Right to Religious Exemption During the Founding
Era
Although the majority opinion in Smith was authored by Justice Antonin
Scalia, a leading originalist, it made no effort to explore the founders’ views. 642
In a long and provocative article, Michael W. McConnell sharply criticizes the
Smith position on originalist grounds.643 Drawing upon what I have called the
revisionist historical view, McConnell argues that the Free Exercise Clause
should be understood not in terms of the “Enlightenment” rationalism of
Locke and Jefferson, but rather in terms of a view that accorded much greater
protection to religion. 644 McConnell contends that this broader view was
championed not only by the Evangelicals but also by Madison.645 At the outset
of his Memorial and Remonstrance, Madison invoked article 16 of the
Virginia Declaration of Rights to argue that everyone has a right to exercise
religion in accord with “conviction and conscience.” 646 “This right,” he
continued,
is in its nature an unalienable right. It is unalienable, because the opinions of
men, depending only on the evidence contemplated by their own minds
cannot follow the dictates of other men: It is unalienable also, because what is
here a right towards men, is a duty towards the Creator. It is the duty of every
man to render to the Creator such homage and such only as he believes to be
acceptable to him. This duty is precedent, both in order of time and in degree
of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society. Before any man can be considered
as a member of Civil Society, he must be considered as a subject of the
Governour of the Universe: And if a member of Civil Society, who enters into
any subordinate Association, must always do it with a reservation of his duty
to the General Authority; much more must every man who becomes a
member of any particular Civil Society, do it with a saving of his allegiance to
the Universal Sovereign. We maintain therefore that in matters of Religion,
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no mans right is abridged by the institution of Civil Society and that Religion
is wholly exempt from its cognizance.647

According to McConnell, this passage “suggests an approach toward
religious liberty consonant with” an entitlement to religious exemptions. “If
the scope of religious liberty is defined by [an individual’s own understanding
of his] religious duty,” McConnell reasons, “and if the claims of civil society
are subordinate to the claims of religious freedom, it would seem to follow
that the dictates of religious faith must take precedence over the laws of the
state, even if they are secular and generally applicable.”649 Dissenting in City of
Boerne, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor adopts this reading of Madison and
uses it to argue that the original understanding supports mandatory religious
exemptions.650
A little reflection, however, shows that this could hardly have been what
Madison meant. The position that he takes in the Memorial is absolute: “in
matters of Religion, no mans right is abridged by the institution of Civil Society
and . . . Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance.”651 If, as McConnell
and O’Connor believe, this position should be understood to refer to religious
exemptions, the result would be an extraordinarily broad privilege to disobey
the law on grounds of conscience. For instance, no one who had a religious
objection to paying taxes would be obliged to do so. There is no reason to
believe that Madison held this view.
The problem with the McConnell-O’Connor interpretation is that it
overlooks the political dispute that the Memorial was meant to address, and
instead applies that document’s reasoning to a very different issue. The
Memorial was directed against Henry’s bill to institute a tax for the support of
the Christian religion. 652 The petition’s first section argued that when
648
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individuals enter the social contract, they grant civil society no authority
whatever over religious matters, and so the government has no power to tax
the people for such purposes. The argument is not that religious liberty
imposes limits on the government’s authority to make laws on civil matters,
but that the government has no business legislating on religious ones. This
insistence that religion and state are separate realms cuts against the view that
religious believers can demand exemption from civil laws. Indeed, the only
part of the Memorial that explicitly mentions exemptions criticizes them for
drawing improper distinctions between religious groups.653
These observations point toward a broader understanding of the lateeighteenth-century movement to promote religious liberty. The movement’s
main objective was not to seek exemptions from the state’s laws but to draw
clear boundaries between the religious and civil realms.654 As Baptists put it in
the most widely subscribed petition against the Assessment Bill, “Let religious
Societies Manage the affairs of Religion and [let] Government exercise it’s
Concern about the Civil Right and Temporal privileges of Man.”655 In support
of this view, Evangelicals cited scriptures asserting that Christ’s kingdom is not
of this world656 and distinguishing between the claims of God and Caesar.657 As
we have seen, many Evangelicals also were willing to employ the language of
natural rights. 658 Indeed, they needed to do so to pursue a second main
objective of the movement: ensuring that the members of all religious groups
enjoyed equal rights within the commonwealth.659
This is the language that Madison uses in the first section of the Memorial.
He begins by quoting article 16’s articulation of the core principle of natural
653
654
655
656
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See Madison, Memorial, supra note 440, § 4.
See Hamburger, Exemption, supra note 643, at 936–46.
Westmoreland Petition, supra note 465, at 308.
See, e.g., Presbyterian Memorial (1776), supra note 510, at 270 (paraphrasing John 18:36); General
Baptist Petition, supra note 531 (same); STILLMAN, supra note 534, at 26 (same).
This passage in Matthew 22:21 was the text on which the Baptist Samuel Stillman preached his
election day sermon. See STILLMAN, supra note 534, at 5.
See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 461–64 (Presbyterians), 522–25 (Baptists).
See, e.g., BRADY, supra note 643, at 136–44; BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 18, 26, 30–31,
40, 68, 176–77; PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 93–99 (2002). On the
movement for religious liberty as a struggle for equal recognition in American society, see CHRIS
BENEKE, BEYOND TOLERATION: THE RELIGIOUS ORIGINS OF AMERICAN PLURALISM 6–7, 157–
201 (2006).
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religion: that “Religion . . . can be directed only by reason and conviction, not
by force or violence.”660 Echoing Locke and other writers in this tradition, he
then explains that religious liberty is an inalienable right and that civil society
and government have no legitimate power over religion.661
On this Lockean view, religion and civil society constitute two
fundamentally different spheres. 662 The latter is devoted to promoting the
temporal interests of individuals, which includes protecting their natural and
civil rights.663 Although the state is empowered to use force for this purpose, it
may not intrude into the religious realm, within which individuals must be free
to believe and worship according to conscience.664 Civil society is concerned
with life in this world, while religion is concerned with life in the world to
come.665 The key to protecting religious liberty is to maintain a clear distinction
between these two spheres.666
The difficulty with this position, as Locke himself recognizes, is that there
is an important overlap between the religious and civil realms. Although belief
and worship clearly fall on one side of the line and matters like property on
the other, both domains are concerned with the way that individuals live their
lives, for their “Moral Actions” affect the common good as well as their
prospects for eternal salvation.667 This raises the possibility of conflict between
the two spheres. 668 From the perspective of Locke and natural religion,
however, there is no inherent tension between them. God is the source of
physical as well as spiritual life. Both realms are governed by the law of nature,
which enjoins individuals to live a “Good Life.”669 The state is responsible for
enforcing that part of natural law which obliges individuals to respect the
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Madison, Memorial, supra note 440, § 1 (quoting VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, art.
16).
See id. (“[I]n matters of Religion, no mans right is abridged by the institution of Civil Society and . .
. Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance.”).
See LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 41, at 11–12, 24.
See id. at 12.
See id. at 12–15.
See id. at 45–48.
See id. at 11–12.
Id. at 45.

See id.
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natural and civil rights of others. 670 Religion is concerned not only with
individuals’ conduct toward one another but also with their obligations toward
God. 671 All these duties are founded upon reason. 672 Thus, from the
standpoint of natural religion, there is an essential harmony between the civil
and religious spheres. So long as the state’s laws are consistent with natural
law, they also will be compatible with the rights and duties of individuals under
natural religion.
Natural law also provides a basis for resolving any conflicts that do arise
between religious exercise and civil law. On one hand, the state is bound to
use its power in conformity with the law of nature, and so it cannot legitimately
make laws that conflict with the natural right to religious freedom.673
On the other hand, this view also sets bounds to that freedom. The same
law of nature that protects the religious liberty of individuals also requires them
to use it in a manner that respects the rights of others.674 Those rights fall into
several categories. The first is religious liberty itself: individuals who assert a
right to freely practice their own religion must permit others to do likewise.675
A second category comprises other natural rights such as life, liberty, and
property. Thus, a religious ritual would not be entitled to protection if it
involved child sacrifice, for that would violate the victim’s right to life as well
as the natural law against murder.676 A third category consists of the rights that
individuals possess as citizens and that derive from the social contract or the
laws of society, such as the rights to vote and to be eligible for office. 677
Although these rights do not arise from the law of nature itself, they are entitled
to protection under that law, which forbids individuals to harm others by
violating their rights.678 In return for the benefits that individuals receive under
the social contract, they also assume certain positive duties toward the
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See id. at 12, 44–45; LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 30, bk. II, §§ 6, 131.
See LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 41, at 8, 45–48.
See supra text accompanying notes 32–42.
See LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 41, at 48–49; LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 30, bk. II,
§ 135.
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See, e.g., LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 41, at 20.
See, e.g., id. at 51; Madison, Memorial, supra note 440, § 4; MASS. CONST. of 1780, supra note 403,
pt. I, art. II.
See LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 41, at 37.
See, e.g., supra note 471 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 41, at 20.
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community, such as the obligation to pay taxes.679 Again, while these duties do
not derive from natural law itself, they nonetheless are binding under that law,
which requires individuals to keep their promises, including the ones they
make in the social contract.680 At least as a general matter, the right to religious
liberty does not exempt individuals from these duties of citizenship.681 Still less
does it exempt them from their most fundamental duty to the community—
the obligation to keep the peace by obeying the laws that are meant to protect
the basic rights of other individuals.682
In short, founding-era Americans understood religious liberty within a
broader framework established by natural law and the social contract. Within
the religious sphere, individuals are free to believe and worship according to
conscience without interference by the state. But religious liberty does not
give one a right to violate civil laws that are adopted to enforce the duties that
one owes to other people, such as the obligation to respect the natural, civil,
and religious rights of individuals and the peace of the community.
On the Lockean view, the main function of the state is to establish and
enforce laws of this sort.683 But the state also has the authority to pass positive
laws for the promotion of economic well-being and other aspects of the public
good.684 Suppose that a public welfare law of this sort requires individuals to
act in a way that conflicts with what some believe to be a positive law revealed
by God. In this case, does the right to religious liberty excuse them from their
duty to comply with the civil law?
In a Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke decisively rejects this position.
Instead, he maintains that while matters of belief and worship are reserved to
individuals and churches, civil matters are the province of the state.685 Under
the social contract, the government is empowered to make laws not only to
protect the private rights of individuals but also to promote “the Temporal
Good and outward Prosperity of the [whole] Society.”686 The government has
no authority to interfere with an individual’s own judgment in religious matters,
679
680
681
682
683
684
685
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See LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 30, bk. II, §§ 130, 140, at 353, 362.
See id. §§ 14, 195, at 276–77, 395–96.
See, e.g., LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 41, at 46–49.
See, e.g., id. at 20, 24-26, 59-60; MASS. CONST. of 1780, supra note 403, pt. I, art. II.
See LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 30, bk. II, § 131, at 353.
See id.; LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 41, at 47.
See id. at 12–16, 18, 45–49.
Id. at 47.
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but that judgment does not relieve him of the obligation to comply with “a Law
enacted in Political Matters, for the publick Good.”687
This does not mean that Locke holds that the claims of civil society
are superior to those of religion. On the contrary, he maintains that because
nothing is more important to individuals than attaining “eternal Salvation,” the
duty to follow God’s will is “the highest Obligation that lies upon Mankind.”688
Thus, “Obedience is due in the first place to God, and afterwards to the
Laws.”689 But people’s lives in this world are also given by God, who ordained
civil society and government for their preservation and well-being.690 It lies with
government to determine what laws should be made for these purposes.
These laws are binding on all: as Locke observes in another context, it is a
fundamental principle that “No Man in Civil Society can be exempted from
the Laws of it.”691 If one truly believes that a law conflicts with God’s will, one
should follow one’s conscience and refuse to obey the law; but at the same
time one must be willing to accept the legal consequences.692 Both the religious
and the civil realms ultimately derive from God’s will, and so one cannot
properly invoke one’s religious convictions to override one’s civil obligations.
Instead, the laws should apply equally to all individuals without regard to their
spiritual beliefs or the motives for their conduct.693 For example, if people may
lawfully slaughter calves, they must be permitted to sacrifice them for religious
purposes.694 But if the public good requires a moratorium on the killing of
livestock which have been decimated by a plague, the belief that one has a
religious duty to perform a sacrifice does not entitle one to an exemption.695
In this way, Locke makes a powerful case against a right to religious
exemptions from civil laws. It is difficult to find any general, theoretical
statement on the other side. As I have indicated, Madison’s Memorial does
not constitute such a statement.696 The passage that we examined simply argues
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that government has no jurisdiction over religion because free exercise is an
inalienable right, and it does so on the basis of the same premises (for
example, that one’s highest obligation is to obey God) that appear in the
writings of Locke and other writers who clearly reject a right to religious
exemption.697
Yet whether or not the Lockean position was convincing in theory, there
were situations in which religious minorities made claims that many foundingera Americans found appealing. The clearest example is the demand by
Quakers and other pacifists for exemption from the duty of citizens to serve
in the militia—an issue that led to spirited debate during this period.

C. The Congressional Debates over Religious Exemption from Militia Duty
1. The Debate over the Bill of Rights
The Quakers and other sects had a strong religious commitment to
pacifism.698 During the ratification debates, three state conventions urged that
the Constitution be amended to provide “[t]hat any person religiously
scrupulous of bearing arms ought to be exempted, upon payment of an
equivalent to employ another to bear arms in his stead.” 699 These proposals
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As we have seen, for example, Madison’s argument echoes one found in the Essay on Toleration by
the dissenting minister Philip Furneaux. See supra note 445. In another work, Furneaux explains
that while the Protestant dissenters believe that one must “obey God rather than men,” Acts 5:29,
there is nothing in this sentiment, in the smallest degree, inconsistent with civil obedience:
“rendering unto God the things which are God’s,” is no objection to “rendering unto Caesar
the things which are Caesar’s.” The Dissenters are so far from setting up the supposed
interests of religion . . . against lawful magistracy, or the peace and good order of society,
that they allow the exemption of none from the authority of the civil magistrate; holding all
to be equally under his jurisdiction; and that no plea of a sacred character, or of religion and
conscience, is to be admitted in bar to his procedure, in matters of a criminal, or merely
civil nature.
FURNEAUX, LETTERS, supra note 169, Letter VII, at 211 (quoting Matthew 22:21).
See, e.g., F ROST, supra note 393, at 29–43, 62–69.
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 571, at 19 (Virginia); THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS,
supra note 582, § 4.1.2.5, at 182 (North Carolina); 1 ELLIOT, supra note 572, at 335 (Rhode Island).
The Maryland minority proposed a similar amendment. See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS,
supra note 582, § 4.1.2.1, at 181. For an insightful discussion of the debates over whether to include
such a provision in the Bill of Rights, see Victor Philip Muñoz, The Original Meaning of the Free
Exercise Clause: The Evidence from the First Congress , 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1083, 1109-19
(2008).
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resembled the protections found in five state constitutions. 700 Madison
incorporated such a provision in his draft of what became the Second
Amendment.701 As reported by the House select committee, that amendment
read: “A well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, being the
best security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall
not be infringed; but no person religiously scrupulous shall be compelled to
bear arms.”702
During the House debates, Elias Boudinot of New Jersey supported the
proposed exemption on the ground that there could be no “justice . . . in
compelling [individuals] to bear arms, when, if they are honest men they would
rather die than use them.”703 Some of his colleagues responded that it would
be unjust to require some members of the community to defend others unless
the latter were obliged to pay an equivalent. 704 Other representatives
contended that the issue of religious exemptions should be left to the
legislature.705 As Egbert Benson of New York put it, “No man can claim this
indulgence of right. It may be a religious persuasion, but it is no natural right,
and therefore ought to be left to the discretion of the Government.”706 The
House narrowly rejected a motion to strike out the religious exemption
clause,707 but amended it to provide that conscientious objectors should not be
compelled to bear arms “in person,” thereby giving the legislature the option
of requiring them to pay an equivalent.708 In the end, however, the religious
exemption clause was rejected by the Senate and did not become part of the
Bill of Rights.709
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See Muñoz, supra note 699, at 1110 n. 140 (citing constitutions of Delaware, Pennsylvania, New
Hampshire, New York, and Vermont).
See CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 571, at 12 (providing that “no person religiously
scrupulous of bearing arms, shall be compelled to render military service in person”).
Id. at 182.
Id. at 198–99.
See, e.g., id. at 183 (remarks of Rep. Jackson).
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2. The Debate over the Militia Bill of 1790-91
During the winter of 1790-91, the First Congress took up a bill to organize
the militia. In a rich debate that has attracted little attention in the free exercise
literature, the House once again struggled with the problem of conscientious
objection to militia service.710
On December 22, 1790, Madison proposed that the bill exempt “persons
conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms.” 711 In an eloquent speech, he
declared that it was “the glory of this country, the boast of the revolution, and
the pride of the present constitution, that here the rights of mankind are
known and established” more fully than ever before.712 This was especially
true of “the rights of conscience.”713 Even if the rights involved were less clear,
the Quakers had shown themselves to be “deserving of [this] high privilege”
because they had long generously extended religious liberty to everyone within
their own settlements in Pennsylvania and elsewhere.714 Finally, as a practical
matter, Congress could not force the Quakers to fight, and so it should “make
a virtue of this necessity, and grant the exemption.”715 As for whether they
should be required to pay money instead, Madison’s own view was that the
exemption should be granted “on terms perfectly gratuitous,” if this could be
done “with justice to the other sects in the community, or if the other sects
were willing to withdraw their plea for an equivalent.”716
Madison’s proposal drew strong criticism from several of his colleagues,
including James Jackson of Georgia, William B. Giles of Virginia, Michael J.
Stone of Maryland, William L. Smith of South Carolina, and Thomas Scott
of Pennsylvania. They argued that under the social contract every individual
was entitled to protection by the community and in return owed a duty to aid
710
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The fullest account of these debates may be found in the Pennsylvania Packet, and Daily Advertiser
in December 1790 [hereinafter Pennsylvania Packet] and its successor newspaper, Dunlap’s Am.
Daily Advertiser in early January 1791 [hereinafter Dunlap’s]. Madison’s contributions are
reproduced in his collected papers. See infra notes 711, 730–31.
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in the common defense.717 The burdens of this effort should be borne by all
alike.718 One of the “glories of the American revolution [was] that all religions
were put on a level.” 719 It would be unjust, or even unconstitutional, to
discriminate in favor of particular groups based on their religious beliefs. 720
Moreover, if the government began to draw such distinctions, there would be
no logical stopping point; for instance, individuals who objected to militia
service might also balk at paying taxes for military purposes.721
The most interesting response to these arguments came from Boudinot,
who maintained that when Americans entered into a new “social compact”
during the Revolution, they had embraced the Quakers with full knowledge of
their pacifist beliefs and without insisting that they perform military service. 722
In this way Americans had implicitly “established the principle, that [the
Quakers] should be taken into our society with all their privileges and rights
as men; among which were acknowledged the rights of conscience.”723 It would
be wrong to break “this tacit engagement” by denying them “an indulgence,
which they have been in the habit of receiving, and which custom has rendered
in some degree sacred to them.”724
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See, e.g., Pennsylvania Packet, supra note 710 (Dec. 28, 1790) (remarks of Rep. Jackson on Dec.
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Protection, Liberty, and the Fourteenth Amendment , 41 DUKE L.J. 507 (1991).
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23, 1790); Dunlap’s, supra note 710 (Jan. 7, 1791) (remarks of Rep. Stone on Dec. 24, 1790).
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Despite these differing views, there also were important points of
agreement. On one side, the critics of exemptions recognized that actually
compelling pacifists to bear arms would impact their rights of conscience and
did not insist that this should be done.725 As Scott put it, although “every man
owes equal duties to the community,” it was not “necessary, that every man
should discharge that debt in the same manner.”726 Instead, money could be
accepted in lieu of personal service.727 On the other side, Madison and his
allies recognized that a purely gratuitous exemption might be considered
unjust to other sects.728 At one point, a consensus appeared to be emerging
that the bill should exempt pacifists who paid an equivalent.729 On December
23, Madison introduced a new amendment to that effect. 730 Ultimately,
however, compromise proved impossible to reach, and that amendment was
voted down 39 to 10.731

3. Conclusion
The defeat of Madison’s amendment should not be taken to show
overwhelming congressional opposition to the idea of conscientious
exemption from military service, for many members were concerned with
such issues as how the amendment was drafted,732 how the government could
screen out fraudulent claims for exemption,733 and whether militia regulation
simply should be left to the states.734 The fact remains, however, that during
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the militia-bill debates Madison and his allies were unable to persuade a
majority to endorse such an exemption even in principle. The same is true of
the debates over what became the Second Amendment.735
Remarkably, in neither of these disputes did anyone suggest that the Free
Exercise Clause itself would require such an exemption.736 As we have seen,
the legislative history of that Clause contains no persuasive evidence that it was
understood to mandate religious exemptions from generally applicable laws.737
Nor during this period can one find general theoretical arguments that the
right to religious liberty requires such exemptions.738 On the contrary, leading
writers like Locke, Furneaux, and Leland clearly repudiated this position.739

D. Some Implications for Contemporary Free Exercise Doctrine
1. Religious Exemptions from Public Welfare Laws
For these reasons, it cannot be convincingly demonstrated that the original
understanding of the Free Exercise Clause points toward a constitutional rule
that mandates religious exemptions to religiously neutral laws. As a nonoriginalist, I do not believe that this should necessarily preclude the Supreme
Court from adopting such a rule today.740 Reasonable arguments can be, and
have been, made on both sides as to whether the government should be
required to meet some form of heightened review before it can apply a general
public welfare law in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the
practice of a minority religion, as the peyote ban did in Employment Division
v. Smith.741 Although the history does not show that founding-era Americans
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See STEVEN J. HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH AND HUMAN DIGNITY 223 n.54 (2008).
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such a rule, see BRADY, supra note 643; McConnell, supra note 6. For some opposing arguments,
see MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD V. THE GAVEL (rev. 2d ed. 2014); Marshall, supra note 15.
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understood the Free Exercise Clause to mandate exemptions, it does show
that many people were sensitive to the impact that general laws of this sort
could have on the rights of conscience.742 This history provides a modicum of
support for a rule that would subject such laws to heightened scrutiny, but it
provides no more than that. More clearly, it indicates that at this time
Americans believed that it was sometimes appropriate for laws or constitutions
to grant exemptions under particular circumstances, as several states did for
conscientious objection to militia service.743

2. Clashes Between Religious Liberty and Civil Rights
By contrast, the history we have explored sheds considerable light on the
problem of conflicts between religious liberty and civil rights. In this section,
I first discuss how this history can help us think about cases like Masterpiece
Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 744 in which weddingrelated businesses with religious objections to same-sex marriage contend that
they are entitled to exemptions from state civil rights laws that require them to
serve same-sex couples on the same terms as opposite-sex couples.745 I then
briefly discuss the implications of this history for the case that is before the
Court this Term, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia.746
One of the clearest teachings of the natural rights/natural religion tradition
is that religious liberty may not be used in a way that violates the civil rights of
others.747 The category of civil rights comprises (1) the natural rights for the

742
743

744
745

746
747

See supra Part VI.C.
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Controversy over Religious Liberty, Civil Rights, and Same-Sex Marriage, 14 F IRST AMEND. L. REV.
1, 100–24 (2015) [hereinafter Heyman, Same-Sex Marriage]. In some cases, the providers also
contend that the law violates the Free Speech Clause by compelling them to engage in expression.
See, e.g., Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1723, 1726. I do not address that argument here but limit my
discussion to the religious liberty question.
104 S. Ct. 1104 (Feb. 24, 2020) (No. 19-123), granting cert. to 922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019).
See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 95-100, 670 (Locke), 222 (Hutcheson), 242 (Price), 254
(Witherspoon); supra note 417 (Maryland Constitution of 1776). Remarkably, McConnell himself
recognizes that this was the accepted view during the founding era. See McConnell, supra note 6, at
1464 (acknowledging that religious liberty gave “a believer . . . no license to invade the private rights
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protection of which individuals enter civil society and (2) the positive benefits
they receive as members of society.748 Because they are equal by nature and
enter society on equal terms, individuals are entitled to equality in civil rights.749
Among the most important of these rights is the ability to participate in the
economic life of the society.750 To bar individuals from equal participation in
this economic life is wrongful. And it is even more wrongful when it is based
on a notion that they are inherently inferior, for this treats them as though they
are not full and equal persons and members of the community.751

748

749
750

751

of others or to disturb public peace and order, no matter how conscientious the belief or how trivial
the private right on the other side”).
See, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 142, bk. I, ch. 1, at 125 (describing civil
rights as consisting of “either that residuum . . . of natural liberty, which is not required by the laws
of society to be sacrificed to public convenience; or else those civil privileges, which society hath
engaged to provide, in lieu of the natural liberties so given up by individuals”). As Jefferson and
Furneaux make clear, the positive benefits include eligibility to hold positions of public trust. See
supra note 471 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Madison, Memorial, supra note 440, § 4.
See LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 30, bk. II, § 130, at 353 (explaining that, by entering civil
society, individuals come to enjoy many benefits “from the labour, assistance, and society of others
in the same Community”).
See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 311 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring). To avoid any
misunderstanding, I should make clear that I am not suggesting that religiously motivated refusals to
provide wedding-related services to same-sex couples reflect the same sort of hostility that
characterizes racial discrimination. On the contrary, such refusals may be based on moral and
religious views that are held in good faith. As I have argued at length elsewhere, however, even if an
act does not reflect subjective animus toward other persons, it nonetheless may treat them as
inherently inferior if as an objective matter it is premised on the view that they lack the moral capacity
to engage in an activity of fundamental human importance. Wedding-service providers who refuse
for religious reasons to serve same-sex couples do so on the ground that, under the law of God, the
individuals involved are not capable of engaging in the fundamental human activity of marrying (in
the only way that accords with their sexual orientation). See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions About
the Defense of Marriage, U.S. CONF. OF CATH. BISHOPS (Sept. 9, 2015),
http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/marriage-and-family/marriage/promotion-and-defense-ofmarriage/frequently-asked-questions-on-defense-of-marriage.cfm
[http://perma.cc/SJ6M-XTSK]
(answer to question “Is marriage a basic human right?”) (“Relationships between two persons of the
same sex are not, and can never be, marriages.”). In this respect, even though the providers may
have no subjective animus toward those individuals, they do treat them as objectively inferior in a
vital respect. See Heyman, Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 745, at 64–68, 102–10.
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For reasons like these, American law has long held that enterprises that
offer to serve the public should be regarded as public accommodations. 752
Such enterprises must serve everyone on equal terms and may not
discriminate on invidious grounds. After the Civil War, many states adopted
civil rights laws that prohibited racial discrimination in public
accommodations.753 Over time, those laws have expanded to include many
other forms of discrimination, from religion and gender to veteran and marital
status. 754 In recent years, twenty-five states as well as many localities have
banned discrimination based on sexual orientation.755 These provisions are
rooted in the same view that animates Supreme Court decisions like Romer
v. Evans,756 Lawrence v. Texas,757 and Obergefell v. Hodges,758 which affirm that
LGBTQ people have the same inherent rights to freedom, equality, and
dignity that all human beings are entitled to.759
The implications of this discussion for the wedding-service cases are clear.
States are fully justified in adopting civil rights laws that bar public
accommodations from discriminating based on sexual orientation. The
founding-era history teaches that the right to religious liberty does not
authorize one to violate the civil rights of others. It follows that those who
operate public accommodations generally have no right to religious
exemptions from laws that require them to serve everyone without regard to
sexual orientation.760

752

753
754

755

756
757
758
759
760

On the history and theory of this right, see generally Heyman, Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 745,
at 79–89; Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private
Property, 90 N W. U.L. REV. 1283 (1996).
See Singer, supra note 752, at 1357–67, 1374–83.
See Lisa Gabrielle Lerman & Annette K. Sanderson, Note, Discrimination in Access to Public
Places: A Survey of State and Federal Public Accommodations Laws , 7 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 215, 260–72 (1978).
See State Public Accommodation Laws, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-public-accommodation-laws.aspx
[https://perma.cc/E3QF-89T4].
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
See, e.g., id. at 2593, 2599–605, 2608.
For discussion of some appropriate exceptions to this general rule, see Heyman, Same-Sex
Marriage, supra note 745, at 110, 112–17.
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An important caveat is in order. Although I have argued that weddingservice providers generally are not entitled to demand a religious exemption,
that does not necessarily mean that the government may not grant one. For
instance, a legislature may consider whether to provide certain exemptions as
a matter of prudence (say, to avoid a backlash against same-sex marriage by
giving the public time to become used to it) or for the sake of compromise
(say, by granting religious traditionalists certain exemptions in return for their
support for adding sexual orientation protections to a civil rights law that
currently lacks them761). Exemptions of this sort may be acceptable insofar as
they advance the ultimate goal of ensuring equality for all. But while such
practical considerations may be taken into account by legislatures, courts
should be governed by principle when they interpret the Constitution.
In Masterpiece, the Court articulated an approach that resembles the one
suggested here. Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy declared that “[o]ur
society has come to the recognition that gay persons and gay couples cannot
be treated as social outcasts or as inferior in dignity and worth.”762 States act
on this principle when they require public accommodations to serve everyone
without regard to sexual orientation.763 Although “religious and philosophical
objections” may be protected by the First Amendment, “it is a general rule
that such objections do not allow business owners and other actors in the
economy and in society to deny protected persons equal access to goods and
services under a neutral and generally applicable public accommodations
law.”764 Kennedy left open the possibility that some providers, such as bakers
who create custom cakes with religious symbols, might be entitled to a free
exercise exemption.765 But he cautioned that any such exemption
would have to be sufficiently constrained, lest all purveyors of goods
and services who object to gay marriages for moral and religious
761
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See id. at 123–24 (discussing recent compromise on housing and employment discrimination in
Utah).
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727 (2018).
See id. at 1728.
Id. at 1727 (citations omitted). Kennedy’s opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Gorsuch. See id. at 1722. The principles just quoted were also
endorsed by the dissent, see id. at 1748 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Sotomayor, J., dissenting), and so
would appear to represent the views of at least eight Justices then on the Court.
See id. at 1723–24, 1728.
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reasons in effect be allowed to put up signs saying “no goods or services
will be sold if they will be used for gay marriages,” something that
would impose a serious stigma on gay persons.766
The conflict between civil rights and religious liberty is once again before
the Supreme Court in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia.767 In that case, the city
contracted with private organizations to certify individuals and couples to serve
as foster parents. 768 After Catholic Social Services (CSS) stated that for
religious reasons it would not consider same-sex couples for this role, the city
terminated its contract with the organization for noncompliance with the city’s
nondiscrimination policy.769 CSS’s free exercise challenge to that decision was
rejected by the district court770 as well as by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit.771 The Supreme Court heard argument in this case in
November 2020, with a decision expected later this Term.772
The view that I have outlined suggests a way of approaching the problem
presented in cases like Fulton. The concept of civil rights includes equal
access to the benefits that society provides its members, including eligibility to
hold positions of authority or service within the community.773 Thus, when the
government establishes a foster-care program, it should not bar otherwise
qualified couples from serving as foster parents based on traits like race,
gender, religion, or sexual orientation. This principle clearly would apply if
the government itself undertook to certify foster parents. By the same token,
when the government contracts with private organizations to perform this
function, it may insist that they comply with the same nondiscrimination
requirements that would apply to the government itself. The right to religious
liberty does not entitle organizations to demand an exemption from such
766
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769
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Id. at 1728–29. The Court ultimately ruled for the baker, however, on the narrow ground that the
state civil rights commission had failed to consider his case in the atmosphere of religious neutrality
that the Free Exercise Clause demands. See id. at 1729–32.
922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 1104 (Feb. 24, 2020) (No. 19-123).
See id. at 147–48.
See id. at 148–51.
Fulton v. City of Phila., 320 F. Supp. 3d 661, 691 (E.D. Pa. 2018).
Fulton, 922 F.3d at 160.
For the briefs and a transcript of oral argument, see Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/fulton-v-city-of-philadelphiapennsylvania/ (last visited November 13, 2020).
See supra text accompanying note 677, 748–49.
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requirements, which are adopted to protect the civil rights of prospective foster
parents. Surely this is the position we would take if an organization refused to
certify interracial couples for this role, and it is difficult to see why a different
rule should apply in cases involving same-sex couples. Again, there may be
circumstances in which a government reasonably could choose to grant an
exemption to religious organizations—say, if there were plenty of other groups
who were willing to work with same-sex couples and an exemption would
benefit the foster-care system as a whole.774 But the history we have explored
counsels against interpreting the Free Exercise Clause to allow the right to
religious liberty to trump the civil rights of other members of the community.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have argued that the eighteenth-century American
conception of religious liberty was deeply informed by the concepts of natural
religion, natural law, and natural rights. In its widely accepted form, natural
religion did not refer to a particular belief system that stood in contrast to other
systems like traditional Christianity. Instead, natural religion offered an
account of the nature of religion.775 Religion was rooted in the relationship
between God and the rational beings he had created. In the words of the
Virginia Declaration of Rights, this relationship could be based only on
“reason and conviction,” and so individuals had an inalienable right to form
and express their own beliefs and to worship and act in accord with them.776
This broad view was endorsed by a wide range of people from Deists like
Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin, to rationalist Christians like
Jonathan Mayhew and James Maury, to Evangelicals like John Leland and
Isaac Backus. It was incorporated in key documents such as the state
declarations of rights, Jefferson’s Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom,
Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance, Evangelical petitions against the
Assessment Bill, and the religious liberty proposals that emerged from the
state ratifying conventions—documents that in turn provide great insight into
the ideas that underlie the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.
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Cf. supra text accompanying note 761 (discussing potential exceptions to public accommodations
laws).
See BYRNE, supra note 15.
VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, art. 16.
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In addition to explicating the nature of religion and the justification for
religious liberty, natural religion offered an account of the most fundamental
substantive principles of religion. According to this account, reason taught that
human beings were created by God and had a duty to worship and obey him.
God’s will could be found in what the Declaration of Independence called
“the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God”777—laws that established the inherent
rights of individuals and the duties they owed one another. This view of the
principles of natural religion held a central place in many fields of eighteenthcentury thought including political theory, natural jurisprudence, AngloAmerican law, moral philosophy, natural science, and Radical Whig ideology.
In this way, natural religion and its associated ideas profoundly shaped the
worldview of Americans during the founding era. Within this general view
there were marked differences. Deists like Jefferson believed that religion
should be based on reason alone. By contrast, most Americans followed
Locke in holding that both reason and revelation were essential and that they
provided complementary means of discerning God’s will. This position
allowed the idea of natural religion to be widely held in a country in which
most inhabitants were Christians, and it enabled that concept to establish
common ground between different denominations of Christians as well as
between Christians and non-Christians.
At the same time that it illuminates the intellectual world of eighteenthcentury Americans, our exploration of this history underscores the great
distance that lies between their world and our own. Natural religion found
support in the leading scientific and philosophical views of founding period.
After the rise of Darwinian evolutionary theory and other modern scientific
developments, it is no longer widely accepted that human beings can rely on
reason alone to establish the existence of God or the moral laws of nature.
Instead, as Charles Taylor has written, we now “live in a secular age” in which
the status of religious beliefs is far more controversial.778
It follows that the ideas about religion that flourished during the founding
era cannot be applied in any straightforward way today. Instead, the question
of whether and how those ideas can be translated to our own context is one
that calls for much careful consideration. Of course, this is not the place to
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DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 372.
CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR A GE 1 (2007).

January 2021]

ORIGINS OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE

123

embark upon such an inquiry. But some present-day lessons do emerge from
the history we have explored. First, the Free Exercise Clause was primarily
based not on an Evangelical commitment to the promotion of Christianity but
on the idea that all human beings should be free to use their own minds in
religious matters. This is the light in which it should be understood.
Second, the history sheds some valuable light on our current debates over
exemptions. It is difficult to find any eighteenth-century support for a general
principle that religious believers have a right to exemption from civil laws.
However, there was at least one context—military service—in which many
people found a claim to religious exemption sympathetic. In view of this
history, it is an open question whether the Supreme Court should adopt a rule
applying some form of heightened scrutiny to laws like the one at issue in
Employment Division v. Smith—a law that imposed a substantial burden on a
group’s religious practice merely to promote the state’s view of public welfare.
But civil rights laws present a very different issue. One of the clearest lessons
that emerge from the history is that the right to religious liberty does not
authorize conduct that violates the civil rights of other people. This suggests
that the Masterpiece Court was right when it articulated a general approach
along these lines. It is in this way that we can best realize the founders’ vision
of a society in which all of the “rights of mankind” are fully protected.779
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Jefferson Bill, supra note 469; Madison, Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 610, at 24.
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